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24/167 12/13/66

Crime Commission
Office Memorandum
December 13, 1966
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

WIRETAPPING
Since the November meeting of the Co:mmission, I haT1e
reviewed more carefully the record of the hearings before (i)
the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate in
1962, entitled

11

Wiretapping- the Attorney General's Program 11

(referred to bel ow as "1962 hearings"); and (ii) the

Subcom~

mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Conunittee of the Judiciary
in 1961, entitled "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation"
(referred to below as the "1961 hearings").
Scope of this Memorandum
There have been other hearings on this subject which
I have not examined.

I am

informed ~

ho-v;;ever ~ that the evidence

at the 1961 and 1962 hearings is c omprehensive as to

wiretapping~

and I know of no significant new evidence.
Acco rdingly~

this memorandum r.vill be limited to those

hearings, and for the most part will be confined to selected
verbatim excerpts of the testimony by proponents of the Department of Justice 0 s position wi t h respect to wiretapping.

As

this testimony related primarily to wiretapping, ( and not to

2.
other means of electronic surveillance), this memorandum will
likewise be so limited.*
There

was~

in addition to testimony supporting wire-

tapping, a substantial number of witnesses who opposed it in
any form and under any conditions.**

Some of these (like Edward

Bennett Williams) make eloquent arguments against it.

But my

reading of the testimony satisfies me that the concern expressed
by opponents is supported neither by experience nor empirical
data.

The overwhelming weight of hard facts is to the contrary.
The excerpts quoted below are severe.ly limited and

selective in the interest of conserving space.

I have not

attempted to present a complete picture of the views of any
witnesses.

It can be said, in general, that each witness

emphasized the importance of safeguards and limitations, and
most witnesses favored prior court orders rather than permitting
wiretapping upon the authority of law enforcement officials.
There was widespread agreement that all unauthorized wire ·a.pping should be forbidden with appropriate sanctions.

It wa.,

agreed by many of these witnesses that court-controlled
*My view is that the principles involved apply generally to
s9-called "bugging" as well as to wiretapping.
**The adverse testimony is not included in this memo.

3.
wiretapping, with all other wire surveillance proscribed, would
afford greater protection to the r ight of privacy of innocent
citizens than either the present chaotic situation or an abs olute
ban against all wiretapping.
The Importance of Wiretap Evidence
The 1962 hearings were upon the "Attorney

ene:ralvs

reconnnendation for legis l ation i n r egard to wi :retapping' \

namely,

S. 2813 and similar bills pending before the .Judi c i ary Committee.
Set forth below are excerpts fr om the test i nnny of soMe of t:he
witnesses favoring the Department of Just i ce
Attorney General Kennedy (1 962

Hearings~

pp .

legisla t ion~

11~46 )

The Attorney General was the first witness in the
1962 hearings.

His testimony covere d 35 pages: .

as to the need, he

In test i fying

said~

"A new law (permitting wiretapping) is urgently
needed • • • to prosecute more effec ·iv ly
certain major crimes." (p . 11 )

***

*'

" . • • organized criminal syndicates engaged in
racke teering act ivit i es involving millions of
illicit dollars do a major pa:rt of their business
over 'the network of telephones in the Un i ted

I'

4.
States'. The very fact that the telephone exists
has made law enforcement more difficult. It permits criminals to conspire and carry out t heir
activities without ever getting together , and
therefore, without giving the police the oppor =
tunity to use other techniques of investigation."
(p

0

12)

****
"I1 can name three areas now , Senator , where
we have very strong information, onein the South ,
one in the East and one in t he West , where maj or
political leaders and figures in those communities
are being corrupted , and are on the payroll of
some of our bigtime gangsters and racketeers , and
we cannot do anything about it.
"Now, if legislation like this is passed , we
could move in on these areas.
"This would give us a very s t rong weapon.
"I think we could make a major inroad in the
bigtime gangsters and racketeers and hoodlums in
the United States, if we had the help and assistance of this kind of legislation.
"I think we could make a big step f orward in
the field of bringing to justice by prosecut ion
those involved in espionage and treason in t he
United States." (p. 28 )

****
"Organized crime . . • is much stronger now than
it was 20 years ago. It is much more powerful
in the United States economically and politically
than when Senator Kefauver made his investigation
10 years ago • • • • And it is growing." (p. 28)

'

.
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"Senator Keating. You are aware that there
have been a number of major gambling and narcotics
cases in New York which have had to be dismissed,
and there are hundreds of other cases pending in
New York which cannot be prosecuted because of
this present wiretapping muddle?
"Attorney General Kennedy. I am aware of
that, and I am also aware that the problem in New
York, which is potentially so serious, has been
kept reasonably under control, largely because of
the fact that Mr. Hogan, Mr. Silver, and the other
district attorneys as well as the police have been
permitted to use wiretapping in a limited fashion.
"Many of their biggest cases, I ·w ould think
almost a majority of the major cases in the New
York City area, where this is a particular prob~
lem, have come to fruition because of wiretapping.
"If wiretapping did not exist and it is not
permitted, I think that the situation in New York
is going to get even more serious than it is at
the present time~ and even drastic."
Francis Biddle, former Attorney General* (1962 hearings, pp.
289-303)
"Wiretapping is not only useful in most criminal
cases but indispensable in covering what is
loosely called organized crime." (p. 291)

****
*At the time of his testimony, Mr. Biddle was Chairman of the
National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union. He
noted that the Union°s view is different from his own.
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"At present in the area of organized crime, law
enforcement is crippled because interceptions
are forbidden.
. 11 (p. 292)
In speaking of the harm done to juveniles by "drug
peddling", Mr. Biddle said:
"When it comes to a choice between protecting
schoolchildren from narcotics and protecting
the public who use public telephones from
having their conversations occasionally over=
heard by law enforcement officials~ I prefer
to protect the children." (p. 292)
In speaking about the British and Canadian experience,
Mr. Biddle

said~

"The British and, I believe~ the Canadian
governments permit wiretaps • . • • The British
public is as insistent on protecting individual
rights as we are, perhaps even more so . • • .
Yet, . • • they give their officials great power,
and if these powers are misused they demand
appropriate action.
"I once asked my friend~ the late Lord
who was the English alternate at the
Nuremberg trial where I was the American member~ and who had been the leading barrister in
his day and a very active criminal lawyer, who
was later on the court of appeals, whether wiretapping by the police was permitted. He answered
that, of course it was, nobody had questioned
the impropriety of wiretapping. 11 (p. 295)
Birkett~

In reply to a question whether specific cases were
lost by the Department of Justice when Mr. Biddle was Attorney
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General because of the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence,
Mr. Biddle

replied~

"I think there probably were three or four, as
many as three or four cases which were lost as
a result ~ maybe more = but I am almost certain
that one would find three, four, five cases
that we lost as a result of the inadmissibility
of wiretapping. Judith Coplon was an outstanding
example. That was an espionage case, as I remember.
"Senator Hruska. General Biddle, Frank
Hogan, and Mr . Silver both testified that they
had to dismiss literally hundreds of cases
because of inadmissibility of wiretap evidence.
"Mr. Biddle. I was only speaking of the
cases in my career." (p. 299)
Mr. Biddle in defending tapping even of public
phones testified as

tele~

follows ~

"Now, that is balanced against the
desirability of people having their phones
tapped who have to use public telephones, and
one reason we have got to tap them is that the
crook, of course~ knows that his telephone wi.ll
be tapped~ so he uses t he public phone. But I
don ut - just to me it is inc once ivable with the
two values. Democracy is after a ll the balance
of values.
"Now, to me it is inconc eivable that the
value of peopleus privacy being interfered with
and public telephones is comparable to our
protection against this vicious and constantly
growing and corrupt organization that is getting
into the lower grades and children are caught
in the narcotic thing with peddlers around the
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schools, in the athletics of young boys, in
taking examinations. That never occurred surely
20, 25 years ago. The thing is spreading. It
has brought new fields to conquer and I feel
very strongly about it." (p. 300)
Mr. Biddle concluded his testimony by stating that
"freedom and democracy" are endangered when "the government
and your police (are not given) . . . enough power to cope
with their problems." (p. 302)
Judge Ferdinand Pecora

(1962 Hearing, p. 303-310)*

"Of course wiretapping is dirty business. Any
invasion of oneus privacy of itself is dirty
business. Gentlemen, I donut think anybody will
deny that crime is a much dirtier business. The
advantages that professional criminals obtain
over enforcement officers through the use of the
telephone in planning their conspiracies and in
consummating their crimes are tremendous. These
advantages in keeping ahead of the law cannot,
in my opinion~ be overcome except by giving law
enforcement authorities the right~ under judicial
supervision, to tap private telephone wires where,
upon affidavit~ it is shown that there is probable
cause to believe that the tapping of the wire will
yield evidences, either of preparation for the
commission of crime~ or of its actual commission.

*Judge Pecora served as a member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and on the Supreme Court of New York for many years,
resigning in 1950 to run for Mayor of New York as the candidate
of the Democratic and Liberal Parties.

'

.

"To permit those who cynically flout the
law, to use the telephone to enable them to
accomplish their criminal purposes, and to pre~
vent the law enforcement authorities from making
use of the same fa cil ity to apprehend the wrongdoers , is as unreasonable as to limit our enforcement authorities to using the automobile to ov ertake criminals who use the jet plane as a means
of escape." (p. 308 )
"I think our judic iary can be depended upon
not to issue such orders i mp r ovidently . nor to
grant them without probable cause." (He then
went on to testify as to the restraint exercised
in New York in the use of wiretapping). (p . 308)
Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney New York County (1962
Hearing, pp. 172=194)
"Telephonic interception, pursuant to cour t
order, is the single most valuable weapon
in law enforcement 0 s fight against organized
crime." (p. 173)

****
"The judicially supervised system under
which we operate has worked. It has served
efficiently to protect the rights, liberties,
property and general welfare of the law·=abiding
members of our community. It has permitted us
to undertake major investigations of organized
crime. Wi t hout it, and I confine myself to top
figures of the underworld , my own office could
not have convicted Charles 0 Lucky 0 Luc iano,
Jimmy Hines, Louis 0 Lepke 0 Buchalter~ Jacob
0
Gurrah 0 Shapiro, Joseph gS ocks 0 Lanza, George
0
Scalise ~ Frank Erickson, John °Dio Dioguardi,
and Frank Carbo. Joseph 0 Adonis 0 Doto, was tried
in New Jersey, was convicted and deported on

9.
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evidence supplied by our office and obtained
by assiduously following leads secured through
wiretapping.
"Over the years committees, commissions and
individuals have investigated intensively our
use of this constitutionally authorized priv ilege .
There has been no evidence produced that law enforcement officials have abused the privilege .
Quite the contrary. There is agreement tha t we
hav e used this investigative weapon fairly ,
sparingly , and with the most selective dis crimination.
"But, for several years now, we have been
deprived of the opportunity to investigate
organized crime. We have been paralyzed by the
uncertainty and confusion generated by judicial
decisions." (p. 173 , 174)
In speaking of the limitation on the use of wiretap
evidence imposed by the Benanti decision in

1957 ~

and the

resulting confusion , Mr. Hogan said :
"An imperative need exis ts to dispel this confusion . We in local law en forcement need
clarification and we n eed it badly . " (p . 174)
The Attorney General's bill (S . 2813), as t hen intro duced, would permit interc ep t ion by state law only in t he
crimes of

11

murder, kidnapping , extortion, bribery or dealing

with narcotic drugs or marijuana . "

Mr. Hogan strongly urged

addition of at least two other categories, namely, "larceny,
where the telephone is an essential instrument of crime , and
gambling" .

"Wiretap evidence is probably the indispensable

11.
weapon in any attempt to deal with fake charity racketeers who
operate multiphone boiler rooms • • • We have a great number of
such cases and continue to get them." (p. 176)

"Syndicated gambling enterprises, although
widespread and likely to be interstate, are
based upon operations that are essentially
local • • • • Wiretaps enabled us to break up
an intricate conspiracy involving a ring of
crooked policy operators . . . they were
gangsters, not just gamblers." (p. 176).
"Gambling of this size is big business and
interception of telephone calls was the only
way we could reach this three-state mob."
(p. 176)
In commenting upon testimony to the effect that wiretapping really isnvt needed by law enforcement, Mr. Hogan said:
"I am always amazed to read testimony
from alleged experts to the effect that wire~
tapping is of little or no value to law en ~
forcement. Our files in New York County are
loaded with evidence which should satisfy the
most skeptical of critics." (p. 178)
Mr. Hogan then went on to say that "without wiretaps,
we never could have convicted" a number of notorious gangsters
and racketeers whom he named. (p. 178, 179).
"Wiretaps have been invaluable in exposing
racketeering in certain union welfare funds . "

12 .
In testifying as to the effect of the Benanti
decision in New York, Mr. Hogan quo ted his earlier testimony
as follows :
"Under present conditions ~ law enforcement
in New York is virtually crippled in the area
of organized crime o Cases, the disposition of
which would contribute materially to the welfare
of our communi ty~ will have to be dismissed for
lack of prosecution, because we are unable to
use evidence obtained through court-ordered
interceptions * * *
"In addition to cases, there are a number
of major investigations that we are now con~
ducting that will collapse due to the restrictions
presently placed on the use of intercepted
information -.'e ')'(: *" (ppo 178, 179)
Mro Hogan then testified that his earlier prediction
as to being forced to dismiss cases had proved to be "no idle
prediction" :
"Not only have investigations collap sed ~ but
we have been obliged to dismiss a number of
cases because of our inability to divulge the
contents of court=ordered wiretaps." (p. 179)
In speaking of the dismissal of seven defendants
characterized by Mr. Hogan as "major figures in the importation and sale of heroin . ", he

said ~

"Without the us e of wiretaps in the courtroom,
their guilt could not be established. The most
diligent police work could not duplicate the
evidence that we had obtained through the use
of interceptions (authorized under New York law
but inadmissible under t he cloud of Benanti ) ."
(p. 179)

13.
Anthony P. Savarese, Jr., Chairman New York Joint Legislative
Committee on Privacy of Communications (1962 Hearings, pp.
78-83)
Mr. Savarese was introduced by Senator Keating as
an expert in the field, having chaired the New York Wiretap
Committee as well as the Joint Committee on Privacy of the
New York State Legislature.
ment of Justice bill as

Mr. Savarese endorsed the Depart-

follows ~

"As chairman of New Yorkns Joint Legis~
lative Committee on Privacy of Communications,
I have often had occasion in recent years to
assert, as emphatically as possible, the urgent
need for Congress to enact legislation such as
you have before you today. Only 11 months ago
I appeared before Senator Ervinvs subcommittee
in support of Senator Keating's eavesdropping
bill. I then went into some detail on the
disastrous effect o.f the Supreme Court's Benanti
decision and the need of correcting it. I
believe such discuss ion may be unnecessary today.
The distinguished sponsorship of the present
bill suggests that this committee may be more
interested in its specific effectiveness than
in the necessity of it. So I shall limit this
discussion to two points .
"This bill accepts the principle adopte.d
by New York in its constitutional amendment of
1938, that wiretapping may be used, by law
enforcement officers , on reasonable grounds,
under the authority of a court order. That was
the first substantial control on this virtually
universal polic e practice, but of course New
York did not invent the procedure. That stems
directly from the fourth amendment in our Bill

0

14.

•

of Rights. Certainly in the 18th century unreasonable search and seizure were just as dirty
business as wiretapping has been called in our
modern times. But the libertarians who framed
the fourth amendment were practical men who
recognized that the security of the home must
sometimes yield to the necessities of public
security and they provided that warran~s might
issue. That is what this bill does in modern
times and I commend it. 11 (p. 79)
Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Assis tant Attorney General in Charge
of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice , (1961 Hearings,
pp. 351-372)
Mr. Miller stated that he was expressing "the views
of the Department of Justice on legislation currently the
(namely ~

subject of these hearings 11

several bills authorizing

wiretapping pursuant to court order, bu t forbidding it otherwise).

(p. 351)
After recognizing

bar "perhaps no single issue

generates more emotional outbursts and stronger views than
wiretapping", Mr. Miller said:
"I deem it of utmost importance that legis~
lation be enacted authorizing interception and
disclosure of telephone conversat i ons ~.dth
strict and enforceable safeguards ~ pro~ection
the normal rights of privacy." (p. 352)

****
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" . . . It is a strange anomaly which allows
spies and professional criminals to profit
from science by carrying on espionage and
racketeering through conversations which would
be impossible without modern communications,
while it forbids the Government, even after
proof of probable cause , to obtain and use evidence ... and bring them to justice." (p. 353)
In supporting the need for clarifying the right of
states to wiretap (in addition to a federal statute), Mr. Miller
said:
"The existing state of inconsistency and confusion is intolerable in the case of State law
enforcement officials. I believe that inter~
state communications should be protected against
interception and disclosure by State police and
investigators no less than Federal officials,
but that the State authorities have equal need
for, a procedure by which exceptions can be
made in special cases.
"Insofar as S. 1495 would permit wiretapping
by State officials , the bill lists certain crimes
in the solution of which tapping would be permissible. Because of the varying State statutes,
the problems of definition , and the delicate relationship between the Federal and State Governments, it is believed that there would be substantial enforcement problems in connection with
that portion of S. 1495 which permits wiretapping
by State officials only for certain enumerated
crimes. It is the position of the Department of
Justice that S. 1086 is preferable, insofar as it
allows a State to authorize wiretapping for whatever crimes it desires, thus leaving the States
their traditional area of law enforcement subject
only to the very important safeguard that wiretapping must be accomplished pursuant to a court
order and upon a showing of probable cause." (p.
357)

16.
Frank O'Connor, District Attorney of Queens County, New York
(1961 Hearings, pp. 327-334)
In supporting the right of law enforcement towiretap, Mr. O'Connor emphasized the "intolerable" situation in
New York resulting from court decisions interpreting §605 of
the Federal Communications Act.

He said:

"We have many, many prosecutions that are
pending right now in which we have devoted not
only days, but weeks and months, and I think
frankly we have in many cases done years of
investigation where we have presented the fruits
of our investigation to a grand jury, where we
have received valid indictments. Those indictments have been sustained against attack on
motions to dismiss and now, because of the
wiretap situation, we are uncertain as to the
legality of the prosecution. For example, in
the county of Monroe where the city of Rochester
is located, the district attorney recently dis~
missed 22 cases pending on his criminal calendar
because the evidence in those cases had been
gathered through wiretaps.
"Mr. Silver has in excess of 200 cases
pending in the county of Kings. I have at least
10 to 15 pending in Queens, and Frank Hogan will
testify tomorrow to the number he has pending
in New York County, in which part, at least, of
the evidence was uncovered through legal wiretaps.
"Now, these are the cases involving serious
crime. I donwt subscribe to the tendency in some
quarters to sweep under the rug cases involving
gambling. I feel very strongly that gambling is
a very integral part of organized crime.
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"These cases involve not only gambling: they
involve in my county, for example, criminal abortion. It is my opinion ·we will never be able to
prosecute cases involving this crime without
assistance of wiretapping.
"If we are to slough these cases off and
not prosecute them because we canat secure the
necessary evidence, I think it is going to put
a dent in the moral fabric of our community."
"We have a situation here where we are con~
cerned on the one side with the rights of individuals as opposed to the rights of society. I
think there is a danger in any choice, but the
test should be this. The protection for i.ndi~·
vidual rights cannot be disproportionate to the
loss of protection for our society." (p. 327,
328)
Goodman A. Sarachan, Chairman, Commission of Investigation,
New York, New York (1961 Hearings, pp. 334-340)
The New York Commission of Investigation, chaired by
Mr. Sarachan, was described as a "crime commission".
"For more than 20 years, law enforcement
officers of New York State availed themselves
of the benefits of wiretapping laws under the
careful scrutiny of State courts. However, the
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court as we know,
in Benanti v. United States and other Federal
court rulings have crea ed a serious situation
in law enforcement in my State as District
Attorneys Silver and OaConnor have told you."
(p. 335)
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"Hundreds of cases - many of them very serious
cases - are awaiting action by Congress to
amend the Federal Communications Act and to
bring to an end this intolerable situation."
(p. 336)

****
"Not to be permitted to procure wiretap
evidence under the careful restrictions of our
State laws would undoubtedly greatly hamper the
effectiveness of our work." (p. 336)
Mr. Sarachan reported on public hearings conducted by
the New York Commission in 1960.

He said "all witnesses" stressed

that'under present conditions, the protection of our citizens,
especially in the field of organized crime and public corruption,
is being seriously curtailed . • • " (p. 336)
He emphasized that "law enforcement officials must
have the right to intercept telephone messages, with proper
judicial restraints sufficient to safeguard personal

liberties~

if they are to cope with the leaders of organized crime." (p.
336)
No Evidence of Abuse of Private

Right~

There is deep and understandable concern that legalized
wiretapping would not be confined to criminals but would
vade the privacy of innocent persons.

But it must be

in~

remem~

bered that no one is suggesting uncontrolled wiretapping.

'

.
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Indeed, the type of legislation under consideration would
significantly minimize - rather than enlarge
private rights through wire interceptions.

=

the abuse of

This expectation

is confirmed by the nearly 30 years of experience in New York
State.
Francis

Biddle~

"There is no responsible evidence against the
succe.ssfu1 operation of taps" and there is
"very responsible evidence" to the contrary.
(1962 Hearings, pp. 299-300)
The evidence as to the experience in New York "does
not show abuse by the District Attorney or by the police". (p.

291).
Judge Ferdinand

Pe co ra~

In testifying as to his own experience with wiretap
orders on the bench i.n New York from 1938 to 1950, Judge
Pecora described the proce.dure and the care wi.th which the law
was administered.

He

sai.d~

"These orders were not signed by

the Justices of the Supreme Court in any haphazard way or as
a matter of form. • • • I think there i.s very definite assurance
that the District Attorney does not lightly go into court
seeking permission to tap private telephone wires."

'

20.

.

After saying that the Attorney Generalus bill (then
before the Committee) provided appropriate "safeguards against
an abuse of the rights," Judge Pecora

said ~

"I don't think that orders permitting such
wiretaps would be made the subject of abuse
anymore than has been through the century
and a half of the history of our courts the
issuing of search warrants. I think our
judiciary can be depended upon not to issue
such orders improvidently, nor to grantthem
without probable cause.
• 'Ihey haven't
done it in the State of New York ~ where permission for wiretapping has existed under
constitutional authority since 1938. 11 (1962
Hearings, p. 308)
Frank S. Hogan
In his testimony in 1961 and again in 1962, Mr. Hogan
documented the extent to which wiretapping had actually been
used in his office.

He

testified ~

"Over the years committees, commissions and
individuals have investigated intensively our
use of this constitutionally authorized
privilege. There has been no evidence pro-~
duced that law enforcement officials have
abused the privilege. Quite the contrary,
there is agreement that we have used this in~
vestigative weapon fairly, sparingly, and with
the most selective discrimination." (1962
Hearings, p. 173)

****

'

.
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"The Chairman of that New York State Legislative Commission , after two years of digging,
stated in writing as a conclusion that no
single abuse could be attributed to a law
enforcement officer in New York State."
(1962 Hearings , p . 188 )
Frank OiConnor :
"We have never received a complaint f r om a
civilian t hat private rights have been in ~
vaded by illegal wiretapping. If there was
anything like the number of illegal wiretaps
banded around in t his r oom yesterday, we
certainly would have received many ~ many
complaints. 11
"Senator
complaint?"
"Mr.

Keating ~

o u connor~

You have never had a

No." (1961 Hearing , p.

329)

There appears t o be. no fac tual evidenc e !>-contradicting
the testimony that the right to wir etap in New York , pursuant
~

to court order, has Abeen abused .

There is a good deal of general

testimony , with t he usual hypothetical cases ( as to bedroom
conversations, talks between lawyer and client , etc.), but I
have seen no evidence to support the view that court controlled
surveillance would in fact abuse privat e righ s in any significant
way.

22.

Perhaps the leading attempt to prove the contrary has
been made by Samuel Dash, a Philadelphia lawyer who has published
a good deal of undocumented argument against wiretapping.

For-

mer Attorney General Biddle, also a Philadelphia lawyer,
characterized Mr. Dash 0 s writing as follows:
"I don't think Dash 0 s evidence means a thing;
I think it is so loose, it is all guesswork. 11
(1962 Hearings~ p. 299)
Position of the Bar Association in New York
No exhaustive examination has been made of the
tions taken by the bar associations in New York.

posi~

I have,

how~

ever, examined the testimony in the 1961 and 1962 Judiciary
Committee hearings , as well as several of the reports of the
various committees.

In

summary~

and although there has been

vigorous dissent , I believe it is fair to say that the New
York State Bar Association) the New York County Lawyers Association (through its Board of Directors), and the Federal Legislation Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York all have favored legislation permitting wiretapping,
subject to court order and appropriate safeguards."/(
*The views of the organized bar in New York seem particularly
relevant as that state has had the greatest experience with
this problem.

23.
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. testifying as Chairman of
the Committee on Civil Rights of the New York County Lawyers
Association, supported Attorney General Kennedy ' s bill in 1962.

Mr. Seymour made the point that civil rights would be "much
better protected" by the enactment of this type of legislation
than "if no wiretapping should be permitted."

He

said ~

"Yet, speaking for our own committees , our
zeal in protecting those civil rights has taken ,
I think, the proper practical turn of viewing
that civil rights will be much better protected
by the enactment of legislation such as that
which is being considered than by taking a
head-in-sand approach that no wiretapping should
be permitted. We think, in fact, that that
approach has, in part , contributed to the
general state of confusion which we think is
actually injuring civil rights in our own community and possibly at large in others."
(1962 Hearings, p. 362)
The New York County Lawyers Association report on
the Attorney General 0 s

bill~

"We are concious of the duty of the bar
to guard the civil rights of all citizens as
zealously as possible. We are persuaded , however, that a workable and enforceable wiretapping law which permits limited interception
under rigid controls, and attaches strong
sanctions against unauthorized interception ,
will tend in the long run to provide a more
genuine protection to civil rights generally
than a continuation of the present situation

24.

of confusion and unenforceability. "~\'
Hearings, p. 419)
Edwin L.

Ga~erini,

(1962

Chairman of the Committee on

Federal Legislation of the Asso ciation of the Bar of the City
of New York, presented the report of his committee in support
of Attorney General Kennedy 0 s bill (S. 2813).
In reviewing policy considerations, and after
acknowledging the ant ipathy to the concept of wiretapping, the
Committee spoke out in favor of the "civil rightsu of the "victims"
of criminals
The report

~

a point of view which seems rarely to be expressed.

stated ~
11

But we believe that we must also recognize
the dangers of unchecked crime. The victims of
criminals are, in a very real sense , deprived of
civil rights. Law enforcement is not simply an
affair between the criminal and the police.
Government owes its citizens a duty to possess
and exercise the power to enforce the laws.
The less effective are the operations of our
law enforcement agenci es ~ the more we all tend
to become the victims of crime. 11 (19 62 Hear ings ,
p 331)
0

*Mr. Seymour testifi.ed tha there was a sharp division in his
Committee on Civil Rights~ with the report being approved by a
margin of only one vote. He testified, however , that the report
was "subsequently adopted by the Cmmn.it· ee on Federal Legislation
and approved by our Bard of Di re~tors. That means that our
report has run the gamut of at least 93 committee members, and
under our by=laws the Board of Directors can speak for our
membership of 10,000." (1962 Hearings~ p. 362)

25.
The final conclusion of the Committee was stated as
follows ~

"Our review of S. 2813 convinces us that
it is a well=drafted bill, that it removes the
anomalies and ambiguities of the present law~
that its general approach to the problem is
sound in banning all private wiretapping and
permitting carefully delimi ted wiretapping
for purposes of law enforcement and national
security and that Congress should enact legislation closely approximating this bill . "
(1962 Hearings~ p. 337)
The Commit .ee on Legislation of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York again considered wiretapping
in its 1966 report on the McClellan bill (S. 2189 ).

The Com-

mit tee reaffirmed "its previous position that wiretapping should
be permitted under adequate safeguards and in limited situations."
See Vol. 5 , Bulletin No. 2 of the Ass oc iation of the Bar of the
City of New York, June 1966.*

*The Committee on Bill of Righ s of the As sociation of the Bar
of the City of New York~ als o by a divided vote~ has consistently
opposed wiretapping. See 1962~ Hearings, p. 348. It appears
from the 1962 hearings ~ however~ that Mr. Gasperini was autho~
rized to submit the report of his Committee on Federal Legislation as representing "the views of the Associat i on. "
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The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill
(S. 917) to assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence
of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of
law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute,
and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

AMENDMENT
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in. lieu thereof
the following:
That this Act may be cited as the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of1967".
TITLE I-LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
DECLARATIONS AND PURPOSE

Congress finds that the high incidence of crime in the United States threatens
the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. To prevent
crime and to insure the greater safety of the people, law enforcement efforts must
be better coordinated, intensified, and made more effective at all levels of government.
Congress finds further that crime is essentially a local problem that must be
dealt with by State and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively.
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4 R. K. Merton 'The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory,' B.J.S. 8, 1957,
192.
o 1949 S.L.T. (News) 153.
6 Contributors to the Advocates' Widows Fund (i.e. all those who have been admitted whatever their preesnt function) numbered 283 in 1966. Of these 19 appear
to live overseas and 20 in England (including 5 members of the Lord Advocate's
staff in London). 57 advocates live outside Edinburgh (of whom the great majority
are Sheriffs or full time law teachers). Of 58 Sheriffs-substitute 51 are advocates and
7 solicitors (whose profession in Scotland numbers about 3.000). Approximately
100 judges of all grades in office and retired (from House of Lords to Sheriff Court)
are members of the Faculty. There are approximately 130 members of the Faculty
living in Edinburgh of whom some 110 are in practice.
7 Even so Faculty patronage has been criticised recently, from outside the group
-see correspondence 'Scotsman' 11th and 18th August, 1967.

FOOTNOTES

in Edinburgh. If they are 'exiled' to Sheriffdoms they make regular visits 'home,' are kept in touch with all news by the Dean's
yearly letter and often retire to Edinburgh and are once more
fully absorbed in the community. If they continue in practice
they can be seen in their daily progress up the Mound to 'P.H.'
Retiring from law practice in the United States has been frequently described as a terrible crisis for the individual. He is
completely cut off from all occupation in his life's work. This is
not true in Scotland. In the solicitor's practice old partners are
kept on, even if they no longer do a full day's work or control as
much of the office business as before. This pattern is even more
obvious in the case of the advocate. He remains, as far as his physical powers permit, a full member of the professional and social
community from his call to the Bar until his death and there is
a full complement of his brethren at his obsequies.
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matter, not in law. To have woven together the varied strands of
privacy into a coherent literate and substantial book is a genuine
feat. Mr. Westin has given us our first book on privacy.
Moreover, Mr. Westin has pursued his topic with indefatigable
energy and with a most catholic taste and has brought together,
in a well organized form, the widest range of references to privacy.
He has provided the indispensable book for any one who wishes
to reflect on privacy in the contemporary world.
There is the intriguing question of the genre to which the book
belongs. It appears at a time when the law world has its first tastes
of a literature of empirical inquiry-a new kind of law book. Yet
while it deals with a topic relevant to law and its 400 pages are
occupied primarily with data other than cases or statutes, Westin's
study does readily fit with Skolnick's study of the police, Carlin's
study of the bar, Rosenberg's study of pre-trial, Conard's study
of auto accidents or our own study of the American jury. It discusses law, it has a view about the possible role of law here, but
it is somehow not a law book. Westin borrows with ease from
sociology, anthropology, electronics, political theory, opinion
polls, yesterdays headlines, Congressional hearings, Supreme
Court decisions. The mix is an effective one and the book among
other things offers a model for broadly based discussion of public
issues. It is worth noting, too, that the book appears to have
achieved something of a popular success, an unusual thing for a
serious, non-sensational study.
Privacy and Freedom is an achievement also of the organized
bar. The book is the direct fruit of the work of the notable special
committee on science and law of The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, headed by Oscar Ruebhausen, which began its
inquiries in 1959. It is a special tribute to the bar that its committee gave such durable, enthusiastic, and thoughtful support to
the venture.
Mr. Westin's book is serious and substantial enough to merit
the compliment of criticism. I have three points on which the
book leaves me troubled and less enthusiastic. I should preface
them by saying that I have learned that reactions to privacy are

!86
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2 It is worth noting that, although he reviews the law on it briefly, Mr. Westin
does not treat as a case study the problems of the press and privacy which gave rise
to the classic Warren and Brandeis article and the tort of invasion of privacy.

roughly 135 pages or about one-third of the book. It is the other
two-thirds, however, that pose the problem for the book, and,
I suggest, for the topic. T~ey are devoted to a report on the new
technologies of electronic surveillance, psychological surveli:.,
lance, and computer collation of data and then to five case studies _,
of recent public controversies over privacy. The controversies
stem from use of the new technolo , and include: wiretaps and
~ tra mo em vanants, polygraphs, personality tests, subliminal stimuli, and computersalla d--at"
s.
every erms used tell their own story. They are the polysyllables from the world of science. In centering on these items
Westin is arguing his major thesis: the technology of science has
suddenly in the past decade vastly augmented man's power to invade man's privacy and has upset the balance between privacy and
disclosure. The theme has an exciting ring. Science has brought
us closer to 1984 than the calendar would indicate.
The material is fascinating and I cannot but be grateful to Mr.
Westin for collecting it. I am left, however, with a difficulty that
neither Mr. Westin nor our seminar solved for me. I take it Mr.
Westin has given us an authoritative inventory of where the problems of privacy are in our society today. 2 If, for the sake of argument, we put to one side for the moment the familiar problem of
wire-tapping and its modern progeny, we are left as the core concerns with the computer, the subliminal stimulus, the polygraph,
and the personality test. My difficulty is twofold: I am somewhat
puzzled as to the grievance in each instance, and moreover insofar as there is a grievance I have difficulty in seeing its connection
to what I would have understood as privacy. To be as blunt as
possible, I am not fully persuaded that these core problems are
serious problems and I am less persuaded that they concern privacy. The upshot is that there is a gap which Westin cannot close
between the fascinating psychological and anthropological nuances of privacy which occupy the first part of the book and the
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'""fhr themselveiJ. :t:,am celi'tatil · lt is· ~e engager . ~ ~tl:)l · an one kti 111 ¢ the I•Howev,i;~ ,
·
ne here is in
,' ··' proper and correct .. interpretation: ()t ~ wireW..:PPtng. title dh the ·. f)'n . ~from
ep n with.the 5Pirit of permitting the .~;
1
1
those cases, and ,th!il concl'Qsions I nay.e Al:ka.nsa.S?· •.· ··~ . .
: l:. t ~ f .
re,s
sue ac on as e eems 7'
'
c;irawn are proper. f
•
• :· ,
... ·
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. Pre
· I ask
.
en
s
" Drawing from those cases, I do,.not feel una.nirnou.s ,consent, without · los.tng. my _thre~~ttene~..I {lannot flnd any bugger in
r·
· it wise pubHc policy to le~~tve 8o critical right to th~ :t1po11, that ,j;he qistinguished ~he woodpile from looking at it. myself.
an issue at!,. the discretioJ::l! C?f the courts, . Se.na11JQ:I:' frQm :Michigan JMr. HARTl may
Mr. HART. l,V[r. President, &orne people
•,,
paJ:ticularly as they are·.ex parte proceed- ~ve 5 minutes in which to explain the can take oomfol,'t, 1 · j;hl,nk, in the lan1ngs. .r'" ,
. . •. . ·
· ;. maroter he wishes to diiscl.l,tSs .~:t:l4 nq<~; i:o):· · gua:ge ,of &ection 2511 <3' >, and esp~ially
' M:r. President' 'We a~e dealing,if.n a new pair my time.
.
..
, ' ' the s.tatement that the. President is in~
field here, and ~ur right to do so, under
The PRESIDING OFFICER' The sen- dee<l J,imited by: t¥ Constitution in his
;r ::. title 'Til, c-omes from· amendment Four. ato? will not lose the floor. 'I'ne Seriator· exercise of the national security power.
·oA the qqn~titution, i~ · whicl;l a. man·.s ·from lv1icbiga~ has yiel~ed t,Q' l;li~ t~e ~ ~s why!' think i~ might be useful to
home · is rendered inviolate: unlesa there right Wspeals',. " > , · · ·
· ,,
' . have this exchange. :, ·-.'
is probable cause as to ;whr it should be
Mr.. HART, Mr. President, I tlUtnk th!'l:,,, (~Ve~, p.oti~e that-, tlqe; ~cltal runs this
·
, , · ·searched or "bugged.'~ , '· , .. ·,
· Senator from lllinois verY much,
· way: · ,
" '·'· 1 • :
, .'In a search and seizure under the
Mr. President, I inyite attenttQn to ' Nothlng contatne<t
thls chapter ...
. fourth am,enctment, . we have one day, . page 56. of the bill. 6efer to soot;!n}i1iaH shaH be iieemed' ~1:9 · ltmtt the constitutional
usually. There is a; specific time, and (3~ As l read lt, this is a,n exemption power <>f tlle President .to do whatever he
there is a specific place., In a few min- .~SU!le thlat nothing in the re:;;triction :WE!<Ut!l ln the area Of l:>ugg!ng against any
utes, in an hour~ or' probably; at xnost 1n on wiretapping shall lin).it the President •ot)ler clear and. present dang~r to the struc2 hou~ •.the search is over. / 1
•
in oerta.i,n area.s !).nd under cerj;ain cQn- ··, ture,~ , !lxls~!!noe ~~tile ?ove'i ment.
But here we . have' ah . Instrument 'ot· ditions. What does it sayi! ,
. ·
,
If w~ agree ~at th~ :President does not
surveillance: whereby .we · tap the man's:, It says that nothing. in this . ~hapter- or have constitutional p.ower to put a tap
wire or we pug his home for a 30-day in the bill shall limit the constitutional on an orga;nizatio~ _tbat ~advocating the
period', and then we can reapply !or·an- power of the President to :ta~e ,,such withholding of in-come tax payments-to
other 30.~day period, and tl;len · for still' measures a.s he deems necessary to pro- cite a current, though as yet a small
another 30-day pe:ti.<;>d. ·... ,
tee~ the '(!n~ted States against tlae. ove.r~
movement;-I wowd feeL more at ease.
1
Mr. President, this 1&, altogether un- throw of the Government by force or But if, in fact, we are here saying that
reasonable and m-uch ,too l'?ng a time. I . other l.lnlawfql means.
....... . . , . , . ·s o long a.s.. the President thinks it Is an ·
think cutting down, ~ 3& days to 7 days,
I.t then goes on to say that noth,lng in ~ylty that 4>nstitutes !il clear and pres.,.. ·
and the~ forcing the< ~rosecutor to go the . bill sball limit fhe power of the nt c;ia,nger tOth~ stlfuc,tUre or xisten Jl'.
d see tfie' judge; after 7 days, and ex- President to take such measures M he o
can ut a
1!ain why he needs e:nother 7 days, is deems ;necessary· to protect the United
ou restraint. then clear y I think
r more reasonable. . ')1 ;l~ , · · '· ·
· ·
States-and this is w,hat botheril me- ~ gmng u -~·
I am 'c ertain the su,pretne Cotrrt would "agains~- other clear ant;l.J:!tesent , . The PRESID~CER. The time
gree with thi$, as ,I jirew upon Berger danger t:il'"tlfu: structure or existence Ol'""allotted to the Senato;r from Michigan
nd Ka't:a in drawing up my amendment. tne Government."
.
. ,
has expired.
,.,.
.·
.
·
·I yield back the tem~.inder of my time.. , ~What 1& .it . that woUld constitute ·a,,
Mr. McCLELI.J\N'!.M:E'President, i ask
' Mr. MaCLELLAN. ·l yield back ·t he re- · clear and present danger to · the struc- unanimous cdnsenti 'that the Senator
mainderofrny time. ··
ture or existence of the Government? As 'from Michiga;n,have'ri.n addit1onal5 IPinThe' 'P RESIDING OFFICER. All · time t read lt-:--and thls is my fear-we are utes without being chl!lrged any time.
having beetJ. yielded back, the question ~ saying, that tp.e President, on his motion,
·The PRESIDlNG OFFICER. Without ·
on agree1pg tQ the ,a.Imlndment of the . could declare--:-name your favo~l't!l poi~ . objection, it 1s so order~d . . ·
.
·I,
~enator !rom Hawaii,~ ·. 'f ,
,.
, ~!-draft do.igers, Black Muslims, the , Mi' ' HOLLAND ·wfu. tb. Senator yield?
~~~ tb~~d:e=ri~Ji::.e~res1dent~ ;aclelil~~fdorp~~~~~g~:l=~~~~~~ Mr: HART. t yi~ld; ..., "
1n :view of• the Sena;te's · act~on on titles structme or emt:mrc~ ~ tlle Uovetn- .
nand In of this bill. I have had to con~ r:Ueni:::
·
. .
· . .
sider carefully what position to · take on =rrth$t 1s the case, · section 2511(3)
the blll as a whole. 'In ,my opinion both ' grants unll.nlited tapping ·and .bugging
ti~les axe clOO.rly ·~ unoonstit1,1tional. authority' tO the President. 'And that
Further•. neither y;ill ~ve any real effect. means there will be bugg!ng in areas
on reducj,ng ::;~eet cnme and it is doubt- that do not come.' within pur ,traditional
ful that either will have a.ny real effect notions of nationa' secm]_tv;•.__ ~ ·. .
on reducing organized crime. New ¥ork~g of that a fair one? Is
permitted court wiretapping for a quarter my concern a valid one? If it 1s why
of a century priortothe Berger case, but do we not agree to ' k.nock out the last
a look at the c_rime situation in New Y<;>rk claust:?
. ,,
proves that'\Ylref.apping is not a solution
Mr. McCLELLAN;' Mr. :President. this
and iJt is not even a very ·effective tool.
language i~ la.nguage that was approved
Despite t~tles ll a.nd . III, however, I and, in fact. drafted by the administrafeel it vital tbat act~on. be taken on title tion, the Justice Department. I have not
I which does hold <;>UJ'. ho~ for helping challenged it. I was perfeotly. willing to
solve our serious CIJme problem. There- reoogmze tb.e wwer of the President in
fore, I support final passage.
this area. If he felt there was an l)rgani.It is m¥ hope that·. Jn the conference zation-whetbe·r black, wh1te, or mixed.
W1i'h th~ Rouse t~t titles n and III will whatever the name and uqder whatever
be e:Hmmated, If tb,ey a.re not ~d they .¥!tuSp1Ces-tnat was plottmg to overthrow
should become law the severability clause the Government, I would. think we would
. wil~ save titles I and IV when the courts . want lrtm to ha•e this xight.
strike down titl~ n and III rela~ve to --wHat sucfi an amendment would do ·
oonfessions a.nd elootromc snoopmg.
wowd be to circumscribe the powers we
715
AMENDMENT No,
. think the President has under the ConMr. D;m..KSEN. Mr. President, I call stitution. As :tar as I am concerned, I
up my amendment No. 715.
·'
Mr. HART. ' Mr. Presd.den:t, would the
SeJlaltor from nlinois be!O•r e calling Up his
amendment--which would con:trol our
time-pennit me a couple of minutes to
0
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a ~nstitutiona,l
c'Oul~. -

power. Clearly we_
Mr. McCLELLAN. Even though intenrtea: weoouiQnof do so~
Mr. HART. l'J. f~;'/ QiiUS a~e I ii6B..-$reEl waet;heF we t:ROYsat t.fteti "'e ft6fte
gull!@

thele£s 69'1118 Eie BBl'ftetaiag aeettt

~e

Ce!lilti4i'l1ties. However, we are agreed
thaJt this language should not be regard...V ed as intending to gl'al'lt any authority,
""'f'-..1ncluding authority to put a bug on,
that the ·President does not have now.
In addition, Mr. President, as I think
• our exchange ·makes clear, nothing in
section 2511<3) even ,attempts to define
the 11mits of the President's national secunty power under present law, which
I"'"fuive a:Iways found extremely vague,
especially in domestic security threats,

\J

· -as oppgseQ. to tareeta ft ern f&Pei8'fl: ~~·
81'&. -Aa I
Mm& ef

Peoall, ht bhe teeenfi Ka.te eeee,
t.fte JtitJMoee ef lihe Stt1$tellre
Cwpt Elel!Sted- t.ft!M;:Jibe::: ~1Ment ~

=~

:.t:;;:·~,~

naUeAa:l: se~J.!t{J'

Qa&&ll

~~v't a ~

~ ~zweaeg;;;!tttz!·

As~hl8-eni0

it<~~ exercise ~~ way a1f=

tiUe III.

bi

e,

ttm now sttre ne PFes!aeat tlli~ t.hat
jU&it eeeaase some J'('Ji!tteal mevemem in

--this cou.t>tl=3' is @'i>1ng him f,lts he ael:lld
-!'E6d this as an a&""emen6 fpem.~a t;.flet;by ids 8'WR m~iteR, Re gm,Jd P,'t a t'Ail ~ft.
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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

i:fo)..e.c.p.

Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing
or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral
Communications
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled:
This report is submitted in accordance with the provisions
of Section 2519(3) of Title 18 , United States Code, which
require that in April of each year the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts transmit to the
Congress a full and complete report concerning the number of
applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception
of wire or oral communications and the number of orders and
extensions granted or denied during the preceding calendar year,
together with a summary and analysis of the data required by
law to be filed with the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts by Federal and State Judges and by prosecuting
officials of Federal, State and Local Governments.
This is the

~econd

report submitted under the Wiretapping

and Electronic Surveillance provisions of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was
approved on June 19, 1968 (82 Stat. 218).

This report thus

covers the period from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969.
The first report was submitted to the Congress on April 30, 1969
and covered the period June 20, 1968 to December 31, 1968.

..

I.

Reporting Requirements of the Statute

In general the new law requires every State and Federal
Judge to file a written report with the Director of the
~

Administrative Office of the United States Courts on each
application made to him in accordance with the provisions of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518, for an order
authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication.
The report is to be furnished within 30 days

'~fter

the expira-

tion of an order (or each extension thereof) entered under
Section 2518, or the denial of an order . . . "and must contain
certain detailed information including the name of the applicant,
offense specified in the application, and the duration of the
authorized intercept.
•

Prosecuting officials who have authorized applications
for intercept orders are required to file reports in January of
each year setting forth various information concerning the
communications that were actually intercepted, the cost of the
intercepts in regard to the use of manpower and other resources,
and the results of the intercepts in terms of arrests, trials,
convictions and the number of motions to suppress the use of
the intercepts.

- 2 -

'

II.

.

Regulations

Regulations, including reporting forms, were first
promulgated by the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts in November 1968,

They were revised

in December 1969 to require prosecuting officials to indicate
definitely the number of days on which listening devices were
actually in operation and to indicate more clearly the type
of intercept (whether a wiretap device or a microphone).

The

revised regulations also clarified the elements of cost to be
used in computing overall costs.

The regulations were widely

distributed and a copy was sent to every prosecuting official
who made an application during 1969, as disclosed from reports
filed by judges.

The letter of transmittal and the revised

regulations appear in Appendix A.
III.

Response to the Regulations

The statute requires that orders by state judges approving
applications for orders authorizing communication intercepts
by state officials may be made only by judges of courts of
competent jurisdiction and that applications can be made only
by a prosecuting attorney, "if such attorney is authorized,
------~---

-

----.,

by a statute of that State to make application to a State court
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judge of competent jurisdiction."

The reports filed during

calendar year 1969 indicate that only a few states have laws
authorizing courts to issue orders permitting wiretapping
or eavesdropping , although the number has increased.

For

the first time reports have been received from judges and
prosecutors in the States of Colorado, Florida, Maryland,
New Jersey and Rhode Island.

IY.

Summary of Reports by Judges

In the twelve month period ending December 31, 1969
there were 304 applications for intercept orders made to
State and Federal judges, resulting in {302 separate authorization
orders.

Two applications were denied, including one denial by

a Federal judge in Nevada and one by a State judge in New York.
Of the 302 applications granted, 33 were signed by Federal
judges and 269 were signed by State judges.

The State judges

in the State of New York signed 191 authorization orders, which
was 71 percent of all orders signed by State judges.
The 304 applications filed during 12 months of 1969 compare
with 174 applications filed during approximately six months of
1968.

Thus, proportionately, there were fewer applications made

per month in 1969 than there were made during the 1968 reporting
-

4 -

period.

This occurred even though 34 applications were

made to Federal judges in 1969 and none was made during 1968 .
Table 1 summarizes the number of intercepts authorized ,
by each reporting jurisdiction, the number of extensions
granted and the average length of the authorization and
extensions and the facilities from which or the place where
the intercepts were to occur.

The Table also shows the total

number of days and hours intercepts were in actual operation
in the respective reporting jurisdictions.
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Total

Jurisdiction

1

1
4
36
2
1
1

.)1
\/

10

4
1

2

2

No

No
No
No

1

report
report
report

4
35

report

10
5

1
1

.1

2

5

-

30

B

1
7

271

302

1

j

none

4
1

none

1

none

1

-

none

11

194

Number
Number of
of exintercepts
Autllor neil iTnstaiied" tensions

Period January

\

30

30
29

1
5

30

30

9
1

-

20

-

30

-

This information wa

""'

20
10

30

30

30

22
14

@

Extension
26

authorization

lenll:th (in days)
Or1ginal
Avera~~:e

*Baeed upon the actual number of intercept devices installed.

Providence ••••••••

Rhode Island

Essex County ••••••
Mercer •••••••••••
Middlesex, ••••••••
Saaerset ••••••••••
Union············

Hudson ............

New Jersey

Baltimore County ••
Prince George's Co.

Maryland

Fulton County •••••
Henry County ••••••

Georgia

Broward County ••••

Florida

Denver County •••••

Colorado

Maricopa County •••
Pima County •••••••

~

Federal ••••••••••••

~
Reporting

·vr

u

r(J'<nte~ept 0~

.y ~/~//0.N
'
·?·~~~,., !- ,'Jfl:t ~~- "/;
~.~
/~f!~?//#4
0
~ ,_fb'~,o"'',/".v;~\)"' - x-/

11

18
2

11

18
2
4
6
17
1

6
13
1

No report

5
1
4
3
3

No repor t

none

2
22

6
3
4

none

2

none

none

4

-

25
20

23
23

30

20

-

-

20

22

23
20
26

Extension

(in days)

'?O~

Thi s i nformation was

28
20
30

20
30
25
23
27
26
26
20

23

86
49

*Based upon the actual number of in t ercept dev ices instal l ed .
**Not reported .

Wes t chester • . . . . . .
Ulster .. . . . . . . . . . .

Suffolk ••• • •••••••

Or a nge .••.••.••••.
Rockland •.. • ...•..

Onondaga ...........

Clinton ..•••••••••
Col umb i a ...•• • •...
Dutch ess • •••• • ••..
Erie . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nass a u ••••••••• • ••
Oneida ••••••••••••

Cayuga ••••••••••••

25
23
24
10
14
19

23
19
18

3
5
1
4
4
3

51

Queens County •.•••

Other New Yor k Count ie s

23
19
19

Kings Oooo''·
County ••.
"'"'"
····• .•·l
NeW York County •• •

(New Yor k City)

New Yor k

Reporting
Juri sdiction

Intercept Orders Iss
Period January 1, 1969 t

A.

Grants, Denials and Authorized Length of Intercepts:

The 304 applications made to judges , as noted above, resulted
in two denials for permission to intercept - one Federal and
one in Nassau County, New York.
for extensions were denied.

In addition, two applications

The length of time authorized for

conducting an intercept varied from a few hours to 30 days .
A similar variation occurred in regard to extensions .

Except

for intercepts where no conversations were heard, the actual
period of operation varied from three hour s to 220 days.
Of the 271 applications which resulted in an intercept
250 involved a telephone wiretap.

Fifteen intercepts used a

listening device such as a microphone.

In six requests both

a telephone wiretap and a microphone were used for the interception.
B.

Offenses:

The offenses specified in the applications

for court orders covered a wide range from abortion to usury .
Several applications specified two or more crimes that were
being investigated.

However, there were five broad categories

of crime predominately listed in the applications.

--

They were

Drugs (including narcotics) , 71; Extortion, 10; Gambling, 102;
Homicide , 19 · Larceny, 10; and Robbery, 24.

Table 2 shows

the offenses set forth in the applications, by reporting
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jurisdiction,with separate data for the Federal jurisdiction,
for the separate counties in the State of New York and for
States and counties in the balance of the country.

-

9 -

79
4
19

23

1
1

102
4
19
1
2
10

-

10

1

-

-

-

-

6

-

-

-

1

-

8

Arizona

..........

Robbery •••••••••
Stolen property ••
Weapons •••••••••
Usury
No offense reported

-

-

24
24
1
5
5
l
1
5
5
1
1
Note: This table shows the offense as reported by the judg

Hijacking l Trucks)
Homicide ••••••••
Intimidating officia1 •••••••••••
Kidnaping •••••••
Larceny "••••••o•

1
85
7
6
4
3
1

12
3

3

1
89
10
7

-

-

Conspiracy •••••••
Drugs and Narcotics
Extortion •••••••
forgery •••••••••
Gambling and Bookmaking •••••••••

1
2

1
2
3
12
3

269

33

Abortion ••••••••
Arson •••••••••••
Assault •••••••••
Bribery •••••••••
Burglary ••••••••

State
Total
federal

302

Total

Total •••••••

Major
Offense

Major Offense for which Court-auth
to Title 18, United States Code, Sectio

,

-

-

1
10

1

17

-

2

2

1

-

-

1
1

1

-

-

7

-

5

-

1
7
2
3

-

-

-

19

19

New Y~~k City Co~nt;" e_s
Kings
New York
Q
23

Bronx

16

-

37

5

')

1
72

2

3

1
1
3

191

New York
Total

-

-

-

23
3
2
Robbery ·•••••••
Stolen property •
5
1
l
1
Weapons •••• • • •o
Usury ••••••••••
3
5
·No offense reported
Note: This table shows the offense as reported by the judg

Larceny ••••••••

Kidnaping•••• o ••

cial • • • • • • • • • •

1
'Hijacking ·(Trucks)
Homicide ••••••• ·
Intimidating offi-

......

Conspiracy ••••••
Drugs ana-Narcotics
Extortion
Forgery ••••••••
Gambling and Bookmaking ••••••••

Abortion •••••••
Arson • • • • c • • • • •
Assault ••••••••
Bribery ••••••••
Burglary •••••••

Total

Major
Offense

Major Offense for which Court-au
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2

C.

Type of Facility:

The locations of the interceptions

authorized by the judges were reported to include 135 residences ,
68 apartments, 14 multiple dwellings, 71 business locations ,
and five business and living quarters.

Also, automobiles and

public pay telephones located on streets were reported as
places where authorized eavesdropping was permitted.
V.

Reports by Prosecuting Officials

The reports filed by prosecuting officials were generally
complete.

Where a report was not complete, requests were made

for omitted information, and most of the prosecuting officials
responded.
Although the Act requires supplemental reports to be filed
by prosecuting officials concerning court activity arising out
of intercepts reported previously, no such supplemental report
was filed by any prosecuting official in relation to intercepts
authorized during the period June 20 to December 31, 1968.
A.

Nature of Intercepts:

The wiretaps installed in 1969

in accordance with court authorizations resulted in intercepted
conversations ranging in frequency from one every day to 546
per day.

In one investigation the conversations of an estimated

900 persons were intercepted and in another investigatiop
~
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5,594 out of 5,889 conversations were reported to
incriminating.

~e

A summary of the average number of intercepts

appears in Table 3.
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Table 3
Summary of Interceptions of Wire or Oral Communication,
January 1., 1969 to December 31, 1969

Reporting
Jurisdiction

Number
of
Wiretaps
Author~ zed
InstaJ..led

Average Number of
Intercepts Per Wi~
~
Persons
ncri~inating
Involved Intercepts
Intercepts

e:

Federal •••••••••

33

Arizona
Maricopa •••••••
Pima County •••••

1
7

5

9

Colorado
Denver County •••

2

2

Florida
Broward County ••

2

Georgia
Fulton County •••
Henry County ••••

1:
1

30

152

1,498

1,228

181

-

-4

3.S

950

30

1

15

202

202

1

1

467
202

548
202

84
78

10
5

10
5

148
4

139
29

22
28

New Jerse)::
Essex County ••••
Mercer County •••

4
35

4
35

29

*

188
336

98
224

Rhode Island
Providence County

1

1

55

790

583

New York
(New York City)
Bronx County
Kings County
New York County •
Queens County ••

23
19
19
51

23
19
18
49

57
3
54

704
639
305
695

94
279
95
25

-

-

Mar~ land

Baltimore County.
Prince Georges Co.

...
...

49

..
Table 3
Surrmary of Interceptions of Wire' or Oral Con~unication,
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969 - Concluded

Reporting
Jur'isdiction

Other New York
Counties
Clinton ..•.•.•
Columbia ......
Dutchess ......
Erie ........•.
Nassau ..•.....
Oneida .•...•••
Onondaga .. •...
Orange •...•.•.
Suffolk .......
Westchester •••
Ulster •••.....

Nwnber
of
Wiretaps
Authorized Installed

5

l
4
4
3
11
18
2
6
15
1

Average Number of
Intercepts Per \Hretap
Persons
Incrimin 1ting
Involved' Intercepts
Intercepts

None

5
1

3
2

263
200

4

*

'*

*

3
3
11
18
2
6
13
1

22
25
3
29

1,551
100
971
578
700

1,286

*
·J:

4
2

10

None
179
76
330

*

*

1~373

275

70

None

*Information not reported.
NOTE:

The information in this table is taken from reports received from
both the judge authorizing the interception and the prosecut jng
official.

B.

Cost of Intercepts:

The total cost of an intercept

(in terms of manpower, equipment and other costs) ranged from
a low of $20 . 00 for one intercept to a high of $45,554.00 for another.
Of the 262 intercepts where cost information was reported, 127
cost less than $1,000 ; 45 cost $1,000 to $2,000 ; 54 cost $2,000
to $5,000

24 cost $5,000 to $10,000 and 12 cost over $10 , 000.

The average cost per wiretap, by reporting jurisdiction, appears
in Table 4.
C.

Arrests, Trials and Convictions:

Most of the cases

in which there were interceptions reported are still under
active investigation.

A total of 625 arrests had been made

as of December 31 , 1969.
were reported.

Also a few trials and convictions

Table 5 shows the type of intercept used and

the number of persons arrested in these cases as of the date
of the prosecutor's report.
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Table 4
Average Cost Per Intercept Installed
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969,
by State and County

Reporting
Jurisdiction

Authorized
I ntercepts
Total
Cost
number
Reported
Installed

/

/ --,

~verage

-...

Cost Per Intercept

Manpower

Other

Total

30

30

$8,0 71.14

$ 813.9 3

~8, H rl 5 . 0 7

5

5

800.00

360.00

1, .1 60 ,00

Color ado
Denve r County······

2

2

850 .00

30.00

88 0.0 0

Florid a
Brow ard County ••...

1

1

2 , 000.00

15.00

2,015.00

Georgia
Fulton County .•.. ••
Henry County .•... . •

1
1

1

2 , fi 72 .65

1,409.00

4,081. 65

10

10

5

5

720.14
1 2fl .8 0

40.00
91.00

760 . 1'1
217 . 80

466. 50
103 . 14

1,504 .25
2, 320. 30

Federal
Ar1zo na
Pima County .••...••

Maryland
Baltimore County···
Prince Georges Co~·

)
)

New Jers ey
Essex County ••••• . .
Me r ce r County •••• . •

4

4

35

35

1 , 037.7 5
2 ,217 . 16

Rhode Isl and
Provide nce County..

1

1

5, 640.00

175.00

5,815 . 00

New York
(New York City)
Bronx County.......
Kings County. • • • • • .
New York County. • . •
Queens County. • • • • .

23
19
18
49

?3
19

2,672.83
2,749.95
4,034.72
761.0 9

15Li . 04
55.35

2~805. 3 0

18
49

**

54.44

2 , 826 . 87
4,034 . 72
815 . 53

Table 4

I
I

Reporting
Jurisdiction

Average Cost Per Intercept Installed
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969
by State and County ·
Concluded
Authorized
Average Cost Per Intercept
Intercepts
Total.
Cost
Manpower
Other
number
Reported
Total
lin stalled
~

Other New York
Counties
Clinton •..•.....•.
Columbia .....•....

Dutchess •••••••.••
Erie ..............
Nassau •••••••••.••

Oneida ............
Onondaga .....•....
Oran.ge •••••••...••

Suffolk •••••••••••
Westchester •••••••
Ulster ............

5
1
4
3
3
11
18
2
6
13
1

5
1
None
1
3
11
18
2
4
13
1

$

300.00
400.00

$115.00
None

1,000.00
3,716.67
190.45
177,83
3.500.00
968.00
3,117.85
1,070.00

150.00

-

-

**
93.82
111.28
-

25.75
127.46

-

$

415.00
400.00

-~ot reported.
**Included with manpower costs.

NOTE:

-

1,150.00
3,716.67
284.27
289.11
3,500.00
993.75
3,245.31
1,070.00

This table is based on reports received from prosecuting officials.

-

2

1
1
1
10
5

Colorado:
Denver County •..•..
Florida:
Broward County •..•.
Georiia:
Fulton County •....•
Henry County •..•.••
Maryland:
B_al timore County•..
Prince George's co.

Essex County••....•
Mercer County•.....

New Jersey:
4
35

5

Arizona:
Pima County ••.....•

Federal · --

30
~

271

Number of
Intercepts
Installed

.. . .........

Total

Reporting
Jurisdiction

4
33

4

2

1
1

1

2

5

27

250

Phone/
Wire

Type of Surveillance
January 1, 196

·-

6
13
1
6
13
1
Suffolk ....••....
Westchester ••..••
Ulster •..•.•..•••
NOTE:

11
18
2

This table is based on reports from

3

4
3

5
1

23
19
15
46

1

5
1
4
3
3
11
18
2

.

23
19
18
49

1

Number of
Intercepts _ Phone/
Installed -- ---Wire
. - --

Other New York
Counties:
Clinton ..........
Columbia •....•...
Dutchess .........
Erie ......•.....•
Nassau •..........
Oneida •..........
Onondaga •...••.••
Orang~ ••..•.•...•

Kings ..........••
New York .•......•
Queens •..........

Bronx ............

Counties of
New York City:

Rhode rsland:
Providence Co •.•..

Reporting
Jurisdiction

Type of Surveillance
January 1, 1969 to D

VI.

Summary

Table 6 summarizes for the periods June 20 - December 31 ,
1968 and January 1 , 1969- December 31 , 1969 information on
authorized intercepts as to type of facility, intercepts
authorized, major offense specified in applications , average
number of persons involved and average cost per intercept.
Detailed data on the intercepts requested and granted by
reporting jurisdiction appear on the pages which follow.

Respectfully submitted,

!u&~ f!
William E. Foley
Acting Director

April 30, 1970
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'>XI.

~

June 20-Dec. 31, 1968

l XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Reporting Period

June 20-Dec. 31, 1968
Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1969

~

Reporting Pe;iod:

O.llllAXJ[Jflrllr'WrJt" V • , . ,..

*Authorized by judges.

June 20-Dec. 31, 1968
Jan • .1-Dec. 31,_ .1969

000<>0<>0000<:

~ Period

June 20-Dec. 3i, 1968
Jan. 1-Dec. 31~ 1969

~Reporting Period~

~

)C
)C

174302

Total

135

67

Residence

4
6

Apar

:iLl'fipf:''''Br''''ri=ci£1±Y'2iiE~\:0.):~:ri~::

14-7
271

12
19

Num
of
Extens

I

Drugs

I 14-7
271
120
262

reported

wh~re : cost

TOtal.

174302

$1,305.
$2,4-55.

Manpo

29
116
·· / AVERAGE C

Person
involv

iiJiGE. L

Extortion

I
17471
302
88
~~ fri:tercepts {E
InTotai*l stalled

Total

iif{~J.§f§iJ:~~~~:J~~~!.'f.K~J'.'

17 4
302

Total
Author- I Inized
I stalled

~//!l~~~~s§:~~:::~~:fF.~~~~£~'~1fttf

June 20-Dec. 31, 1968
Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1969

~~;!0~}-):~~-~~z:~~~
~
~XX~

SUMMARY REPORT ON AUTHORIZED INTERCEPTS GRANTED
June 20 - December 31, 196

Appendix Tables

Table A.

Reports by State and Federal Judges Pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Sec. 2519, on Applications for
Court Orders to Authorize the Interception of
Wire or Oral Communications during the
Period January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1969,
by Reporting Jurisdiction.

Table B. Reports by State and Federal Prosecuting Officers,
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sec.
2519, Concerning Court Authorized Intercepts
of Wire or Oral Communications during the
Period January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1969,
by Reporting Jurisdiction·

D. C.
New York,
Western
New Yor k,
Southern
Washington,
D.C .
Indiana,
Northern
Illinois,
Northern
New York,
Southern

Wilson

Wilson

Wils on

Wilson

Wilson

Wilson

Wilson

Wilson

Phone call
Oral

Phone call

Phone call

Phone call

Phone call

*Per day unless otherwi se indicated.

15

14

13

12

11

10

Nevada
Was~ington,

9

Wilson

Florida,
Southern

Phone call

Walters

Phone call
Oral

Phone call
Phone call

Phone call

Phone call

I

16

I

so

375

75

I

181

590

425

5 , 889

171

30

375

450
1 ,015

2,000

I

Number of
Intercepts

554

340

5,594

161

40

none

17
240

25

18

Incrimi
Interc

546

I

SOl

I

17' 690

I

17.513

Intercept was never installed and order was vacate

Intercept was never installed and order was vacate

Every 45 rnins .

Installed, never used.

28

Every 9 min .

Application denied .

27

30

900

113

I
47

30
624
17
78 in 9 hrs.

500

100

Persons

Reports by United States Department of Jus
Concerning Court Authorized Interc
Calend

20 per hr .

10

Nature of Intercepts
Average
Frequency*
Type

Wilson
Wilson

Wilson

Wilson

Wilson

Assistant
Attorney
Generall.

New York,
Eastern
Ohio,
Northern
Michigan,
Eastern
New Jersey
Oklahoma,
Eastern
New York,
Western

a

7

6

4
5

3

2

1

United States
District Court
and Reporting
Number

Table B.

Wilson

Wilson
Wilson
Wilson

Pennsylvania
Eastern
New York
New Jersey

Pennsylvania
Eastern
Florida,
Southern

29

Wilson

Phone call

Phone call

*Per day unless otherwise indicated .

30

Wilson

Wilson

Pennsylvania
Eastern

28

Phone call

Phone call
Wilson

call
call
call
call

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

23
24
25
26
27

Wils011
Wilson
Wilson
Wilson

Phone call
Phone call
Phone call

Phone call

55

101

Approx,. 60

Approx . 1 call
per 7 minutes

I

83
9
19
8a .m. to midnight
1.5 per hr.
3
63
80

I

1 per 3 mins.

I

10

47

20

Approx .
45

820

823

500

Approx.
1,407

710

815

45o

Appr
1,087

304
none
10
126
1.337

386
90
19
884
2,175
59
1
12
317
140

I

660
15

Appr
2, 547

308

668
128

Approx.
2,677

682

Incrimin
Interce

24
4

Approx.
126

No record maintained
Phone call
Wilson

I

Never installed
54
28
Phone call

Type

Nature of

Reports by United States Department of Justi
Concerning Court Authorized Interce
Calerdar Ye

Wilson
Wilson

District of
Columbia
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Western
Ohio,
Northern

Assistant
ttorney
General 1

Connecticut
New Jersey
New Jersey
New .Jersey
Ohio,
Northern

21
22

20

19

17
18

16

United states
District Court
and Reporting
Number

Table B.

Wt:>sc.ern

Ne-w · ·or·:,

Mi!:so uri,
West.ern
New Jersey
Illinois,
Northern

Phone call
Oral

Wilson
Wilson

Phone call
Phone call

Type

*Per day unless otherwise indicated.

8

30

25

so

Persons

25

446

1, 240
143

Int.?rcepts

Nu:nber of

12

249

1, 228
JS

!ncr imin
lnter c o

Reports by United States Department of Just
Concerning Court Authorized Interce
Calendar Year

each of the reported applications and, as authorized

2

56

177
14

Average
Frccp..;ency*

Nature of Intercepts

Wilson
l'l"ilson

Assistant
P.tt o rney
General 1

1 The Attorney General personally approved
to authorize its filing .

34

32
33

3l

1\ ..,·l'! L ... ..

United States
Di s t r ict Court
a nd ~:::- crtin

Table B .

Maricopa
P ima
Pima
Pima
Pima
Pima
Pime
Pima

Denver
Denver

Broward
Broward

Baltimore
Ba l timore
Ba l timore
Baltimore
Baltimore

I

I

I

Phone call
Oral
Oral
Oral
Oral

Phone ca ll
Phone cal l
Phone call

Phone call
Phone ca ll

I

I

I

I

15

78
1
12
1
1

1, 397
1
69
1
1

1, 316
1
60
1
1

202

47
435
170
178
77

Intercepts

6
22
9
6

I

I
4

Pe-rsons

No prosecutor report received
No prosecutor report received
No prosecutor report received

27
20

10

installed
c a ll
Twice we-ekly
installed
call
20 - 30 times
ce 11
7-10
call
9
call
24
insta lled

Phone> ca 11

Never
Phone
Never
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Never

Type

Number of

I

n
n

n

n

Incrim
Inter

Report s by State Prosecuting Office-rs, P
Concerning Court Authorized Intercep
Calendar

Average
Frequency*

Nature of Int.ercepts

"'Per day uule-ss otherwise indica ted.

1
2
3

Moylan
Moylan
Moylan
Mo¥lan
Moylan

Slaton
51 a ton
Slaton

Fulton
Fulton
Fulton
Maryland

3
4
5

Geiaer

Nelson
Schafer
Schafer
Schafer
Schafer
Schafer
Silver
Silver

Pr o s:!utor

Name

Bolton
Bolton

I

I

Fulton
Henry

G~orgia

----

2

l

Florida

---

2

l

Co lorado

2
3

l

Arizona

State,
County and
Report1.ng
N..Jnber

Table B.

Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
MercE'r
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Esse~·

4

Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer
Mercer

Esse"'
Essex
ESSE'Y

1

Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills

Sills

Lordi
LordL
Lordi
Lordi
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills

t-toylan
Moylan
Hoylan
1-loylan
Moylan
M"'lrshall
r-,arshall
Marshall
Marsha 11
Marshall

call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
calli
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call

cal
ca 1
cal

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Oral
Phone

call

ca 11
call
ca 11
call

Phone call

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonE"
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

Cral
Oral
Oral
Phone
Oral
Phone
Oral
Phone
Phone
Phone

calli
i
calli

l

I

I

37

21

19
4

7

60
52
45

14

17
46
13
22
16
11
43
35
26
22
18

Unknown
Unknown
l,;nknown
Unknown
41
42

10

71

18

59
37
36
28

13

25
27
29
43
9
34
10
14
27
14
32
23

30 per hr.

NI

1
7in2hrs.

NI

Per sons

I

32
9
90

127

197

127

104
579
634
G05
218

131

414
18
144
1,096
29
64
168

5

152
73
95
71

121

I ncr imin
Interce

142
204
38
200

I

213

161

65
188
133
265
593
753
727
257

29

303
244
119
87
145
553
20
153
1' 585

123

13

Intercepts

Number of

Reports by State Prosecuting Officers. Purs
Concerning Court Authori~ed Intercepts
Calendar Y

1 per hr .
2 per hr.

Interc~ts

Average
Frequency*

Natt..:re of
Type

*Per day -~nless otherwise indicated .
NI-Not Indicated

7

I

Name
of
Prosecutor

Baltimore
Baltimore
Baltimore
Baltimore
Baltimore
Prince George's
Prince George's
PriP.ce George's
Prince George' .s
Prince George's

NE"W Jersey

6
78
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Maryland

State,
Cour.ty and
aeporting
Number

Table B.

-

State.

___1

Hudson
M1.ddlesex
Middlesex
Somerset
Union

Mo:>r-:-er

Merce-r
Mercer
Mercer
H£>rcer

MercE'r

Mercer

Mercer

1

Providence-

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Oral
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phon£>
Phone
Phone
PhonE'
Phone

Type

call
call
call
c a ll
call
call
call
call

call
call
call
call
call

No
No
No
No
No
No

I

_j

report
report
report
report
report
report

r£-ceived

received

39
119
199
219
118
37
218
S£>ve-ral
596
530
953
481
Num£>rous
23

Intercepts

received
re-cE"ived
received
receivE"d

17
9
97
29
30
7
53
SE"vera 1
22
41
69
48
NumE"rous
9

Persons

Number of

I

583

l3

26
74
165
44
20
1
206
Sev
55
52
953
471
Nt.rn£>

Interc

Incrim

Reports by State Prosecuting Officers. Pu
Concerning Court Authorized Intercep
Cal(mdar

prosecl.!tor
prosecutor
prosecutor
prosecutor
prosecutor
prosecutor

15
Constant
20
14
86
6
Constant
11

l3
7
99
7

Average
Frequency*

I

Nature of Intercept s

*Per day unless othe~w1.se indicated .
NI-Not Indicated

Si 1 ts
Tur:mlty
Dolan
Dolan
Imbriano
Kaplowitz

Sills
Panaro
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Panaro
Sills

Sills

Mercer
Mercer

Mercer
MercPr
Me>rcer
Mercer

Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills
Sills

Prosecutor.

of

Name

Mercer

RhodE" Island

40
41
42
43
44
45

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

New Jerse-y

County and
Reporting
Numbe-r

Table B .

Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
BronY
Bronx
Bronx
Bron)f
Bronv
Bronx
Bronx
Bronv
Bronx
Bronx
Bronv

Bronx

Brom~t

Bronv

Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
RoOerts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts
Roberts

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

TyP"

call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call

10
15
50
10
18
10
34
25
50
24
5
11
5
2
30
20
8
20
10
6
10
200
5

Av•r a qe
Frequency*

I

55
10
10
108
30
5
12
15
5
15
500
10

8
10
50
15
9
100
100
30
50
150
4

Persons

I

400
300
3000
.200
18
1000
2000
500
1000
500
280
185
80
64
1800
350
450
250
325
100
240
3000
150

Intercepts

Number of

I

12
none
none
220
25
none
none
none
none
5
10
none

300
10
4
none
1500
30
20
20
none

none
none

Interce

I ncr imin

Reports by State Prosecuting Officers, Pursuant t
Concerning Court Authorize-d Intercepts
Calendar
Nature vf Intercepts

*Per day unless otherwise indicated.

23

22

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

1
2
3

New York

Prosecutor

of

Number

Name

RPporting

State,
County and

B.

Kings
Kin!iS
Kings
Ki ngs
KLngs
Kings
Kings
Kings
Kings
Kings
King s
Kings
Ki n g s
Ki ngs
Kings
Kings
Ki ngs
Kings
Kings

Gold
Go l d
Gold
Gold
Gold
Gold
Golden
Go l den
Gold
Gold
Go l d
Gold
Gold
Gold
Gold
Golden
Golden
Go l den
Golden

Name
of
Prosecutor

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonE'
Phone
Phone

call
call
call
call
call
call
call
ca l l
call
s:all
call
cal l
c a ll
cal l
call
call
call
call
call

Type

I

ti
30
24
13
15
25
29
30
23
50
23
4
2
5
5
25
12
12
6

3
2
2
2
2
6
6
8
2
4
4
1
1
3
5
6
3
2
2

Persons

I

300
325
435
712
14 3
853
283
25
21
100
143
1. 500
360
360
180

1 , 055
2,479
1,814
1, 052

Intercepts

Number of

I

n
n

1.
1,

Incri
Inte

Reports by State ProsecutLng Officers,
Concerning Court AuthorizE>d IntercE
Calenda

Averaqe
Frequency•

Nature of Intercepts

*Per d a y unless othe:-rise indicated.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

4
5
6

1

New York

StatE" 1
County and
Reporting
Number

Table B.

Hogan

Hogan
llogan
Hogan
Hogan
Hogan

New York
New York
York
York
York
York
York
York
York
York
Yor·K
York

New
Nt:>W
New
New
New
Nc>w
New
N€'W
New
New

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

call
call
ca ll
ca ll
call

Phone call
Phone call
PI-:o· t.: ..all
Oral
Pr:one call
Cral

Phone ca ll
Phone call

Phone ca 11

Phone ca 11
ora l
Phone call

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonE>

Phone call
Phone call

I
I

10

Ts
1 in 30 days

~I every

1 (,• '(>ry 2 days
9
1 per wee-k

3
!\pver installed
1
15

2 pE'r week

39

2
2
2

7

16
269
9
3
1
1

28
1,091

20
61
8
69

297

49

2,:,oo

9
194
7
2
1
1

23
368

140

2

365

11
22

153
193
7

1>

186

21

Inlercepl

I ncr iminat

c2

I

,,

275
600
12

21
327

3

I

~UMb

Inll?'rcE"pts

2

432

14
20
179
41
9

19
34

Per sons

RC'ports by State ProsE."cutir,q Officc>rs. Pursu
Concerning Court At.thorized IntercPpts
Calendar 'ea

4 pE'r hr.
l (,~very 2 days
7
10
1 every 2 days

s

1

T

at;.,re of Intercepts
t\verage
·requency*
Typ<>

*Per days unless otherwise indicated .
NI-Not Indicate~

nogan
l!ogan
lloqan
Hogan
Hogan
Hogan

!logan
floqan
Hogan
lloqan
Hogan

York
Vorl<:
NE>W York
New York
N(>w York
N"E'W

t\t.•w

3
4
5
6
7

IJ0<1an
Hoqan

NE"W York
N<.'w York

I

of

·arne
ProsPcutor

1
2

N£'w Yor k

StatE',
Cour.ty and
Reporting
N';m_;,er

Table B.

Queens
37

_.~-:-r

Mackell
Mackel!

vu~ens

Queens
Queens

J5
36

call

call
call.

ca l l
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
cal l
call
call
ca l l
call,

ca ll
cal l ,

call

759
177

39
19

1
9

179
1.900
369
2 , 039
76
251
470
1,174
303
465
209
979
293
317

333
198
109
736

l, 324
9

29
30
39
153
23
20
16
112
75
49
39
23
22
55

55
21
42
25

14
7

I

44

24

19
17
12

22
25
25
13
12

•5

724

411
610
67

7' 225
1.395
373
404
653
95
l. 546

I Inter~ep~-s _l

19
35
No report
No conversation recorded

I
call
call
call

Phone call
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Oral
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonePhone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonePhone
Oral
Phone
Phone
Oral
Phone

95
26
54
5
49
5
14
9
52
Order never executed
7
55
12
91
5
49
Appl i c at ion de-n ied

36

1

call
call
call
call
call
call
call

Persons

Number of

77

16
12
9

99
9

54
4

60

26

2

non
26

3
1

19

I ncr im
Inter

Reports by State- Pro s ecuting Officers, Pu
Conce-rning Court Authorized Intercep
Calendar

Phone call
Phone call
Phone call

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

I

Nature of Interc!£!
Average
Frequency •

Type

day unless otherwise ind i cate-d.

Mackel !

Hackel!
Mackel !
Mackel !
Mackell
Mackel!
Mackel!
Mackel!
Mackel!
Macke-11
Mackel!
Mackel!
Maclcell
Mackel!
Mackell

Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Que-ens
Queen s
Queens
Queens
Queens

Mackel!
Hackel!
Hackel!
Mackell
Mackel!
Hackel!
Mack ell
Mackell
Mackel!
Hack.el l
Hacke l!
Mackel!
Mackell
Hack e l l
Mackel!
Mackel!
Mackel!
Macke l!
Mackel !
Macke l !

Name
of
Presecutor

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

5
6

4

Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Que-ens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queen s
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queen s
Que-ens
Quee-ns

New York

State,
County and
Reporting
Numbers

Table- B.

St~te,

Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

PhonePhone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

PhonE'
PhonE'
Phone
Phone
PPone
Phone

Mackel !
Mackel!
Mackel!
Mackel !
Mackell
Mackell

Mackel l
M.ackell
Mackell
MacKel!
Mackel!
Mack e ll

call
ca l l
call
call
call
call

call
call
call
call
call
ca.l.l

Phone call
Phone call
Phone- call

Mackel!
Mackel!
Mackel!

of
Prosecutor

~:ame

•Per day unless otherwise indicated .

Queens
Queens
Queens

38
39
-10

---

KE-w Yvrk

'·~ .noLE:'CS

o " nty and
RPporling

1
93
12
12
3
3

9
6
34
17
5
4

5
3
20

Table B.

430
160
650
551
168
2.060
514
158
376
42
280
1,414
600
77
84

54
15
70
170
67
58
27
186
11
22
55
110
42
19
20

I

4

no
no

1

no

non

no

_ .no

Incrii7,1
Interc

Reports by State Prosecuting Officers, Pu
Concerning Court Jl.uthorized Intercep
Calendar

•

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phcne
Phone
Phone

Ru ie-nblatt
Del in
Cbl-1:1
C.:uhn
Cahn
Di l lon
D.J.llon
DiJ ton
Dillon
Ingrassia
In.:Jrassia

Meehan
Mechan
Meehan
Pote-ehan

Nassau
Nassau
Nassau
Nassau
Erie
Erie
Erie
Erie
Orange
Orange

Rockland
Rockland
Rockland
Rockland
Ulster

1
2

4
1
2

1

1

4

4

and Oral

N:h:::·::ol

•P«:>r day unless otherwise indicated .,
NI - Not Indicated

To!"raca

28
25

15
11

I
10

report r eceive,d.

many
many

-.... 5
14
Device never used
32
12
8
40

23
NI
NI

I

70

600
800

1,500
273

2,881

116
35

150

NI
NI
NI
NI

200
2
2
At least 5
NI
NI

75
300
250
140
550

1
2
1
2
10

NI

NI
NI
NI
NI

10 per hr.

4
9
7
7
150

No prosecutor report received.
No prosecutor r eport received.
No prosecutor report received ..

Phone call
Phone call

call
call
call
call

call
call
call
call

call
call
call
call

Phone
Phone
Phone>
Phone
Rv~•·wbLJtt

Ro!tvnblatt
1\osenbl.:ttt

Dutchess
Dutchess
Dutchess
Dutchess

1
2
J

Phone call
1'\il'ler

Columbia

t

4

call
call
call
call
call

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

NQrth
North
North
North
North

Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton

1

J

No prosecutor report re-ceived
No prosecutor report received
No prosecutor rr:>port received

Type

Nature

LlpSki
'.ipski

L ~ pski

Name
of
Prosecutor

Cayuga
Cayuga
Cayuga

York

I

!

2

!nc
In

Reports by State Prosecuting Offic
Concerning Court Authorized I
C

1
2

~ew

---

State,
County and
Reporting
Number

Table B.

Oneida
Oneida
Oneida
Oneida
One i da
Oneida
OnC'ida
Oneida
Oneida
Oneida
OnPida

Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga
Onondaga

Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
GualtiC'ri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Gualtieri
Jcs!lkc
Gualtieri
Gua lt ieri
Gualtieri
Gualtie-ri

Darrigrand
Darrigrand
03rrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand
Darrigrand

Name
of
Prosecutor

*PC'r day unless otherwise i ndicate-d .

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

1
2
3
4
5
6

New York

9
10
11

6

1

New York

State,
County and
Reporting
Number

Phone
PhonC'
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
PhonE'
Phon('
Phone
Phone
NoonePhone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phon<'

call
call
call
call
call
call
call
ca ll
call
call
call
Ciill
cdll
call
call
ca ll
call
call

call
call
call
call
call
call
ca ll
ca ll
ca ll
ca ll
ca ll

I

12
23
13
11
17
5
37
daily
28
daily
daily
27
16
.j.:Jily
daily
daily

:9

23

daily
daily
dai l y
daily
daily
daily
daily
dally
daily
daily
weekdays

Nature of Intercepts
Average
Frequency *
Typo

Table B.

30
15
123
45
30
35
45
46
27
2
30
3
1
45
27
4
5
2

5
5
2
1
2
1
2
2
5
9
1

Persons

I

407
249
243
458
264
410
350
93
2' 166
707
577
709
208
800
469
758
695
842

1. 903
2 055
423

~21

485
1, 288
848
374
496
515

1. 767

Intercept1

J

Number of
Ir.
I

Reports by State Prosecuting O
Concerning Court Authorize

Phone
PhonE'
Phone
Phone
Phone
otr;,~rwise

*Pc·r da:,• i...nl e£:5

lJ
14
15
16
17

:\I-~ot

Indicat~J

in·.J..cat.c-J

call
call
call
call
call

Phone call
Phone call

Vergari
Vergc.ri
Vergari
Vergar i
Vcrgari

call
call
call
call
call

call
call
call
cull
call
call

WestchestE>r
WestchestC"r
Westchest<'!:
WestchE"ster
Nestchester

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone

Phon<.> call
we~tchester

W('stche~ter

10
11
12

~

6
7
8

WE>stchester
WE>stchcster
Westchester
Westchester
WE>stchester
Wcstchester
WC>stch<>st<'r
~ ...·stdl.:ster
Wcstcho.."!'l"t<'r

liE>stchP~tC'r

Aspland
Aspland
Asp land
Aspland
Aspland
Aspland

Verg3r i
VE>rgari
Vergari
Vergar i
Vergari
Vergari
V.:>!:gari
Vergar i
Ver":luri..
Vergari
Vergar i
Vergari

l

N('W Ycrk

Suffolk
Suffolk
3 Suftolk
4 Suffolk
Suffolk
Suffolk

New York

State.
County and
Reporting
Number

10
27
10
24
47

2
1
4
2
1

1
1
l3
1
66
1
17
1
Order never executed
20
37
23
2
Order never executed
43
2
0

160
214
218
1 , 407
2, 873

862

364
2.,150

!76
174
247
8,480
525

1
1, 7

1

2

8
1

:;o
no

Incri
Inte

Reports by State Prosecuting
Concerning Court Authori

maintained
raintained
maintained
rr.aintaincd
r"aintained
rnaintainC'd

I

re-cords
records
records
reccrdo::
records
records

No reoort
No n~oort

No
No
Ko
No
No
No

Table B.

This petition arises from a criminal proceeding,
pending trial in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Mi0higan, in which the three defendants are charged with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, and
one of the defendants, Plamondon, is charged with
destruction of government property in violation of
18 U.S.C. 1361. The charges arose from the bombing
of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann
Arbor, Michigan.

STATEMENT

The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Crime Cont11ol and Safe Streets Act 'Of 1968 are set forth in App.
D, infra.

STATUTE INVOLVED

1. Whether electronic surveillance is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
has been specifically authorized by the President, acting through the Attorney General, to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect against
attempts to overthrow the government by force or other
unlawful means or against other clear and present dangers i1o the government's structure or existence.
2. If such national security surveillances are unilawful, whether-notwithstanding Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165-it would be appropriate for the
district court to determine in camera whether the interceptions are arguably relevant to the prosecution
before requiring their disclosure to the defendant.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

a pretrial order entered in a pending criminal case.
The judgment of the court of appeals is set forth in
App. C, inf'ra. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 12'54(1).
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See the orders of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Johnson,
set fomh as Appendices to the opinion of the court of appeals
(App. A, infra, pp. 44--48).
4
The Dellinger decision is pending on appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the SeYenth Circuit. The goyernment has petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit seeking vacation of the order in the Smith
case. The O'Neal case has not been appealed; the defendant
has fled the jurisdiction.

been undertaken by successive Presidents over a period of thirty years/ and was given explicit recognition by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 2511(3). This well established practice was
thought to be a proper exercise of Presidential power,
lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court below,
in the first appellate consideration of this question, held
to the contrary, as did Judge Keith in the district
court. One district court has agreed, United States
v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Calif.); but two
district courts have upheld the power, United States
v. Dellinger, et al., Criminal No. 69-180, N.D. Ill.,
E.D., decided February 20, 1970; United States v.
O'Neal, Criminal No. KC-CR 1204, D. Kan., decided
September 1, 1970/
This Court has specifically left undecided " [w ]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in
a situation involving the national security * * *."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 23; see
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313, 314.
This issue should now be considered by this Court.
The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all seizures
without a warrant. There is no constitutional require-
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2. If national security surveillances of the kind here
involved are at variance with the Fourth Amendment,
then we suggest that this Court should reconsider
what procedures are appropriate and necessary to
assure that a particular criminal prosecution is not
tainted by them. The automatic disclosure requirement seemingly established by Aldett·man v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, for every situation of unlawful
interception of a defendant's voice-which was applied below-is, we suggest, inappropriate and unnecessary in a case such as the present one. We urge the
Court to consider again whether the district courts
should be permitted to screen such national security
interceptions in camera to determine whether they are
arguably relevant to the prosecution before directing

ous judges ~nd magi~trate; ~ho. may happen to have- jurisdiction in the locality where a warrant might be sought.

surveillance in this case was based primarily upon the
last two of these concerns; of course, these concerns may
frequently tend to merge with the first three, since the
line between domestic activity and foreign intelligence
is often blurred, or merged. It is also important that
such electronic surveillance is authorized only by the
Attorney General-and no other official-acting on behalf of the President.
Thus, the issue is whether, in the areas defined abo\e,
the standard of reasonableness specified by the Fourth
Amendment allows the judgment of the President's
chief law enforcement officer-who is directly accountable to the President and through him to the electorateto be relied upon in this narrow and important area of
national security in lieu of the judgment of the numer-
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For purposes of this case, \Ye accept the statement
of facts from the petition filed by the United States:
On December 7, 1969, defendants in the court
below were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for
destruction of Government property in violation
of 18 u.s.a. 1361. In the COlU'Se of the pre-trial
proceedings, defendants filed a motion for disclosure of certain electronic surveillance information. That motion v1as granted by respondent,
and petitioner has been ordered by respondent
to disclose the information sought. Respondent's
Order is the subject of this petition.
On October 5, 1970, defendants filed a "Motion for Disclosure of Electronic or other Surveillance, For a Pretrial Hearing, To Suppress
Evidence and to Dismiss the Indictment.'' * * *
On December 18, 1970, petitioner filed, in response, an opposition to defendants' motion. By
way of an affidavit of the Attorney General

STATEl\fENT OF FACTS

add at least some dimension of risk of exposure of
federal investigatorial intentions.
The background of this case is the pending trial in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Detroit of three young men for
conspiracy to destroy government property in Ann
Arbor, :Michigan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
( 1964). One of them named Plamondon was also
charged with destruction of go-vernment property in a
value exceeding $100, in violation of 18 u.s.a. § 1361
(1964). The particular case before us is a petition for
writ of mandamus filed originally in this court by the
United States to compel the District Judge who is
presiding at the Detroit trial to vacate an order directing the United States to "make full disclosure to defendant Plamondon of his monitored conYersations."
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"2. This affidavit is submitted in connection
with the Govermnent's opposition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of information concerning the overhearing of his conversations which occurred during the course of
electronic surveillances which the Government
contends were legal.
"3. The defendant Plamondon has participated in conversations which were overheard
by Government agents who were monitoring
wiretaps which were being employed to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic
organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the Government. The records of
the Department of J"ustice reflect the installation of these wiretaps had been expressly approved by the Attorney General.
"4. Submitted with this affidavit is a sealed
exhibit containing the records of the intercepted conversations, a description of the premises that were the subjects of the surveillances,
and copies of the memoranda reflecting the Attorney General's express approval of the installation of the surveillances.
"5. I certify that it would prejudice the
national interest to disclose the particular facts
concerning these surveillances other than to the
court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit
referred to herein is being submitted solely for
the court's in camera inspection and a copy of
the sealed exhibit is not being furnished to the
defendants. I would request the court, at the
conclusion of its hearing on this matter, to place
the sealed exhibit in a sealed envelope and
return it to the Department of Justice where
it will be retained under seal so that it may be
submitted to any appellate court that may review this matter."
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'rated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1943); Banke1·s
Life &: Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382
(1953); Black v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.
1957); Hoffa v. GTay, 323 F.2d 178, 179 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963); University National
Stockholder's Protective Comm., Inc. v. Univm·sity
National Life Ins. Co., 328 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964).
Petitioner United States, however, points to the
All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), as source of
this court's power to grant the writ prayed for and
argues that this is an extraordinary case wherein the
respondent has entered an illegal order which, if allowed to stand, "would result in grave and irreparable
harm to legitimate Governmental interests.''
Concerning the use of mandamus in "exceptional
cases," this court has said:
It is settled that although sparingly used, the
power to issue a writ of mandamus exists and
will be exercised by the court when in its discretion the exceptional circumstances of the
case require its use. Its use in such exceptional
cases, however, does not mean that the All
Writs Statute grants the appellate court a general power to supervise the administration of
justice in the district court and to review any
otherwise unappealable order. Black v. Boyd,
248 F. 2d 156, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1957).
See also Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932);
LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957);
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-98 (1967).
In this last case, .Justice Black in a concurring
opinion said:
I agree that mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy which should not be issued except in
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The District Judge in issuing the disclosure order
relied upon the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches, and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme
Court has held that electronic sur\eillance and
recordation by wiretap is a search and seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); Gio1·dano v. United States, 394 U.S.
310 (1969); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S.
316 (1969).
The basic holding of these cases is set forth in the
Katz case by Mr. Justice Stewart:
The Government urges that, because its
agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead
and Goldman, and because they did no more
here than they might properly have done with
prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively
validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It
is apparent that the agents in this case acted
with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not
required, before commencing the search, to pl·esent their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They
were not compelled, during the conduct of the

THE FOUR'rH AMENDMENT
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In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, the Court
sta;ted:
'The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and
to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find
and seize things connected with. lthe crime as its fruits or as
the means by which it was committed, as well '3.S weapons and
other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be
doubted.'
Whatever one's view of the long-standing practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused
fotmd upon ~~rrest,' Uni-ted States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
61; cf. id., at 71-79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Franknnter), the concept of an 'incidental' search cannot reltdily be
extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual
either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.
" 21 Although '-[t]he Fourth Amendment d'oes not require police
officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to d"o so
would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others/
Warden v. Hayden,, 387 U.S. 294,. 298-299,. there seems 'l ittle
likelihood that electro:nlic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in. a situation so fraught with urgency.
"2'2 A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth
Amendment requirements, Zap v~ United States, 328 U.S. 624,
but of course 'tlle usefulness of ele.ctronic surveilianoo dependson lack of notice to the suspect.' Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 463 (dissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE BRE~NAN)."

ous with an individual's arrest could hardly be
deemed an 'incident' of that arrest. 20 Nor could
the use of electronic surveillance without prior
authorization be justified on grounds of 'hot
pursuit.' 21 .And, of course, the very nature of
electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent." 22
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967).
(Footnotes in quotation.)
These cases and the requirement of judicial review
just quoted represent settled law which the government does not dispute as generally appliDable. It is,
as we have noted, however, the government's position
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. . . he shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers; he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
U.S. CoNsT. art II, § 3.

*

The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the lTnited States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the S enate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the S enators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by
law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.

*

The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.
He shall hold his Office during the Term of
four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as
follows .... U.S. CoKsT. art. II, § 1.
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gov-ernment" to employ force to "brush aw.ay" obstructions to int-erstate commerce and to the mails.
Th-e instant case has no relation to interstate commerce or the United States mails. And the Debs case
ean hardly be read as authority :£or igno-ring judicial
processes.
As to Marbury v. Madison, supra, the government's
citation seems to us to be questionabl-e from its point
of view. The case does deal with presidential power
vis-a-vis the Constitution. But it is also Chief Justice
Marshall's ringing affirmation of the .supremacy of
the Constitution over all three branches of gove-rnment and of the authority .and obligation of the Supreme Court of the United States to make hinding
interpretations of that document. We shall quote from
Justice Marshall's ·l anguage in "the last section of this
opinion.
As for In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), we thank
•t he government for calling to onr attention this fascinating story of the problems of the judiciary ·i n an
earlier day. But the holding that the President has a
right under .Article I:I, § 3 t0 appoint a Deputy Marshal to protect the threatened life of a Supreme Court
Justice is hardly precedent fo-r this ease.
The government also cites Abel v. Uwit-ed States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960). This case involved a prosecution for espionage against the most important foreign
spy known t<:> the American public in the Twentieth
Century. He was an alien and, hence, subject to statutory regulations providing for administrative procedures for deportation for violations of the laws and
regulations of the United States. He was arrested l!ly
war-rant, which the opinion of the Court found to
have been lawfully issued by a lawfully authorized
magistrate, and cthe materials seized at the time of his

22

on provisions in Article II which say that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President
. . . '' ; that ''he shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed", and that he "Bhall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States.''
The order cannot properly be sustained as an
exercise of the President's military po·wer as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The
Govermnent attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not
concern us here. Even though "theater of \Yar"
be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that
the Commander in Chief of the Armed F orces
has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a
job for theN ation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be . sustained because of the several constitutional provisions
that grant executive power to the President. In
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refute the idea that he is to be a la\Ymaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending
of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws
he thinks bad. And the Constitution is n either
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws
which the President is to execute. The first
section of the first article says that ''All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States. . . . '' After
granting many powers to the Congress, Article
I goes on to provide that Congress may ''make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution. in the Government of the United

..
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Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (11161); Mapp v.
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) ; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) ;
Warden v. Hayden, 387' U.S. 294 (1967'); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967'); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347'
(1967').

THE WffiETAP ISSUE

IN THE SUPREME COURT
Historieally th€re have been four positions stated
on the legality of wiretapping- or the admissibility of
evidence derived therefrom.
1. In its first encounter with the problem, the
United States Supreme Court simply decided that
since there was no trespass involved in the wiretap
there concerned, it was therefore not .a search and
"Seizure and the Fourth Amendment did not apply to it.
8lmsteatl v. United States, 2'17 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldnan v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (194-2).
'2. In Olmstead .Justiee Brandeis in dissent (joined
by Justice Holmes, who called wiretapping a "dirty
business") staked aut a position which has many adherents today. This position is that wiretapping represented an unfair invasion of privacy which the g"overnment should not undertake under any circumstance.
3. The third position, one which the Supreme Court
came to gradually/ is now the dominant one in our

historical -€vents, the fears of power and the
hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.
Such a review would but confrrm our holding that
this seizure order cannot stand. Youngstown
Sheet &: Tube Go. v. Sawyer, supra at 587-89.
The Youngstown case, of course, had nothing to do
with wiretaps. But it is the authoritative case dealing with the inherent powers of the Presidency-a
doctrine which is strongly relied upon by the government in this case.
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The wiretap problem has also been the subject of
great concern in the Legislative Branch of government. Early in the history of the wiretap controversy,
and with little debate, Congress enacted § 605, which
says in part :
no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person; ... 47 u.s.a.
§ 605 (Supp. V, 1965-69).
Section 605 played some role in the development of
the Supreme Court case law. But its language (forbidding interception and divulgence in describing the
<>ffense) failed to establish a decisive policy. Private

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

23. Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving
the national security is a question not presented
by this case. Katz v. United States~ supra at
358 n. 23.
Even more recently in a foreign intelligence wiretap
context, the Supreme Court had this issue presented
on application for writ of certiorari. It denied the
writ as applied to this issue. United States v. Clay~
430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), ce1·t. granted~ limited to
question 4, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971)
(No. 783) .
From what has been said, it is clear that as far as
the Appellate Courts are concerned, we write upon
a clean slate.

the subject of adjudication in the United States Supreme Court. In fact, in footnote 23 in the Katz case,
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, expressly
reserved decision thereon :
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enforcement O'f the Atomic Energy Act of
1954), or under the following chapters of
this title: chapter 37 (relating to espionage),
chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), chapter
115 (relating to treason), or chapter 102
(relating to riots) ;
(b) a violation of section 186 or section
501( c) of title 29, United States Code
(dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations), or any offense
which involves murder, kidnapping, robbery,
or extortion, and which is punishable under
this title;
(c) any offense which is punishable
under the following sections of this title:
section 201 (bribery of public officials and
witnesses), section 224 (bribery in sporting
contests), section 1084 (transmission of
wagering information), section 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer, juror, or
witness generally), section 1510 ( obstruction of criminal investigations), section
1751 (Presidential assassinations, kidnapping, and assault), section 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence),
section 1952 (interstate and foreign travel
or transportation in aid of racketeering
enterprises), section 1954 (offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influence operations
of employee benefit plan), section 659 (theft
from interstate shipment), section 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), or sections 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property);
(d) any offense involving counterfeiting
punishable under section 471, 472, or 473
of this title;
(e) any offense involving bankruptcy
fraud or the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic drugs, mari-

3Q

ventory shall be serYed as proYided for in subsection (d) of this section on the person named
in the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp.
v' 1965-69).
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in
section 605 of the Communications Act 'o f 1934
(48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit fue
constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the Nation against a~ctual or potential attack
or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States,
or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed
to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the
overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clea-r and
present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government. The contents of any wire or
oral communication intercepted by authority of
the President in the exercise of the foregoing
powers may be received in evidence in any trial
hearing, or other proceeding ~only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be
otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(3) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
Without now passing specifically upon any of the
more controversial aspects of this legislation, we view
the wiretap provisions of the Omnibus Crime Bill as a
general recognition by Congress that the Fourth
Amendment does mandate judicial review of proposed searches and seizures of oral communications
by wire. In addition, in § 2518(7) (a) Congress provided a statutory remedy for the exact sort of "national Security'' problem which is presented by this
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Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplaie them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature
repugnant to the constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered bv this c'o urt as one of the flmdamental
principle~ of our society. Marbury v. Madison,
supra at 68-69.
In the same opinion Chief J" ustice Marshall outlined
the function of the courts in interpreting the Constitution:
It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial deparlment to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably
to the constitution disregarding the law: the
court must determine which of these conflicting
rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental.
And as the authority, from which they proceed,
is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the
government, and assigns to different deparlments their respective powers. It may either
stop here; or establish certain limits not to be
transcended by those departments.
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stitution was adopted to provide a check upon "sovereign" power. The creation of three coordinate
branches of government by that Constitution was designed to require sharing in the administration of that
awesome power.
It is strange, indeed, that in t'his case the traditional
power of sovereigns like King George III should be
invoked on behalf of an American President to defeat
one of the fundamental freedoms for which the founders of this country overthrew King George's reign.
The argument for unrestricted employment of Presidential power to wiretap is basically an argument in
te1·rot·em. It suggests that constitutional government
is too weak to survive in a difficult world and urges
worried judges and worried citizens to return to acceptance of the security of "sovereign" power. We are earnestly urged to believe that the awesome power sought
for the Attorney General will always be used with discretion.
Obviously, even in very recent days, as we shall
see, this has not always been tbe case. And the history of English-speaking peoples (to say nothing of
others) is replete with answers. See e.g., Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765) . In Mat·cus
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the opinion
for the United States Supreme Court summarized
the long history of the English striving for freedom
of expression and press and noted:
Historically the struggle for freedom of speech
and press in England was bound up with the
issue of the scope of the search and seizure
power. llfat·cus v. Search Warrant, supra at
724.
The Court also pointed out that as early as the
1760's Lord Camden has denounced a" 'discretionary
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for warrantless wiretaps in domestic security cases.
In that case the government did not contest the
illegality of four separate domestic wiretaps made
under the same inherent powers relied on in this case.
The transcripts of defendant Clay's intercepted conversations were turned over to him by the Department of Justice. In one such instance the illegal wiretap was upon the telephone of the Rev. Martin Luther
King, Jr. One wonders, if the inherent powers of the
Presidency were broad enough to authorize the wiretaps in the first instance, how these wiretaps became
concededly unconstitutional in court.
As to the "fifth" wiretap disclosed in the Clay case,
the Attorney General's certificate said that it was
"for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information." The Fifth Circuit did squarely hold
that such foreign intelligence surveillance without
judicial warrant was not a constitutional violation.
This was the second issue on which certiorari was
sought from the Supreme Court, but, as we have
noted, the Supreme Court refused certiorari on this
issue while granting certiorari on another unrelated
matter.
In the case before us, however, the Attorney General's certificate makes clear that the wiretaps involved
were thought to be warranted by domestic security
problems. We have noted the special constitutional
powers of the Presidency in foreign affairs which the
Fifth Circuit thought justified his "gathering foreign
intelligence information" without judicial waiTant.
Without passing on that issue, we reiterate that we
have found no such specific constitutional authority
to disregard the Fourth Amendment in domesrtic security cases like this one.
The last issue argued (this one by the government)
concerns the order of disclosure of the overheard
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In the unlikely event that this interpretation of the District
Judge's order proves erroneous, the government may seek relief
from any broader order by filing a motion under Rule 40,
FED. R. A.PP. P.

I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision relating to wire-tapping in
investigations. The Court is undoubtedly sound both
in regard to the use of evidence secm·ed over tapped
wires in the prosecution of citizens in criminal eases;
and is also Tight in its opinion that under ordinary
and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents should not be carried on for the excel-

CO~FIDENTIAL

THE WRITE

APPEXDL'C A

fend the Fourth Amendment rights of the American
public.
For these reasons, we hold that the District Judge
properly found that the eonversations of defendant
Plamondon were illegally intercepted, and we cannot
hold that his disclosure order (as interpreted below)
is an abuse of judicial discretion.
In perhaps an excess of caution, we note that we
read the District Judge's disclosure order as limited
solely to the transcripts and dates of defendant
Plamondon's illegally intercepted telephone conversations. (See Taglianetti v. United States~ supra) .6
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
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You are therefore authorized and directed in
such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need iu each case, to authorize the
necessary investigating agents that they are at
liberty to secure information by listening devices
directed to the conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversiT"e activities against the Government of the United
States, including suspected spies.
This directive was followed by Attorneys General
Jackson and Biddle, and is being followed currently
in this Department. I consider it appropriate, however, to bring the subject to your attention at this
time.
It seems to me that in the present troubled period
in international affairs, accompanied as it is by an
increase in subversive activity here at home, it is as
necessary as it was in 1940 to take the investigative
measures referred to in President Roosevelt's memorandum. At the same time, the country is threatened
by a very substantial increase in crime. While I am
reluctant to suggest any use whatever of these special
investigative measures in domestic cases, it seems to
me imperative to use them in cases ntally affecting
the domestic security, or where human life is in
jeopardy.
As so modified, I believe the outstanding directive
should be continued in force. If you concur in this
policy, I should appreciate it if you would so indicate
at the foot of this letter.
In my opinion, the measures proposed are within
the authority of law, and I have in the files of the
Department materials indicating to me that my two
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B.

JoHNSON.

WEICK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A two-count indictment was returned in the District Court charging
the defendants, John Sinclair, Lawrence Robert
''Pun'' Plamondon, and John Waterhouse Forrest, in
the first count with entering into a conspiracy commencing on or about September 1, 1968, and contining thereafter up to and including November 1, 1968,

(s) LYNDON

by any mechanical or electronic device, without
the consent of one of the parties involved, (except
in connection with investigations related to the
national security).
(2) No interception shall be undertaken or continued without first obtaining the approval of
the Attorney General.
(3) All federal agencies shall immediately conform their practices and procedures to the provisions of this order.
Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to
01erhear non-telephone conversations is an even more
difficult problem, which raises substantial and unresolved questions of Constitutional interpretation. I
desire that each agency conducting such investigations
consult with the Attorney General to ascertain
whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with
the law and l'i'ith a decent regard for the rights of
others.
Every agency head shall submit to the Attorney
General within 30 days a complete in1entory of all
mechanical and electronic equipment and devices used
for or capable of intercepting telephone conversations. In addition, such reports shall contain a list of
any interceptions currently authorized and the reasons
for them.
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The monitored conversations took place subsequent
to the bombing and after· the conspiracy alleged in the
indictment had terminated. They did not relate in
any way either to the conspiracy or to the substantive
offense charged in the indictment, and would not be
relevant or admissible at the trial; nor did they lead
to any relevant and admissible evidence.
The surveillance was not dil·ected at Plamendon,
nor at any property owned or possessed by him. Disclosure of the dates and the monitored conversations,
however, might furnish valuable information to the
organization under surveillance as to the activities of
the Government. The Government was of the view
that a protective order would furnish no protection
against disclosure. The Government sought to prevent
disclosure by resisting the motion to produce, and in
all probability will decline to comply with the order
of the District Court, which would result in the dismissal of the indictment and the defendants would
go free.
The fact that the interceptions took place before
the indictments were returned is of no consequence.
Since the interceptions contained no useful information relative to the conspil·acy or bombing, they could
not have assisted in the investigation.
In my opinion, the District Judge could not determine illegality by merely examining the logs. He conducted no evidentiary hearing but postponed it until
the end of the trial. In my opinion he abused his discretion b'y ordering production of the logs.
The District Court interpreted 'Alderman v. United
States, 394 U~S. 165 (1969), as requiring an adversary
proceeding to determine illegality in every case of
electronic surveillance, even though critical material
may be involved and the issues in the criminal case
are not complex. The majority opinion takes the
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The precise question was resolved in favor of the
Government in United States v. Clay, 430 F. 2d 165
(5th Cir. 1970), which involved five logs of electronic
surveillance submitted to the District Court for in
carnera inspection. The Government did not challenge
illegality with respect to four of the logs, and they
were turned over to the defendant. None of the four
related in any manner to the charge in the indictment
for violation of the Selective Service laws, and had
no bearing on his conviction. The fifth log which
"related to the gathering of foreign intelligence was
held to be lawful surveillance, reasonable and necessary to the protection of the national interest.''
The District Court in Clay determined this from
an in carnera inspection of the fifth log and an affidavit of the Attorney General, similar in form to his
affidavit in the present case. The Court declined to
turn over to the defendant the fifth log. The Court
further determined from the in camera inspection and
the hearing with respect to the other four logs that
the defendant had failed to establish relevancy.
The Court of Appeals in Clay likewise examined
the fifth log in cameTa and agreed with the District
Court that the contents of the wiretap were not germane to any issue in the criminal prosecution and
that the Court was correct in declining to order its
production.
In an opinion written by Judge Ainsworth, the
Court held:
Under the circumstances here, publication of
the fifth log to defendant is m1warranted and
would be contrary to the national interest, having been obtained in foreign intelligence surveillance. The Court's in camera examination
of the fifth log establishes to our satisfaction
that the contents of the wiretap were not ger-
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In my opinion, the Supreme Court in declining to
rule -on the constitutional issue m(}rely followed "the
traditional practice of this Court of refusing to decide
constitutional questions when the record discloses
other grounds of decision, whether or not they ha\e
been properly raised befor-e us by the parties." Neese
v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77., 78 (1955).
In Alma Motor Go. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Go., 329
U.S. 129, 136 (1946), the CoUTt said:
This Court bas said repeatedly that it ought
not pass on the constitutionality of an act of
Congress unless such adjudication is unaT"oidable. This is true even though the question is
prope:r'ly presented by the record. If two questions .are raised, one of non-constitutional and
the other of constitutional nature, and a decision of the non-constitutional question would
make unnecessary a decision of the constitutional question, the former will be decided.
The Court will wait on a concrete fact situation in
order to avoid rendering a series of advisory o:pinions.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), rehearing denied,
382 u.s. 873.
The District ·Cou1i should have followed the procedure adopted in Clay. Had it done so, it would not
have been necessary to rule on the constitutional issues in this case.
Rule 16 'Of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to p'retrial discovery permits discovery
only of evidence which is •relevant and material. The
intercepted communications were neither relevant nor
material. The ru1e does not authorize the order entered by the District Court in the present case.
In ruling that the President, acting through the
Attorney General, was without constitutiona1 power
to utilize electronic surveiJlance to gather intelligence
information deemed necessary to protect the .nation
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1096 bombings and 176 attempts were reported in the
United States in 1970, against 549 bombings in 1969. 79 explosions were reported in January, 1971. The latest bombing
was the Capitol building in Washington. U.S. News & World
Report, March 15, 1971.
2
This would occasion delay and involve the possibility of
leaks. To require the President of the United States to have
probable cause before he can investigate spies, subversives,

1

and violence. The risk of injury to the Govermnent
is just as great whether the attacks are from within
or without, and domestic attacks may even be instigated, aided and abetted by a foreign power.
Attacks by domestic subversives and saboteurs may
be even more dangerous than those of foreign sources,
because of the difficulty of detection of "Fifth Column" activities. 1
At a time when our soldiers are fighting on foreign
soil and there is turbulence at home, thereby confronting the President on two fronts, with many serious,
perplexing and complex problems, there rests upon his
shoulders a heavy responsibility to protect, not only
the fighting men abroad, but also the people at home,
from destruction of their Government by domestic
subversives.
The legislative and judicial branches of the Government do not have the facilities to cope with the destruction of public buildings by saboteurs. Only the
Executive Department of the Government has the
facilities and know-how to deal with these intricate
problems. When the Chief Executive deems it necessary to gather intelligence information for this purpose he ought not to be required first to make detailed
explanations of classified information to a magistl"ate
and procure his consent as a condition precedent to the
exercise of his constitutional powers. 2
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The power of the President to order electronic surveillance in national security cases 'has been upheld in
United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Btttenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J.
1970); and United States v. Dellingett, Crim. No. 69180, N.D. Ill., 1970. It was denied in United States v.
Smith, Crim. No. 4277, C.D. Cal., 1970.
Mr. Justice White, concurring in Katz v. United
Stcttes, 389 U.S. 347, at 363-364 (1967), said:
In joining the Court's opinion, I note the
Court's acknowledgment that there are circumstances in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this connection, in footnote 23
the Court points out that today's decision does
not reach national security cases. Wire-tapping
to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive Presidents. The present
Administration would apparently save national
security cases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
112-118 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). We
should not require the warrant procedure and the
magistrate's judgment if the President of the
United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has 'Considered the requirements of
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reas'Onable.
Justices Douglas and Brennan expressed contrary
views, 389 U.S. at 359-360. The Supreme Court has
not decided the issue. Giordano v. United States, 394
u.s. 310, 314.
I regard as inapposite the case of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
which involved seizure by the President of private
property in order to prevent a strike which he thought
would seriously affect the economy of the country.
The protection of the Government against attacks
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an answer which stated that at that time the Government had no knowledge of any electronic surveillance
pertaining to any of the defendants but that a further
inquiry was then being conducted with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. In its answer the Government stated that the United States Attorney's Office
would advise the Court if and when any evidence of
electronic monitoring was discovered, and in such
event, would file a reply to the defendant's motion to
disclose.
Subsequently, the Court received an affidavit signed
by the United States Attorney General, John N.
Mitchell, stating that he had authorized and deemed
necessary the wiretapping of certain of defendant
Plamondon's conversations. Sealed records and files
were submitted with this affidavit for the review and
inspection of the Oourt in camera. Also accompanying
these materials was a motion to dismiss the defendant's request for disclosure of the surveillance evidence and a brief in support of said motion. In both
the affidavit and the above stated brief the Attorney
General has certified that public disclosure of the
particular facts concerning this surveillance would
prejudice the national interest, and, therefore, it has
been requested that the Government be notified prior
to any decision regarding disclosure so that it can
determine how it will proceed with the case. Defendants have submitted reply briefs maintaining their
position that this electronic evidence must be submitted to them for their investigation. Oral argument
was heard regarding this issue on January 14th and
16th, 1971.
In Alde1·man v. United States, S'ltpt·a, the Supreme
Court held that the Go\el'Ilillent must disclose and
make available to a defendant who has the proper
standing, any conversations he participated in or that
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Felix Lindsey O'Neal, Criminal No. KC-CR-1204 (D.
C. Kan., September 1, 1970), a case in which the
District Judge made an in-court ruling that surveillance pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney
General was lawful. See, also, United States of America vs. Dellinger7 Criminal No. CR 69-180 (N.D. Ill.,
February 20, 1970) ; United States v. Clay, No. 783,
O.T. (5th Cir., July 6, 1970) cert. pending.
Particularly noteworthy, and the basis of defendant's oral argument in support of his motion for disclosure, is the exceptionally well-reasoned and thorough opinion of the Honorable Judge Warren Ferguson of the Central District of California. U.S. v.
Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8,
1971). The affidavit and circumstances which were
represented before Judge Ferguson are identical to
the affidavit and issues now before this Court for consideration, and the Court is compelled to adopt the
rule and rationale of the Smith case in reaching its
decision today.
The great umbrella of personal rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment has unfolded slowly, but very
deliberately, throughout our legal history. The celebrated cases of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914), and lrfapp v. Ohio7 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
became the cornerstone of the amendment's foundation and together these decisions established the precedent that evidence secured in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights could not be admitted against him at his trial. In Silve?·thorn Lumber Go . v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the
familiar legal simile of the ''poisonous tree'' became
the pillar for the Court's ruling that the exclusionary
rule of Weeks was to be expanded to prohibit the admission of any fruits derived from illegally seized
evidence. The :final buttress to this canopy of Fourth
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The makerR of our Constitution undeTtook
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and

or other hostile acts of a foreign power, or to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States,
or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed
to limit the constitutional power of th8 President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States agajnst the
overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government . . .
In addressing himself to the relevance of th]s statutory provision to the warrantless surveillance issue,
Judge Ferguson of the California District Court
stated succinctly that; "Regardless of these exceptions in the criminal statute the President is, of
course, still subject to the Constitutional limitations
imposed upon him by the constitution. This Court is
in full accord with this rationale for it is axiomatic
that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the
Land. MaTbury v. Madison, 1 Cra.nch (5 U.S.) 137."
The contention by the Government that in cases
involving "national security" a warrantless search is
not an illegal one, must be cautiously approached and
analyzed. We are, after all, dealing not with the rights
of one solitary defendant, but rather, we are here concerned with the possible infringement of a fundamental freedom guaranteed to all American citizens.
In the first Supreme Court case involving wiretapping,
Justice Brandeis concisely stated the issue at stake
in a case of this nature:
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warrant the Court must independently review the request to search and make an objective determination
whether or no't probable cause of some criminal activity exists, which activity would make the searching
reasonable and not in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. In absence of such a requirement of an
objective determination by a magistrate, law enforcement officials would be permitted to make their own
evaluation as to the reasonableness, the scope, and the
evidence of probable cause for a search. This Court
is loath ·to let such a condition come to exist.
In its brief the Govern._rnent cites several cases
which have held that the President has the authority
to authorize electronic surveillance which he deems
is necessary to protect the nation against the hostile
acts of foreign powers. Using this precedent the Government submits that the President should also have
the constitutional power to gather information concerning domestic organizations which seek to attack
and subvert the Government by unlawful means. This
argument, however, is untenable for although it has
long been recognized that the President has unique and
plenary powers in the field of foreign relations; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water·man S.S.
Gorp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); in the area of domestic
affairs the Government can act only in limited ways.
See, Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
The Government also asserts that the President's
authority for warrantless monitorL'1g stems from a
confidential memorandum vvTitten by President Roosevelt in 1940. But if the President is given power to
delegate who shall c:onduct wiretaps, the question
arises whether there is any ~imit on this power. Furthermore, the Smith case, supra, in tracing the history
of the Roosevelt directive, establishes that the Presidential power of surveillance is specidically limited
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cause did exist, a warrant to search may have properly been issued.
In the opinion of this Court, the contention of the
Attorney General is in error; it is supported neither
historically, nor by the language of the Omnibus Crime
Act. Such power held by one individual was never
contemplated by the framers of our Constitution and
cannot be tolerated today. This Court adopts the holding of .Judge Warren .J. Ferguson in U.S. v. Smith,
Criminal No. 4277-CD, (C.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 1971),
which held that:
... in wholly domestic situations there is
no national security exemption from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Since there is no reason why the Government
could not have complied with this requirement
by obtaining the impartial judgment of a court
before conducting the electronic snrveiJlance
in question here, it was obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
This Court hereby ORDERS that the Government
make full disclosure to defendant Plamondon of his
monitored conversations. The Court, in the exercise
of its discretion, further orders that an evidentiary
hearing to determine the existence of taint either in
the indictment or in the evidence introduced at trial
be conducted at the conclusion of the trial of this
matter.
DAMON J. KErTH,
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APPENDIX D

\

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 provides, in pertinent part (82 8tat. 214, 18
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2511(3)):
Nothing :contained in this chapter or in secti:on 605 of the Communications A'c t of 19,34 ( 48
Stat. 1103; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other
hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained
in this chapter be deemed to limit the eonstitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government
by force or other unlawful means, or against any
other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government. The contents of
any wire or oral communication intercepted by
authority of the President in the exercise of the
foregoing powers may be received in evidence
in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only
where such interception was reasonable, and shall
not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
(74)
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Mr. Erwin N. Grilwold
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Deal' Mr. Q,riawold:

I received yout-

'

no~ea

ot the 17th a..t 18th and the enclosed memo.
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The flrat deal• with the duty of the 1overnment to deny ar atfirrn the
exletence ot a. wiretap.

·'

The ·• •tolld 1et1 up a 1tandard for the· dlac:loauro of wbe-.p data,. wheee
the date. •tema lrom a wiretap occurrlaa prior to June of 1968.

The tblrcl deale with the que•tlon •hen data may be held
a

w~retap
·•

oc:c::u.rrlng prior to June of 1968.

t:.Q have ttemmed from

·

'

Mr. Tuttle ll correct when he obae"ea that S. 30 in the Seute applied to all
kinda of aolawlully obtained evidence and that it waa not limited in a.pplieatlon to
a particular period ot time •.
·Ml', Tuttle ie not correct when he

.l.J

deacrlb~•

how the Hou•• ameGded

.~;:~'":·

s. 30,

~·'

The Ho\J.ee llmited the acope of all of Title VU to wiretaps and the impact of
aubpa.l'agrapha (Z) and (3) to wiretapa occurring prior to .June 19, 1968.
The laquaae of eubparagraph (1) .... which waa the aubject of my letter ..... waa
Ho~e •

not. changed by the action of the
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Conaequently, the Sena\e leglalath•e blatory. quoted 11) my letter, romaine
relevant to the cora.atruction of Tltle VU and 1t1 relation to Title m.
.
MJ' .. Tuttle l.t correct when he obaerved that •ub~rasrapha JZ) and (3) of
Title VU. aa •meaded, canllot be lQ confllet: with T~tle IlL since they clovetaU,
each applying· to ,t.Uferent perioda of tbne.

The referen.ce · ie the Senate D.eport, however, waa "e. S·. &ectioQ. ZSlO(a)."
Tb.e poaeiblllty ot a confllct betwe4tn other provlalona of Title Ill and TU1e VU
waa not precluded.

•uaae•t• 'one euch po•i1ble

The aovernrne~t'a brief ln !fl!.!• (pp. Z3-Z4},
conflict.

m

lt ars~·· 11'011). the notice prcwlaloaa of Seatloo ZS18 (q) ot Title
that Iince
no notice of a whtetap need be tiled betore a grand ju.ry proceecUng, no motloa to
auppreaa lft tbe context of a grand JurJ proceedtns waa envleloaed by Title UL
Thla cott.atrw=tloa of Tltle ta '' ia accord wlth tbe iraten& .o f tbe dl'aftere ....
a a far aa it goea. , , :
'

I,

I

'•

It ~ontiouea,. however, to confuae the court proceeding foso clvll eootempt with
the arand jury p:roceedil1s ltaelf. The <Jlvil contempt pro1:eedlng tn ootart atande
i.Qdependent ot the grand Jury proceecUnJ. Suob a cou.rt proceedit&l mlsbt Item from
a grand j\lry proceec:Uq n & crlmlaai trial, !!. the enfor<aement of an admlnletrative
agehoy'• eubpeou.

•I

·'

I would augse•t. therefore, that where a clvU contempt proeeedial Ia court. was
contemplated,. Section Z518 (q) would. la fact, require that a nOUC:fe to Wte wlretap
evidence be ee1'~ed where the p.-oeecuttoo intended to rely on aucb evidence to •ua•
tain the cltatloo.
The Senate Report tbu1 makes lt clear that Title VD and not Tltle U1 11 intended.
to govern those •ituationa under subparagraph (1) ln wblch a witneea may requeet the
government to afibm or deDy the exletenee of a wiretap...... Ne> oega.tive implication
from Title DI 1bould be drawn, in ebol't, wblc:h would limit the ecope of TlUe VU.

.

.

' Parenthetically, J note that i.f the soveromen.t told the wltaee• in the &rand jury
tha.t be wae the 1u.bject of a wiretap, the Dotice requirement of eec:Uon l.518 (q) could
be waived by the court, •lnce no prejudice would rceult to the w1tae11 from being
brougbt before the court on the citation ''wltbou~ notlceu.,

'·

..

.

·~

.

',,

..

•,

!

'•'

.

,·'··'

... .. "

.r '

"!'.' l ::'·

. ' '""·,,.

;; ; '

-~'

'

...

·~-,

•

,,.~·,_;

;;,· .t'' .. _,

·,, ·U•

~

'
.~. • 'I•
~·

I'

<

, ,. ,

l

·•-~.:

• ".· •.:.,·

'I .• ' .

•I''

.'):.'

'

'

1.''

,,

'

'

..... 3

Th ulti~te rneaDlftl o.f Lann lleaYe to yoQ~ ju.dgmeu. I only .;lehed to call
the caee ,to you atteotion, not to pre•• on you a partlcsulaf interpwetatlon of it. My
eugseation wae that Mr. J'Witiee Stewart and the JD&jorlty seemed to feel a need to
di•cu•• leauee relevant to ~sap. I note. too. that the minority, which lnoluded two
preaently alttina joaUQea. felt tbatneoeeeity to disavow aepeete of the JJ¥lJority•e
opi&lon •• the etatua of a jail as a conatituUonally protected aaoea, the atandiog ot
a visitor to object to 8\Jrveillanee of a jaU, and the I' each o£ the J'oul'th Amendment
"to prote~t acaiaat teetlmonial eompulaloG 1olely ae a reeult of an uncon1tltut1onal
eearch OJ" aeizure." , (370 U.S. at 150]
Might it not bo eusseeted that thl,e a•pec:t of

~!za

has mearllna for Egan?
'

May I also •uggeat that you or whoever preeeata the aovernm.eat•e araum.,nt
take a look at CosteUo v. Unlted Statee, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), a cue that ll'eally
should have brought to your attention when lra1•ed the poetible lmpllcatioo.a of

I

!"'"\····'

Lanza.
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~ Coetell~ the 4efendaat argued that admiealont made during & arattd jury
appeaaoance should 110t be coneldeJ>ed in a deu.turallzatlon procoedlng becauee hie
appearance before the grand jury, the questions aakttd, and the anawere elicited
were all the proda~t of unlawful wiretapa.
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·
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Mr • .Juetlce Brennan, lor the majority, dld aot hold aga.lut Mr. Costello
because bie theory 9~ theory waa untenable •• a poaltion that tbeaovemment eeema
to bo ar;uins aboulcJ be adopted in ~sae- ~etead, ho eoa.ceded that the wiretap• in
queatlon pt-ompted the calling of Coatello. He then went on to lind, however, that
more wae required to invoke the 11 fruit of the polaonow. tree 11 doctrine. Tho Court
waa aatiell4itd., he aalcl, that proa.,eutor ha4 baeea independent of tho wiretap to ask
the questions anct that Costello made the admleaiona for reaeou other than the
e.x.iatenc:e of the waeta.p. Hence, no O&U8a.l connectlon bad been abown between the
unlawful tap and the adrnleaione, and the admissions need not be •upppe11ed in the
denatw.-all:aation prooeeding.
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Even more 10 than Lanza, Costello would aeem to ar1u.e tbat a witne•• ln a
proceedlq ... leglelatlve or grand jury -baa a right to re1lat unlawful queationing,
at least in tbe contest of subsequent COUI't proeeed.lng. Change the factu.alllndinge
in Coatetlo and you ppocluce a situation analogous to the assumed facta 111 EaaD.
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Like L&naa, Coetello waa not cited it'l, the Esaa brle£.
Finally~ I note that Mr. Tuttle 11 ri3be when he euggeate that l had staff reapon•
eibility in working oo tbe leglelative hiato~y of Title VU ot the 1910 Act. laleo bad
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: February 24,. 1972

U.S. v. U.S. District Court (Michigan)
No. 70-153

Note 13 of the Solicitor General's brief (p. 30) refers to the
sealed exhibit involved in the case, and states that it has been lodged
with the clerk of this Coo.rt.
I would like to examine this exhibit. If authority from the

Chief Justice is required, or if the exhibit must be examined by the
Court in Conference, I woo.ld appreciate being informed. Otherwise,
U I may view it in my chambers, please set up a time for me to do

so - probably week after next after the February hearings have been
completed.
L. F. P., Jr.

Con£.

2/25/72

Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued . f.~Ofllf\:J;"Y . ?~, .... , 19.??
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WIRETAP CASE No. 70-153

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

u.S.

523 (1966)

The ease involved prosecution of a person who refused to permit
inspection - under the San Francisco housing code - of his apartment. The
housing code authorized warrantless inspection in connection with fire, health
and safety provisions of the City Code.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for six members of the Court, held
that the appellant could net be prosecuted for depying admission, as the
Fourth Amendment proscribes warrantless search of private property.
It was argued- relying upon Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 -that
no warrants were necessary for this type of inspection, emphasizing the
public emern over health, safety and fire. The city also argued that it
would be impossible to obtain a specific warrant for each specific residence,
and that its inspeetioo program would be frustrated entirely.
The Court's answer was to suggest that validity of "area warrants".
Ita analysis was that the Fourth Amendment prooibits only ''unreasonable"
searches; that reasonableness is a relative standard, dppending upon the
circumstances and the public interest and private interest involved.
Among other things, the Court said:
I

"Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard,

including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that
the public interest demands a particular rule must receive
careful consideration.

••• * *

2.
''In assessing whether the public interest demands creation
of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which
in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search." (p. 533)

The Court emphasized that the search in question was not to obtain
evidence with respect to a particular crime but was "aimed at securing citywide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property."
In commenting upon the relationship between "reasonableness" and

"probable cause" the Court said:
"In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant for that inspection - the need for the inspection
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code
enforcement. " (p. 535)

The Court then addressed the issue of allowing "area" searches:
"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused, for
the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidabl' based on its appraisal of conditions in the
area as a whole, not on its lmowledge of conditions in each
particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable
cause standard urged by appellant is adopted, the area
inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking compliance with code standards and the reasonable goals of
code enforcement will be dealtha crushing blow.

* ••• *
"Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search

..

.,,~

3.
against the invasion which the search entails. But we think
that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the
reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First,
such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. s. at 367-371.
Secoo.d, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any
other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results.
Many such coodttions - faulty wiring is an obvious example are not observable from outside the building and indeed may
not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally,
because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor
ai.ed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve
a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
Both the majority and the dissent in Frank emphatically
supported this conclusion. " (pp. 536-37)
My Comment
Note the holding that there must be a ''balancing (of) the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails. " Also note that the
Court referred toMa number of persuasive factors" which support the
reasonableness of area inspections: (1) long history of judicial and public
acceptance (analogous to the long history of Presidential usage of wiretap);
(11) the public interest need in cities like San Francisco (analogous to the
national need to preserve our government against unlawful attack or
subversion); and (ill) the area type warrant is not directed at "discovery of
evidence of crime" (analogous, perhaps, to the collection of intelligence).
The Court then concluded that "area inspection is a reasonable
search of private property within ~e meaning of the Fourth Amendment"
and went on to say:

"(Since reasonable) it is obvious that 'probable cause'

4.
to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling. " (p. 538)
My Comment:
The foregoing is important. The Court says that once a determination
of "reasonableness' 'is made the probable cause element "must exist if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards" are satisfied. (In the
wiretap case, I think we can establish the reasonableness of the need for
this type of search. What is lacking at the present time is appropriate
"legislative or administrative standards".
Dissenting Opinion:
The dissent, written by Clark and concurred in by Stewart and Harlan,
thought that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to administrative searches
such as this. They would have followed Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 which the majority opinion partially overruled. But Clark came down hard
on his view that the "area search" approved by the majority wouia in effect
result in "synthetic search warrants".
Mr. Justice White met this objection in the dissenting opinion as
follows:

5.

"It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause
test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be
to authorize a 'synthetic search warrant' and thereby to
lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373. But we do not agree.
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a
decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion cootemplated, then there is probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf.
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186.
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity
of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely
gives full recognition to the competing public and private
interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills
the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy.
see Eaton v. Price, 364 U.s. at 273-274." (Pp. 538-39)

* * *. *
See v. City of seattle, 387 U. S. 541 - decided the same day and with the
same division among members of the Court- substantially followed Camara,
a nd adds nothing presently relevant.

'

"
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Katz v. United states, 389 U. S. 347
This case applied the Fourth .Amendment to the wiretapping, by the
FBI in an interstate gambling violation case, to conversations in a public
telephone booth. Justice stewart's emphasis, in construing the Fourth, was
that it protected "persons" and not just things.

This case also departed from prior law in holding that "no physical
penetration" of premises was required to come within the Fourteenth
Amendment, effectively overruling (eroding the scope of) Olmstead v. U.S.,
277 U.s. 438 and Goldman v.

u.s.,

316 u.s. 129.

Justice stewartsstated that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the trespass
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. " p. 353.
He relied on Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 and Silverman v. United states,
365 U.S. 505 as having accomplished this "eroding".
The FBI agents had acted without any warrant or judicial authority.
The Court noted that they had acted with restraint:
" "The Government urges that, because its agents relied
upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because
they did no more here thin they might properly have done
with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively
validate their cmduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent
that the agents in this ease acted with restraint. Yet the
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the
agents themselves, not be a judicial officer. They were

'

,,

2.

not required, before commencing the search, to present
their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by
a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during
the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits
established in advance by a specific court order. Nor
were they directed, after the search had been completed,
to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that
had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this
Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground
that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities
to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.
Searches conducted without warrants have been held
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably sh\UWing
probable cause, ' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
33 for the Constitution requires 'thiit the deliberate,
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . • . be interposed
between the citizen and the police. • . . 'Wong Sun v.
United States 371 U.s. 471, 481-482. •aver and again
this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial
processes,' United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
and that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are~
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subjecl
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. " (p. 356-87)
Comments on the Foregoing:
1. The "well-delineated exceptions" referred to above are not
presently relevant. They relate to search incidental to arrest and the like.
2. The paragraph quoted above set forth the standards which were
incorporated into Title

m,

namely:

(i) authorization by a "neutral magistrate";
(ii) requirement "to observe precise limits established in

advance by a specific court order";

8.
(iii) after the search, "to notify the authorizing magistrate
in detail of all that had been seized". ·
(ive) although not expressed in the above paragraph, the opinion
clearly shows that the magistrate's warrant will issue only after
a showing of "probable cause".
3.

In footnote 23, the majority opinion states that the "national security"

problem is not "presented by this case".
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:
Douglas and Brennan concurred briefly, for the purpose of disagreeing
with Justice White as to surveillance in national security cases. It is clear
from their brief opinion that they would apply all of the safeguards even to
national security cases.
Harlan concurred, but sought to narrow the scope of the majority
opinion.
Justice White concurred in a brief opinion which is directly primarily
to national security:
"In joining the Court's opinion, I note the Court's
aelmowledgaent that there are circumstances in which
it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this
connection, in footnote 23 the Court points out that
today's decision does not reach national security eases.
Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nationahas
been authorized by successive Presidents. The present
Administration would apparently save national security
eases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 112-118 (1967) (White J.,

•., , '

1.-

4.
dissenting). We should not require the warrant procedure
and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the
United states or his chief legal officer, the Attorney
General, has considered the requirements of national
security and authorized electronic surveillance as
reasonable. " (pp. 363 ... 64)
Mr. Justice Black's dissent was based on his view that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to protect any right of privacy; that it was directed
primarily against places and things.

•

I

lfp/ss lee 2/28/72

WIRETAP CASE No. 70-153

Berger v. New York, 388 u.S. 41
t.

~

t,

'?- .. ' ~

~\

In this ease, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, a majority of the

Court held the New York statute violated the Fourth Amendment, as being
overly broad and without adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights.
The Bergt:r case is a convenient reference to the history of the
Wiretap controversy.
Prior eases analyzed include: (I) Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438
(Clark's opinion, p. 50); (11) Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (Clark's
opinion, p. 51); (iii) Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Clark's
opinion, p. 51); (iv) Wong Sun v. U.s., 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (Clark's
opinion, p. 52;* (v) Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963) {Clark's opinion,
p. 52).
Basis of Court's Decision
New York had a statute requiring a warrant and a prior court order.
But the New York statute was weak as to "probable cause". Mr. Justice
Clark addressed this probable cause issue as follows:
l

I

I

I

*Wonfc Sun applied the exclusionary rule to verbal statements. It had
there Ofore been applied to the exclusion of physical evidence and documents.

2.
"While New York's statute satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a neutral and detached authority
be interposed between the police and the public, Johnson
v. United states, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), the broad sweep
of the statute is immediately observable. It permits the
issuance of the order, or warrant for eavesdropping, upon
the oath of the attorney general, the district attorney or
any police officer above the rank of sergeant stating that
•there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be thus obtained .•. ' Such a requirement
raises a serious probable-cause question under the Fourth
Amendment. Under it warrants may only issue 'but upon
probable cause. supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.' Probable cause under
the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he
has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient
unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.s. 132, 162 (1925);
Husty v. United SlatS& 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1931);
Brinef.r v. united
tes, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949)."
(pp. 5 -55)
But the Courts decision was not predicated solely on the "probable
cause'' issue. The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant ''particularly
describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. "
The New York statute was held to lack this "particularization". The opinion
stated:
"The Fourth Amendment commands that a warrant
issue not only upon probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, but also 'particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. t New York's statute lacks this particularization.
It merely says that a warrant may issue on reasonable
ground to believe that the evidence of crime may be
obtained by the eavesdrop. It lays down no requirement

3.
for particularity in the warrant as to what specific crime
has been or is being committed, nor 'the place to be
searched,' or 'the persons or things to be seized' as
specifically required by the Fourth Amendment. The
need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the
showing required when judicial authorization of a search
is sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. "
(pp. 55-56).
On pages 58 and 59 of the opinion, Mr. Justice Clark condemned the

use of "general warrants" -leaving too much to the discretion of the officer
executing the order. He questioned the "two months period" allowed by the
New York statute; he spoke of the statute allowing "a roving commission to
seize any and all conversations.. "
Although the Clark opinion reflects a narrow and restrictive view with
respect to electrooic surveillance (and its standards could hardly be applied
to "intelligence' cases), it did recognize - in the concluding paragraph - that
valid statutes could be drawn:
"It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authoriz·
ing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth
Amendment's requirements. If that be true then the •truits'
of eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment.
On the ether hand this Court has in the past, under specific
conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of eavesdropping devices. Bee Goldman v. United states, 316 U.S.
129; On Lee v. United states, 343 U. S. 74'1; Lopes v. United
states, supth; and Osborn v. United states, suhta. In ffie
litter case e eavesdropping device was permi ed where the
1c ommission of a specific offense' was charged, its use
was 'under the most precise and discriminate circumstances'
and the effective administration of justice in a federal court
was at stake. The states are under no greater restrictions.
The Fourth Amendment does not make the 'precincts of the
home or the office . . . sanctuaries where the law can never
reach,' Douglas J., dissenting in Warden, Maitland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.s. 294, 321, bU tt does

I.
prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before
official invasion is permissible. Our concern with the
statute here is whether its language permits a trespassory
invasion of the home or office by general warrant, contrary
to the command of the Fourth Amendment. As it is written,
we believe that it does." (pp. 63-64).

• * •• *
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
·Justice Stewart e oncurred in the result because he felt that on the
particular facts before the Court -the Fourth Amendment has been violated.
He refused to hold, as did the Justices concurring with him, that the New
York statute was void on its face. Justices Black, Harlan and White
concurred with Justice Stewart as follows:
''I fully agree with Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice White that this New York law is
entirely constitutional. In short, I think that 'electronic
eavesdropping, as such or as it is permi*d by this
statute, is not ailunreasonable search and seizure. t
The statute contains many provisions more stringent
than the Fourth Amendment generally requires, as
Mr. Justice Black has so forcefully pointed out. And
the petitioner himself has told us that the law's
'reasonable grounds' requirement 'is undisputedly
equivalent to the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. ' This is confirmed by decisions
of the New York courts. People v. Cooen, 42 Misc.
2d 403, 248 N.Y. s. 2d 339; People v. Beahan& 43
Misc. 2d 521, 252 N.Y. S. 2d 110; ~eopdf v.
ossman,
45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y. s. 2d 26 .
course, a
state court's construction of a state statute is binding
upon us.

5.
"In order to hold this statute unconstitutional, therefore, we would have to either rewtite the statute or
rewrite the Constitution. I can only conclude that the
Court today seems to have rewritten both.

"The issue before us, as Mr. Justice White says, is
'whether this search compUed with Fourth Amendment
standards-:-'"For me that issue is an extremety close one
tn the circumstances of this case. It certainly eann<X be
resolved by incantation of ritual phrases like 'general
warrant. ' Its resolution involves 'the unavoidable task
in any search and seizure case: was the particular .
search and seizure reasmable or not.'" (pp. 68-69)
Important Pobtg
Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that "reasonable grounds" have been
held to be the equivalent to the "probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment" - under the New York statute.
Mr. Justice Stewart then went on to hold that the affidavits fUed in
support of the Judge's order lacked the ''particularity" required -especially
in view of the 60-day period.

Justice Black fUed a separate dissent holding - with obvious feeling that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "ban the use of evidenc obtained by
eavesdropping. "
Justice Har1an fUed a very strong dissent, attacking the majority
opinion for intruding into state criminal law enforcement, for holding a state
statute unconstitutional on its face, for allowing the particular plaintiff
"standing" and on other grounds.

6.

The Harlan opinion contains a number of educational and helpful points:
(a) He points out that there are two separate clauses in the Fourth
Amendment - one forbidding ''unreasonable" searches, and the other setting
forth "specific constraints upon the issuance and character of warrants".
In concluding that electronic surveUlance is not "unreasonable search and

seizure'' .1?!!'.!!.!; Harlan makes the following helpful statement:
"At the least, reasonableness surely implies that this
Court must not constrain in any grudging fashion the
development of procedures, consistent with the Amendment's
essential purposes, by which methods of search and seizure
unknown in 1789 may be appropriately controlled. It is
instead obliged to permit, and indeed even to encourap,
serious efforts to a · roach constructive! the difficul
~ro
ms crea e bye ec ronic eaves ropp g." pp. 94-95)
emphasis added)
Mr. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
His dissent, commencing on p. 107, attacks both the factual assumptions
and the reasoning of the majority opinion. Relying heavily on the Crime Commission •s Report - and quoting excerpts from it in an &ppendix to his opinion,
Mr. Justice White strongly defends the necessity for the use of electronic
surveillance, and finds the New York statute to be reasonable.
Perhaps the most important point he makes (for purposes of the present
case) is that "reasonableness" depends upon the public need and the circumstanc
Citing two previous opinions of the Court, he said:

·

7.
''How the Court can feel itself so much better qualified than

the Commission, which spent months an its study, to assess
the needs of law enforcement is beyond my comprehension.
We have only just decided that reasooableness of a search
under the Fourth Amendment must be determined by weighing
the invasions of Fourth Amendment interests which wiretapping
and eavesdropping entail against the public need justifying such
invasions. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523; See v.
City of SeatN& 387 u.s. 541. In these terms, it would seem
imperative
t the Court at least deal with facts of the real
world. This the Court utterly fails to do. In my view, its
opinion is wholly unresponsive to the test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. " (p. 114)
Justice White's opinion also contains an interesting analysis of
legislation proposed by the Johnson Administration (Ramsey Clark) which
would have allowed "to protect the nation against actual or potential attack
or other hostile acts of a foreign power or any other serious threat to the
security of the United states, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities." H. R.. 5386 and

s.

928

§

3 (Note to

myself: I should haveaaada research done as to the hearings on this bUl,
particularly with respect to what Attorney General Clark recommended with
respect to national security. This part of Justice White's opinion commences
at p. 114 and carries on overtop. 116.)

·

. ..,,.,..
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~

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against three
defendants, charging them with conspiracy

1!t

-wx to destroy

property in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 371.

f

government

~~
the defendants,

Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of
the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

During

pretrial proceedings, the defendants filed a motion for disclosure of
certain electronic surveillance information.

With its response, the

government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General of the United
States~cknowledging

that government agents had overhead conversations

participated in by Plafnondon.

A copy of the Attorney General's

affidavit is set forth in the margin.

The logs of the surveillances were

filed with the affidavit in t~~a sealed exhibit for in camera
inspection by the Court.

2.
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and the SRXb!ed:
sealed exhibit, the government asserted that the surveillances were
lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, as a reasonable
exercise of the President's power (exercised through the Attorney General)
"to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the
~

nation from attempts of domestic organization to attack and subvert
1\

the existing structure of the government.

';1

The District Court held

that the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment, and ordered the
government to make full disclosure to Pla:Jmondon of his overhead
conversations x as a necessary prelude to an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether any of the evidence upon which the indictment was
based or which the government intended to offer at trial was "tainted"
by the surveillance.

Alderman v. United states,

~

394 U.S.

~

169

(1969).
The government then filed in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside the m.strict
Court's order, which was stayed pending final disposition of the
petition.

r:;)

~

'Phe Cuutt of

~~ had jurisdiction •
~e

-u,·(..

fite.

Co« ..t ot /le eds

•The-Court' s risdiction was challenged '&Qhp& tke Q wnrt 9f!it~eals on
the ground tha the District Court's order was interlocut_3I'Y j!pd not
appealable under 28 U. S.C. § 1291. On this issue, the ~?uffheld that it
did have jurisdiction, relying upon the All Writs Statute 28 U.S. C. §1651
and cases cited in its opinion, __ F. 2d ___}
__. No attack is made
in this Court as to the appropriateness of the writ of mandamus procedure.

3.
the Court of Appeals held that the surveillances were unlawful and that
the District Court had properly required disclosures of the overhead
conversations.

Aeso;pdingly, aJl-OPder was-en:t~"£mytllg1he

gO'"v·ernment's-petition

ancl~

granted certiorari. *
\.

n
; • "''presented in this Court, is whether
The issue, not ft-r'
neretofore
the Attorney General, acting for the President has authority to authorize

~Y

"to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to

protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack
and subvert the existing structure of the government?"**
In considering this issue, it is necessary to review X:Jce briefly
the pertinent history relating to the use of electronic surveillance by
the national government both with respect to ordinary crime and national
security. ***

*The Court of Appeals order was dated April 8, 1971; the petition for
writ of certiorari was filed here on May 8, 1971, and was granted June
21, 1971 ( 403 U. S. 930), this Court taking jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C.
§ 1254 (i).
**The framing of the issue is necessary expressed in general terms in
the interest of brevity at this point. The scope of the issue will be
apparent from the opinion which follows.
***The term "ordinary crime" is used imprecisely to incwde the tyt~es of
crimes specified in Title Til of the Omnibus Crime and Safe streets Act
of 1968.

4.
Until 1967, the law with respect to electronic surveillance was
chaotic.

In Olmstead v. United states, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court

held, where the interception of a telephone line was accomplished without entry upon the premises, that it was not proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. Apparently in response to this ruling, the Congress enacted
§ 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. * Section 605,
covering both interstate and intrastate telephone calls applied to
private pe rsons as well as federal and state law enforcement officers. **
But in view of the ambiguous wording of the statute, it was construed
by the Department of Justice as allowing interception so long as no
disclosure was made outside of the Department of the fruits of the
interception.

Federal officers therefore felt free, both under the statute

and Olmstead, to engage in wiretapping although the results could not
be used in the federal courts.***
*48 stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S. C. §605, Ill (1958), prohibiting the
interception and public divulgence of the contents of any wire communication or its interception and use for personal benefit.
**See Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Benati v. United states,
355 u.s. 96 (1957)-.***See Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. U.S., 308
u.s. 338 (1938). See, ~ _g_. , testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Committee on
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong. 2d session 34 (1966).

5.
The confusion at the federal level was compounded by that
among the states. Most of them made no effort to regulate

H

surveillance of any kind; others had a variety of statutes of dubf ious
meaning and merit.*

In addition to the lack of harmony among

state laws, and between the federal statute and such state laws as
did exist, there was doubt as to the
§

degree~

of supremacy of

605, as to who had standing to complain, and - for a time - as

to whether the X:H fruits of an interception must be suppressed in
state as well as federal courts.
Not until 1942 did a "bugging" case reach the Court. In
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, it was held that a
~

detectaphone placed against the outer wall of

an office involved no physical trespass and therefore did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. **
**See also On Lee v. United states, 343 U.S. 747

~

(1953).

~

~~~-~

*The most notable exception to the inadequacy of state law
. ew
.
York, where a court order system had been employed with~e
success for many years. "Wiretapping was the mainstay of the
New York attack against organized crime until federal court decisions
intervened." The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 201
(1967). The New York~ statute was held invalid as being overly
broad,x and violative of 4th Amendment~ rights in Burger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

6.
In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) the Court
found a Fourth Amendment violation wre re "the eavesdropping was
a cc omplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises occupied by petitioners. And in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court for the first time specifically
held that the Fourth Amendment protects "against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure
of papers and effects". *
It was this state of the law, both statutory and that derived

from the cases, that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration found to be "intolerable":
"It serves the

neither of privacy
nor of law enforcement. One way or the other, the
present controversy with respect to electronic
surveillance must be resolved."
interest~

*Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 485. The exclusionary
rule was applied where the evidence was obtained through "an
unlawful invasion" of a private area, as contrasted with the absence
of physical invasion in Goldman. Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373
u. s. 427 ( 1963)
**The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra, 203.

7.
A long step toward clarification was taken a few months later
in Katz v. United states, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). * Although foreshadowed
by the decision in Burger, the Court expressly held in Katz that "the
underpinning of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the no trespass doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling." 389 U.S. at 353.

The

interception in question has been accomplished in a public telephone
booth in an interstate

gambling~

investigation.

*Prior to Katz, the Court in Burger v. New York, supra, had held
that the New York Six statute violated the Fourth Amendment.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Chief:
In No.( 70-153, •
·
a suggestion. ~

s.

v. U. S. D. C., I would like to make

I think the assignment to Byron (much as I love my friend)
is not an appropriate one for the reason that he and two others
including yourself voted to affirm on the statute, , while there were
five who voted to affirm on the Constitution.
Those five were
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, myself, and Powell.
You will recall that Lewis Powell said that to handle the
government's problem of searching the country over for an appropriate
magistrate to issue a warrant, an opinion should be written suggesting
that the court here in the District of Columbia should handle all
of the cases, which I thought was a splendid idea.
With all respect, I think Powell represents the consensus.
I have not canvassed everybody, but I am sure that Byron, who goes on
the statute, will not get a court.
To save time, may I suggest you have a huddle and see to it that
Powell gets the opinion to write?
Or if you want me to suggest an assignment, that would be mine.

WI 0. D.

~-

The Chief Justice

-.
~r-nttt <q"tttttt cf t4t 'J!ittittlt .;%tatts

~asJringictt,
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CHAMBERS OF

March eighth

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

1972
Dear Lewis:
Re:

No. 70-153 - U. s. v.
U. S. Dist. Ct.

As you know, the Chief and I have had
an exchange of correspondence on the above
case.
The vote at Conference was to affirm
but there were five of us who could not do
it on the statute but went on the Constitution. And according to my notes, you
were one of the five.
Byron, however, was
explicit. He could not go on the Constitution
but would have to go on the statute.
Traditionally an opinion would therefore
be in the province of the senior Justice to
assign.
That was not done in this case and
the matter is of no consequence to me as a
matter of pride and privilege -- but I think
it makes a tremendous difference in the result.
I am writing you this note hoping you
will put on paper the ideas you expressed in
Conference and I am sure you will get a
majority.
I gather from the Chief's memo
that he is not at all averse to that being
done.
William 0. Douglas
Mr. Justice Powell
Copy to Mr. Justice Brennan

,j~tmt

<ijcu:d of flrt 'Jifuittb ,jtatts

Jras4i:ughtn. ~. <q. 2ll~'!-~
CH ...MI!I!:RS 01"

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

March 6, 1972

Re: No. 70-153 - U. S. v. U. S. Dist. Ct., East District, Michigan,
Southern Division

Dear Bill:
I have your memo of March 6 and see no reason why Lewis should
not undertake to write and see what support his position achieves.
I am not as clear on Lewis' position as your memo suggests but I
would be happy if his view could command a majority.
I believe there may be much likelihood of Byron's securing substantial
support and I am not sure Byron's and Lewis' views are not rather
close.
In all events this, like several other of our current cases, will not
clarify until we have something in writing.
I adhere to my request that Byron proceed to write. We cannot evaluate
the views until we see them. They may not 11 write 11 as they were expressed at Conference and of necessity few were very precise -- or
could be.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conference

uran 1cc

Jf'<Jf · t~

Re: No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. Distrist Court

(A,epft,.. ' , ,M
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This refers to your notes as to the drafting of"' opinions in

the above case.
As it seemed: te

Ri8 th~

views were fractionated (and in some

instances, tentative) at the ronference, I am not at all sure that any
opinion will command a majority.

My own views, subject - as always -

to more carefully study and mature consideration, may be outlined
briefly as follows:
There are

Plf!IW

three types of situations in which the government

0

is emplying electronic surveillance:

1. Specified types of crime. Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Act authorizes the use of surveillance in cases involving specified
crimes or types of crimes.

This authority is subject to prior court

order, and to complying with the rather detailed and specific standards
specified in the Act.

The Act was drawn to meet the requirements

of Katz.
2.

National security.

a disclaimer that:

Section 2511(3) of Title III contains

2.
"Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a fnreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United states, or to protect
national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. "
This recognizes the

jmpo~aRoo ~

1-w
responsibility of the

aati.Qaal

~aoonPUy

a.ui ihe special

~ ;UIC·~~...-~.y.

Presiden~

It is in conformity with the uniform

practice of Presidents since President Roosevelt's memorandum on
this subject in World War II.

The inclusion of this section in Title

III recognizes, implicitly if not explicitly, that the system of judicial
supervision and public disclosure required by Title III with respect

.

;tt:;:t;l'la•
u
in
national
security cases.
,.

to +fte specified crimes is n o t d

3. Domestic subversion . Section 2511(3) also provides
(immediately following the language quoted above):
"Nor shall anything ~ contained in this chapter
be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measure:;xx as he deems necessary
to protect the United states against the overthrow of the
government by force or other unlawful means, or against
any other clear and present danger to the structure or
existence of the government."*

*The final sentence in § 2511(3) provides that any communication
intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of these
powers "may be received in evidence" only where such interception
was "reasonable".

This language, to the same extent perhaps as that quoted in 2 above,
indicates a ~ongressional intent

t

to exclude such Presidential

action from the judicial supervision and other standards prescribed

J+-d~
in Title III, and u e li!JoO 8letu ly suggests a

1m

Congressional judgment

that the President's extraordinary power in this respect is not limited
L

H-... ·~4.d-t( ~

exclusively to national security involving foreign powers. BulA.-...., ~
not

n

clear from the language

FWesident to he tree to

~r:_, So"~""" MMS~

?£t.

where the President deems it necessary to protect the United State

~

structure o existence of the government. " Although not limite

iauhtelen atilt &f i1 *t "overthrowH" or "other clear and present

"

.._,..

danger" emanat~ from American citizens a.wl domestic organizations.

I come now to the case before us.

There was nc{ testimony.

The case was submitted on the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit

4.

~

and the logs of the surveillances were presented for in camera

"
~inspection

only.*

The Attorney General's affidavit

reads in pertinent part as follows:
"The defendant Plamondon has participated in
conversations which were overheard by government
agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were
being employed to gather intelligence information
deemed necessary to protect the nation~ from
attempts of domestic organizations to:.:ll:tiiok attack
and subvert R the existing structure of the government. "
The affidavit does not

t+-..Jt..the language of

~w

§

2511(3).

The

danger described:XH is limited to "attempts of domestic organizations
to attack and subvert the existing :siD: structure of the governmentx:

"r

~

lhere is no averment of danger of overthrown by force or of a'blear
and present

danger'~
~

On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit (and the
absence of other evidence), th;tourts below considered this case
to involve only "domestic organizations", and they drew a distinction
between a President's power with

respec~

to national security where

~~~~

J

foreign governments are concerned, and ,--.rely domestic organizations

"

*I have not yet examined the logs, but my recollection is that we were
told during argument that they related - in this case - exclusively to
a domestic organization. Footnote 13, Solicitor General's brief, states
that - in addition to the sealed exhibit filed with the District Court
below - the SG has lodged with the Clerk of:Xmx this Court for its
in camera inspection "the same exhibit we submitted to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Ferguson case." Tt.,.,c, S ~

.,..._,,_,. r ,._~ ~ l"kJ. "t4~ u..., ~ ~·4·1" ~ ~
··~ .-( a...oA-~ ... t ~(tJ ·11-f
Gotr\e

V.C.;Aa&.~ ~ ~ ...... :. '

IlL- ~<J,:I

A-•~·11-l41Mc"-''•,.·.J... ~A~&~~
1....--~-- .........

~

~.... Ji-tl~~v ........~+'

(See Judge Keith's opinion
Circuit was as follows:
"We hold that in dealing ·th the threat of domestic
subversion, the Executive ranch . . . is subject
to the limitations of the Fou h Amendment . . . " (A •' 1}
Afj~Q:M:QlU

ftiJ

The Court of Appeals le@lwr expressly re ained from deciding whether
there are limitations upon the President whe he acts "under his
constitutional powers as commander-in-chief . . . to defend this
country from attack, espionage or sabotage by fo ces or agents of

/A-~~).

.
a foreign pow~

'j The Clay case (430 F.

on the ground that it involved

2d 165)

s distinguished

m "foreign intelligence surveillance. "

Thus, on the skeletonized record in this case,
concerned only (in the language of the Attorney Genera 's affidavit)
with "attempts of domestic organizations to attack and ubvert the

-

existing structure of the government. " This specificat on probably

does not come within the language of

~J
aiB suc.h.languag.e, I

§ ~ But if" i

weJ:e deemed

J-o ~ ~ 4tJ ~ f?,, ..... J, .. .t~ue

gray.e dqpfi a.s t9-wJ;uirlber tije

"~ ~~•<vL ~ ~ ~
C@'f~iiiitutiQaaJ p~ ell!i~t&"'" ~lt:4Kt:W.

• ,g{•,

eHiet in thQ .PP'i8i'ii.t urhere

~ ~ ~44Lif

• .._..

'f!

~~

6.
o physica action (as distinguished from speec .
anguage: "overthrow . . . by force"

......--- It is to be borne in mind, however, that § 2511(3) is not an

:X affirmative grant of power.

Rather, it is at least an indication that

•

Congress did

"""' .J..,.,..J. ti.o

no~act

in the specified areas.

At most, the Section is

a Congressional acknowledgment of J.X Presidential power

lX

in these

areas without precise definition thereof.
In view of the foregoing considerations,

(i) the President (through the Attorney General) was not acting pursuant
to any statutory authorization; (ii) no statutory provisions purported
to authorize the action taken1 and (iii) in the absence of statutory
~

4

,

5

authority prescribing standards appropriate to the circumstances,
the surveillance in this case violated the Fourth Amendment.

~

) _ , •'•'a!

~

Perhaps I should ahlfjhat in my view, the President's powers
*The majority juil82i' in the Sixth Circuit opinion expressed the view
that § 2518(7)(a) of Title III provided a statutory procedure appropriate
for this case. This subsection relates to''emergencie~' and in my view
olea:f'i.:y was not intended to encompass intelligence surveillance of the
type here involved. Nor do I think the provisio(of § 2516(l)(a) with
respect to ~ionage, sabotage and treason - all specific criminal
offenses - ~applicable to this case.

?'4-aL ~ ,t,.., L4.1 /Jc .-14~ ~
LM,., ~ tt-1. , -It-• ~;.f: • .t ~J· ~
8.
,_,_,.., ....., ....J~~ ~d~~~

olowu~could be made ......,..ta specially desi#caurt <!!:..!>·
Court of Appeals for the District of Co
requirements could be design
source~ 8
~~~.-

IAII'~Y

~

bia); and*"the reporting

to protect adequately government

•

~l ......J..-1

....,

1-e .... ··~ £,t.~ ~~A

-,

draft opinion, as I am presently advised, it

1.- .F. P. rrc.

•

"national security" or "& domestic subversion".

Footnote 13 of

the SG' s brief states that this distinction cannot be drawn in this

-

case. Yet, on the record before us (unless the in cameras exhibit
materially alters the situation) the case is presented as involving
neither national security or the participation EX: by foreign sources

=

in domestic plots or subversion. I suppose the categorizing of cases.)

where the surveillance
could

.KmEDB:

s1::zf

~

become quite difficult.

degre~s of foreign contacts,

The extent and seriousness of the

foreign involvement would, I suppose, be the controlling consideration.

...

>- ..
7.
with respect to foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief are
adequate to authorize him to act where in his judgment national
security is endangered by activities of a foreign government.

~ Jt.A-

This

,.,

would include the"intelligence and counter-intelligence

~l'e szrtJf

operations referred to in the statute. I think different considerations

~d

~

apply where the a9RtW&t emanates solely from domestic sources.

~~~

~t/..c~

This is not to say that precisely the same standards prescribed by

"

"

Title III (based on Katz) with respect to specified crimes are
~

ft88'ifDII'?

iP'My required where the govern ment deems it

HRKRRKXX

necessary tn conduct intelligence gathering operations against
domestic subversion.

The gathering of in lligence

fge

~ot

!fte

~

du

r<>boioas i'l'!ae""" is usually long
7kc. .,
:c..,.t&c;f ~-k

and inv lves the interrelation (
&,.ec., ,.,.,.....~.._ t(. ~1c.•
~

.. ...,..

of various sources and types of information.

hus, standards""Wlrtelf

t is test in domestic surveillance cases. But some standards are
equired -to IW.otecL.Fourth Amendment right

I suggested in the

~~

Conference, for example, that the application, and probable cause

J\

Thus, standards which are different from those detailed in
Title III may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they
are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government
for information and the protected rights of citizens. ( Cf. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523).

Drawing a fair line may not

be easy but it should not be impossible.

3/13~/72

lfp/ss

CONFIDENTIAL

70-153 U. S.v. U.S. District Court (Michigan)
In Camera Exhibit Filed in District Court
I have examined the above exhibit, obtaining it from the Chief
Justice.
It contains rather fragmentary exchanges between Plamondon,

who is a member of the White Panther Party, with several members
of the Black Panther Party.
These conversations occurred on six separate occasions extending
over a five months period.
They relate to possible cooperation between the two organizations
on relatively minor matters,

~· ~·

, printing of certain propaganda; a

meeting in Cleveland; and a bogus chapter of one of the organizations.
I could detect no foreign involvement nor any evidence of planned
violence.
My guess is that, as the Government's brief suggests, the
interception of Plamondon's conversations was fortuitous; did not
relate to the crime for which he is being prosecuted; and, in fact
contain information of no real consequence to anyone.

*****
I also examined some of the material referred to in Note 13,
p. 30, of the SG' s brief. As the brief states, this material - which

'

.

2.

apparently was submitted to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but not
in the instant case - does involve many telephone calls to foreign and
overseas installations.

The data which I reviewed - which was primarily

in Volume VI - reflects a great deal of activity by individuals and certain
organizations, both domestic and foreign, but there appears to be no
obvious and direct involvement by foreign governments. One cannot
tell, however, to what extent individuals and organizations in other
countries (particularly) are fronting for - or acting as agents of either the governments or the ruling parties

~·

g. CP) of foreign powers.

All of this material was returned to the Chief Justice today.
L. F. P., Jr.

lfp/ss lee 3/13/72

'

'

U. S. v. U. S. Dist Court 70-153
The Alderman Decision
For a discussion of the Alderman decision, and:JL limitations
imposed upon its use by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969,
see the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on that Act (being
Report No. 91-617 of the 91st Congress dated December 18, 1969).
The Alderman decision is discussed at pp. 64-70, and provides
helpful background.
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CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR.

March 9, 1972

Re: No. 70-153 U. S. v. U. S. District Court
Dear Chief and Bill:
In view of the exchange of notes as to how we proceed with
the opinion writing in the above case, I thought it might be well
for me to outline my present thinking on this case. I have no very
clear idea as to whether the substance of these views is shared by
other members of the Court. I suspect each of us differs in
certain respects.
Byron (to whom I am sending a copy of the memorandum) is
clearly better qualified than I am to write, and I assume that he will
do so. But I will undertake to enlarge this memorandum into a
draft if this seems desirable.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
lfp/ss
cc: Mr. Justice White

March 9, 1972

No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. District Court
Memorandum to:
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas
This refers to your notes as to the drafting of opinions in
the above case.
As views were fractionated (and in some instances, tentative)
at the Conference,. I am not at all sure that any opinion will command
a majority.

My own views, subject - as always - to more careful study

and mature consideration, may be outlined briefly as follows:

I.
There are three types of situations in which the government
is employing electronic surveillance:

1. Specified types of c rime. T itle III of the Omnibus Crime
Act authorizes the use of surveillance in cases involving specified
crimes or types of crimes.

This authority is subject to prior court

order, and to complying with the rather detailed and specific standards
specified in· the Act.
of Katz.

The Act was drawn to meet the requirements

1

2

iI

. 2.

National security.

o

Section 2511(3) of Title III contains

a disclaimer that:
"Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United states, . or to protect
national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. "
This recognizes the special responsibility of the President for national
security. It is in conformity with the uniform practice of Presidents
since President Roosevelt's memorandum on this subject in World
War II.

The inclusion of this section in Title III recognizes, implicitly

if not explicitly, that the system of judicial supervision and public

disclosure required by Title III with respect to specified crimes is
not appropriate in national securities' cases.
3.

Domestic subversion.

Section 2511(3) also provides

(immediately following the language quoted above):
"Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed
to limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the United states against the overthrow of the government
by force or other unlawful means, or against any other
clear and present danger to the structure or existence
of the gave rnment. "*
*The final sentence in § 2511(3) provides that any communication
intercepted by author ity of the President in the exercise of these
powers "may be received in evidence" only where such interception
was "reasonable".

3.
This language, to the same extent perhaps as that quoted in 2 above,
indicates a Congressional intent to exclude such Presidential action
from the judicial supervision and other standards prescribed in Title
ill.

It also suggests a Congressional judgment that the President's

extraordinary power in this respect is not limited exclusively to
national security involving foreign powers. But the extent of this power
is not clear from the language quoted. It does contemplate, however,
situations where foreign powers are not involved and where the threat
of "overthrow" or "other clear and present danger" emanates from
American citizens or domesttc organizations.
II.

I come now to the case before us.

There was no testimony.

The case was submitted on the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit
and the logs of the surveillance which were presented for in camera
inspection only.* The Attorney General's affidavit reads in pertinent
part as follows:
*I have not yet examined the logs, but my recollection is that we were
told during argument that they related - in this case - exclusively to
a domestic organization. Footnote 13, SG's brief, states that - in
addition to the sealed exhibit filed with the District Court below - the
SG has lodged with the Clerk of this Court for its in camera inspection
"the same exhibit we submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the Ferguson case. " The SG further states that the Ninth
Circuit exhibit "consists of additional record(s) of conversations
overheard during this surveillance, " and that these show foreign
involvement.

4.
·"The defendant Plamondon has participaed in conversations which were overheard by government
agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were
being employed to gather intelligence information
deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts
of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the
existing structure of the government. "
The affidavit does not track the language of

§

2511(3).

The

danger described is limited to "attempts of domestic organizations
to attack and subvert the

ex~sting

structure of the government. "

There is no averment of danger of overthrow by force or of a "clear
and present danger. "
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit (and in the
absence of other evidence), the courts below considered this case
to involve only "domestic organizations", and they drew a distinction
between a President's power with respect to national security where
foreign governments are concerned, and his power where only
domestic organizations are involved. (See Judge Keith's opinion
A-30).

The holding by the Sixth Circuit was as follows:
"We hold that in dealing with the threat of domestic
subversion, the Executive Branch • . . is subject to
the limitations of the Fourth Amendment .
"
(A-63)

The Court of Appeals expressly refrained from deciding whether there
are limitations upon the President when he acts "under his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief . . . to defend this country

5.
from attack, espionage or sabotage by forces or agents of a foreign
power" (A-63).

The Clay case ( 430 F. 2d 165) was distinguished on

the ground that it involved "foreign intelligence surveillance. "
Thus, on the skeletonized record in this case, we are concerned only (in the language of the Attorney General's affidavit) with
"attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the government. " This specification probably does not
come within the language of § 2511(3). It is to be borne in mind,
however, that § 2511(3) is not an affirmative grant of power.

Rather,

it is at least an indication that Congress did not intend to act in the

specified areas.

At the most, the section is a Congressional

acknowledgment of Presidential power in these areas without precise
definition thereof.

But if the Attorney General had stated a case

within a general statutory grant of authority, I question whether the
President has the same freedom to act against domestic threats as
exists by virtue of his responsibility in foreign affairs and as
commander-in-chief.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it is my tentative

opinion that (i) the President (through the Attorney General) was
not acting pursuant to any statutory authorization; ( ii) no statutory

6.
provisions purported to authorize the action taken;* and (iii) in the
absence of statutory authority prescribing standards appropriate to
the circumstances, the surveillance in this case violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Perhaps I should add that in my view, the President's powers
with respect to foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief are adequate
to authorize him to act where in his judgment national security is
endangered by activities of a foreign government.
the type of intelligence and counter-intelligence

This wruld include

oper~tions

referred

to in the statute. I think different considerations apply where the
threat emanates solely from domestic ·sources. **
*The majority in the Sixth Circuit opinion expressed the view that
§ 2518(7)(a) of Title III provided a statutory procedure appropriate for
this case. This subsection relates to "emergencies" and in my view
was not intended to encompass intelligence surveillance of the type
here invo1ved. Nor do I think the provisions of § 2515(1)(a) with respect
to espionage, sabotage and treason - all specific criminal offenses - are
applicable to this case.
· **There will no doubt be cases which are difficult to label as either
"national security" or "domestic subversion. " Footnote 13 of the
SG' s brief states that this distinction cannot be drawn in this case.
Yet, on the record before us (unless the in camera exhibit materially
alters the situation) the case is presentedas involving neither national
securityror the participation by foreign sources in domestic plots or
subversion. I suppose the categorizing of cases, where the
surveillance logs show varying degrees of foreign contacts, could
become quite difficult. The extent and seriousness of the foreign
involvement would, I suppose, be the controlling consideration.

7.
This is not to say, however, that precisely the same protective
standards prescribed by Title III (based on Katz) with respect to
specified crimes are required where the government deems it necessary to conduct intelligence gathering operations against domestic
subversion. The gathering of intelligence is usually long range and
involves the interrelation of the various sources and types of information.

The exact targets also are more difficult to identify than in

surveillance operations against crime.

Thus, standards which are

different irom those detailed in Title III may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of government for information and the protected rights
of citizens. (Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523).

Drawing

a fair line may not be easy but it should not be impossible.
I suggested in the Conference, for example, that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not be as particularized
as in cases of specified crimes; that the request for prior court
authorization could be made to any member of a designated court
(e. g. the District Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia);

-

that the time limitation need not be as strict; and that the reporting
requirements could be designed to protect adequately government
sources as well as to assure Executive compliance.

,,

8.
If I write a draft opinion, as I am presently advised, it would

be along the foregoing lines.

L. F.P., Jr.
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No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

The issue before us is an important one for the people
of our country and their national government. It involves the
delicate question of the Attorney General's power to authorize
electronic surveillances in internal security matters without
prior judicial approval.

Resolving this question requires sensitivity

both to the government's rights to protect itself from unlawful
to
subversion and attack and;the citizen's need for privacy!

i;,

.:.,··)J,'~.-:::.,J.:/1.

The case arises from a criminal proceeding in the
United states District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, in which the United States charged three defendants
with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of
18 U. S. C.

§

371. One of the

defend~nts,

"Pun" Plamondon,

was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the
Central Intelligence ~gency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

I
/

I .

2.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to
compel the United states to disclose certain electronic surveillance
iaformation and to conduct a hearing to determine whether this
information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment was
based ~which the government intended to offer at trial. In
response, the government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General,
acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in
which Plamondon had participated.

The affidavit also stated that

the Attorney General approved the wiretaps "to gather intelligence
information rummd: deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subve rt the
1

existing structure of the government. "

The affidavit, together

with the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit
for in c amera inspection by the district court.
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and
the sealed exhibit, the government asserted that the surveillances
were lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval,

3.
as a reasonable exercise of the President's power (exercised
through the Attorney General) to protect the national security.
The District Court held that the surveillance violated the
Fourth Amendment, and ordered the government to make full
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations.

- - - F. Supp.
The government then filed in the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside
the District Court order, which was stayed pending final
disposition of the case.

After concluding that it had jurisdiction,

that court held that the surveillances were

unlawful and that

the District Court had properly required disclosure of the
overheard conversations 444 F . .2d 651 (1971).

We granted

, certiorari.
I

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe streets
Act, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes e;:te the use of

'2-

4.
electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully specified
in 18 U.S. C. 2516.

Such surveillance is subject to prior court

3
order.

Section 2518 sets forth the rather detailed and
4

particularized application necessary to obtain such an order
as well as carefully circumscribed conditions for its use.

The

Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote
the more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy
of

~

individual thought and expression.

Much of Title III

was drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic
I

surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger v. New York,

I
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United states, 389 U. S. 347
(1967).
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U.

s. C.

§

2 511( 3 ):

"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat.
1103; 47 U.S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
/

5.
information deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the consititional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States against
overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government. The contents of any wire or
oral communication intercepted by authority of
the President in the exercise of the foregoing
powers may be received in evidence in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be
otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power. " (emphasis
supplied).
The language in
troublesome.

§

2511(3) has

~xmdat

proved fundamentally

This section, including the second sentence which

pertains to what might be termed the area of "national security"
~:i_~. b t~~!(s; lijvj

or "domestic~ ", has provoked conflicting .interpretations as to
its effect and the Congressionalxtwx intent behind it.

The

government regards this section as an affirmative grant of power
where Congress intended to exempt "from the requirement that
a warrant be obtained for electronic surveillance;certain categories
of cases dealing with foreign and domestic intelligence and security. "

I

/

6.
(Brief, pp. 20 and 28 ).

My brother White, on the other 't hand,

views the section as an "exception" to the general proscription
against warrantless wiretapping in Title III and as a congressional
attempt to set forth an area outside of which all warrantless
wiretaps would be void, pp. 3-4. (He would thus affirm the
Court of Appeals solely on the statutory ground that the wording
of the Attorney General 's affidavit was insufficient to bring the
~

surveillance
wiretaps in

within the specified exception to court-ordered

2511 (3)).

§

The Court of Appeals sees the language

of this section as "clearly designed to place Congress in a
completely neutral position in the very controversy with which
this case is concerned. " 444 F. 2d at 664.
"-TI-. e..

.

!a. s -~~

·

.

";~;'~ interpretation is the most plausible.

For

A

reasons to be

stat~d

forthwith, Congress did not intend

§

2511(3)

as an affirmative grant of warrantless surveillance power to the
government in the area of national security.

The words "overthrow

of the Government by force or other unlawful means .

;

7.
clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government" to which my brother WHITE attaches significance •
.)

operate rather as a general and abbreviated means Congress
used to describe an area to which it did not wish this statute to
address itself.
Given the general context of Title ill and the legislative
history of the Act, this Court should be wary of investing the
wording of

§

2511(3) with excess significance.

It would be

incongruous for Congress to employ such refinement and
specificity in delineating classes of crimes and requirements
~> _..,~,

for surveillance in

cle /-:;: c'

-4eiiftiJl.g

the~

§

2516 and

§

I

F

•

'

~/C :--;'<,/'?! ~ ..-

2518 wfiUe :S:Jfewptiag

<*'-

equally important area of national security

in a single brief and nebulous sentence.

Section 2511(3) is a

short congressional disclaimer that it did not intend the Act
( a.f"/'' l~f

~)

to opeJ?ate illthe areas of foreign and domestic intelligence
~

c_§ h-I! (3)_;
and security.

Seeing it as something more simply does not
/1

comport with the sensitivity of the problem to which it refers

1

.-

!

t

8.

(fljfJ

.

or/the extraordinary care Congress exercised in drafting other
A.

sections of the Act.
The legislative history of
interpretation.

§

2511(3) supports this

Most relevant in this regard is the colloquy

between Senators Hart, Holland and McClellan on the Senate
floor:
Mr. Holland . . . The section [2511(c)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively
give any power . . . . We are not affirmatively
conferring any power upon the President. We are
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such
power as the President has under the Constitution .
• We certainly do not grant him a thing.
There is nothing~ affirmative in
this statement.
Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it
understood that we are not trying to take anything
away from him.
Mr. Holland.

The Senator is correct.

Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention
here to expand by this language a constitutional powe:r:
Clearly we could not do so.
Mr. McClellan.
could not do so.

Even though we intended, we

Mr. Hart . . . . However, we are agreed that
this language should not be regarded as intending to
grant any authority, including authority to put a
bug on, that the President does not have now.

9.
In addition, Mr. President, as I think our
exchange makes clear, nothing in Section 2511(3)
even attempts to define the limits of the President's
national security power under present law, which
I have always found extremely vague. . . . Section
2511(3) merely says that. if the president has such
a power, then its exercise is in no way affected by
5
title III.

The Senators explicitly state in the above exchange that
nothing in § 2 511( 3) attempts to expand or to contract or to
define the surveillance powers of the President in matters
affecting national s'e curity.

We could not expect a stronger

expression of congressional neutrality in this area.

The debates

I

make clear that the entire subject of national security wiretaps

i 6
was fraught with political emotion , and one which many members
of Congress did not wish to open up or pass judgment on for fear
it would delay and jeopardize passage of the entire Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe streets Act.

As the above exchange

indicates, § 2511(3) represented political compromise and
congressional neutrality.
Thus interpreting § 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer

I

and expression of neutrality, we cannot utilize it as a grounds
/

10.
for decision in the way either the government or my brother
White suggest. We do not lightly brush aside the

xmc wise

XJhrxix'ri: admonition that courts should avoid constitutional

determinations except where necessary to decide the case before
them.

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 279 U.S. 288,

346-7 (1936) (concurring opinion). But we cannot accept a
statutory ground of decision where Congress intended no statutory
instruction.

Clearly Ashwander does not teach the avoidance

of constitutional issues which squarely front this Court.

Section

2511(3) says only that nothing inthe Act shall ''be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President" in the surveillance
of foreign and domestic attack and subversion.

Given a proper

controversy before us, the scope of that constitutional power
is for this Court to determine.

I

/
/

'

I .

11.
II

In view of the intense public controversy over electronic
surveillance, we think it important to emphasize the limited nature
of the question before the Court.

This case raises no constitutional

challenge either to the general practice of electronic surveillances
specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe streets Act of 1968. Nor, on the other hand, is there
any question or doubt as to the necessity of obtaining a warrant
in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national security
interest, Katz v. United states, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Further, the instant case requires
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance power
over the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country.
Though characterization of an activity as "domestic" or "foreign"
may, on occasion, involve difficult distinctions, the Attorney
General's affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were

12.
"deemed necessary to protect the national from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure
7

of government" (emphasis supplied).
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore a
narrow one. It addresses the very question left open by Katz,
supra, p. 358 n. 23:
WdtkX Whether safeguards other than prior

authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security . . .
the
The determination of this question require&! essential Fourth
Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and
seizure in question, and the way in which that "reasonableness" derives
content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-484 (1971).
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the
United States has the fundamental duty, under our Constitution,
Art. II Section 2, "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution

13.
of the United States. " Implicit in that duty is the power to protect
our government against those who would subvert and immobilize
it.

Electronic surveillance enables the President, through the

Attorney General to gather information on the plans of those who
would disable the functions of Government and, hopefully, to
prevent those plans from reaching fruition.

Such surveillance
8

has a recognized place in the fight against organized crime;
and its use in internal security cases has been more or less
continuously sanctioned by various Presidents and Attorneys
9

General since July 1946.

Herbert Brownell, Attorny General

under President Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic
surveillance both in internal and international security matters
on the grounds that those acting against the government
turn to the telephone to carry on their :.iiodxix: intrigue.
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received
from many sources and many nests. The participants
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic ~positions 9_<fovernment
and industry throughout the cmmtry.

14.
Though the government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage against
11

the government exist in sufficient number

to justify presidential

investigative powers with respect to them. The covertness and
complexity of many schemes against the government and the
necessary dependency of conspirators upon the telephone make
electronic surveillance an important investigatory instrument.
Moreover, the general acceleration in this country's technological
sophistication has, quite understandably, left its imprint on
techniques of crime commission and crime prevention.

Effective

control of complex criminal activity, including that directed
against the government, may perforce involve applications of
contemporary technology that jar our traditional notions of

12
personal privacy.
But viewing the foregoing as a necessary development
cannot make it a welcome one.

Together with our aspirations to

15.
live and circulate in a society free from the fear of violence
and crime is the concept fundamental to our freedoms that proper
limits govern official surveillance of private thought and speech.
The framers of the Bill of Rights inscribed this value in the
First and Fourth Amendments.

Though physical entry of the home

is the chief evil against which the wording of the latter is directed,

.

its broader spirit shields from unreasonable governmental
intrusion man's now private words and speech as well.

Katz v.

I

United States, supra; Berger v. New Yor}) supra; Silverman v.

I

United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz refused
to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances of actual physical
trespass.

Rather, the Amendment governs "n_ot only the seizure

of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements 'without any technical trespass under . . . local
property law.'" Katz, supra, at 353.

I
/

That decision implicitly

16.
recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions
13
into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a
confluence of First and Fourth Amendment . values in cases of
"ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive
may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy
to constitutionally protected speech.

"Historically, the struggle

for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the
issue of the scope of the search and seizure power," Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). It is in the nature
of government to suspect those who most fervently dispute its
policies.

Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary

when the targets of official surveillance may be those "suspected
14
of unorthodoxy in matters of political belief and conscience. "
The danger to political dissent is acute where the government
(
I

17.
attempts to act under so vague a concept as the "national security
power" or the broad and indefinite language of

§

2511(3).

Given

the difficulty of defining the "natural security" interest, the
14-1/2
danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.
Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511(3):
As I read it - and this is my fear - we are
saying that the President, on his motion, could
declare - name your favorite poison - draft
dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or
civil rights activists to be a clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the
Government. 15
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection
to an unchecked surveillance power.

Nor must the fear of

unauthorized official eavesdropping chill vigorous citizen dissent
and discussion of government action in private conversation.

For

private dissent, no less thanopen public discourse, is essential
to our free society.

FOOTNOTES
1.
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1
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The Attorney General's affidavit reads as follows:
JOHN N. 1\fiTCHELL being duly sworn deposes
and says:
1. I am the Attorney General of the U nitcd
States.
2. This affidavit is submitted in connection
with the Government's opposition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of information concerning the overhearing of l1is conversations which occurred during the course of
electronic surveillances which the Government
contends were legal.
t .
3. The defendant Plamondon has participated in conversations which were overheard
by Government agents who were monitoring
wiretaps which were being employed to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic
organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government. The records
of the Department of Justice reflect the installation of these wiretaps had been expressly approved by the Attorney General.
4. Submitted with this affidavit is a sealed
exhibit containing the records of the intercepted conversations, a description of the premises that were the subjects of the surveil-

laners, and copies of the mcmor:t11da reflt•<·ting the Atto1·ney Gcntral't; nxprcss approvnl of
the instaJJati.on of the surveillances.
, 5. I certify that jt would prejudic~e the national interm;t to diflclose the particular facts
concerning these sunrcilJancos other tlwu to t!Je
court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit referred to herein is being submitted solely for tho court's in canw1·a insJwetion :mel a
copy of tho scaled exhibit is not being furnished to the d.efonclants. I would request the
court, at the conelnsion of jts hearing on this
matter, to place the sealed exhibit in a sealed
envelope and return it to the Depa1·bnont of
Justice whore it will be retained under seal
so that it may be submitted to any apprllnte
court that may review this matter.

- - - - - ----- -

ii.

2.

Jurisdiction was challenged before the Court

of Appeals on the ground that the District Court's order
was interlocutory and not appealable under 28 U.S. C.

§

1291.

On this issue, the court held that it did have jurisdiction,
relying upon the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1651 and
cases cited in its opinion 444 F. 2d at 655-6. No attack
is made in this Court as to the appropriateness of the
writ of mandamus procedure.
3. 18 U. S.C.

§

2518( 7) does provide an exception

for emergency situations but, even here, application for a
court order must be made within forty-eight hours after the
interception begins.

iii.

4.

u.s. C.

18

§

2518, section (1) and (2) read as

follows:

f¥,-t;&

"§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizinO" or appro,·ing the
inter<·eption of a wire or oral communication shall~)e made in writing
upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdidion antl shall
state the appl icanfs authority to make such application. Ea('h application shall inc·lnde the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative orlaw rnforcenwntoffi<·er making the application, and the oftieer authorizing the
application;
''(b) a full and ('omplet<:' statement of the fads and circumshtJH'es reliP<lupon by the applicant, to justify his belid that an
order should be issued, including (i) <letails as to thP parti('nlar
ofl't•nse that has IJeen, is beillg, or is about to be c·ommittP<l, ( ii) a
parti('ular dt>scription of the natut·e an<llo<":ttion of tlte facilitirs
from whic·lt or the pla<"e wlwre the eotnmnnit·ation is to be illfPr<'PJ>ted, (iii) a particulardes('ription of tlw type of <"OJttmuni<·ations
sought to Le inten·Pptrd, ( iv) the iclPttt ity of tht> pt>rs<m, if
knowtt, c01nmitting the oJI'ellSC a!ld wJwsP c·OJmltuni<·ations are to
lm intercepted;
"(c) a full and ('Otnplete statPtnPJtt as to whether or not otlH·r·
investigative procPdnrcs have been trit><l and failrd or why they
rPaBonably appt>ar to be unlikely to snC"et>ed if tried or to b(• too
uangerous j
"(d) a statement of the period of time for wltic·h the interception is required toLe maintaineu. lf the nature of the invt\stigation is such that the authorization for intcreeption should 110t
automatically terminate \\'hen the described type of ('Otnmunieation has been first obtained, a part ic~ular dPseri pt ion of fads
establishing probable cauBe to believ<l that additional eommunications of the same ty/>e will oc:eur tlwrcafter;
"(e) a full and comp etc statPment of the faets eoncerning nll
previous applications known to the individual authori,.;ing and
making the application, made to any judge for aut horizatwn to
intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oml communications involvmg any of the same persons, faeilities or
plac ~es speeiJied in the application, and the action taken Ly the
Judge on each Buch applwation; and
"(f) where the applieation is for the extension of an order a
stafPrncnt srtl ing forth the results thus far obtained from the
inten·(•ption, ot· :treasonable explanation of the failure to obtain
SJI(' h rPSU If S.
"~:::l) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional
testnnony or doc·unw11tary evidence in support of the application.
GG

1

) \

i

-·

_

I

1

I

,

,

""--::----=-=
- ~...:::....-~-,__-

iv.
5. Cong. Rec. Vol. 114 Pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23,
1968.

Senator McClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The

above exchange constitutes the only time that

§

2511(3) was

expressly debated on the Senate floor.
6. Before being assured by Senators Holland and
McClellan that

§

2511(3) was nothing more than a congressional

disclaimer, Senator Hart worried that the "clear and present
danger" wording might afford a fertile opportunity for wiretapping
adaxex

abuse:
"What is it that would constitute a clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government? As I read it - and this is my
fear - we are saying that the President, on his
motion, could declare - name your favorite
poison - draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the
Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a
clear and present danger to the structure or
existence or the Government. 11 Cong. Reco
Vol. 114 Ft. 11, p. 14750, May 23, 1968.

The subsequent assurances that

§

2511(3) implied no statutory

grant, contraction, or definition of Presidential power eased
the Senator's misgivings.

v.
7.

See n. 1, supra.

8.

FrankS. Hogan, District Attorney for idx New York

County for over 25 years, described telephonic interception,
pursuant to court-order, as "the single most valuable weapon in
law enforcement's fight against organized crime. " Cong. Rec.
Vol. 117, 86476, May 10, 1971.
9. In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised
President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases
vitally affecting the domestic security." President Roosevelt had
in May 1940 authorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize
wiretapping in matters "involving the defense of the nation, " but
it is questionable whether this language was meant to apply to
solely domestic subversion.
liZIIX:J[e

The nature and extent of wiretapping

varied somewhat under different administrations and

Attorneys General, but except for the sharp curtailment under
Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the latter years of the Johnson
administration, electronic surveillance has been used both against

vi.

organized crime and in national security cases at least since the
1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. fk:Hzt Gov't. Brief,
pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. Vol. 117,
S. 6476-7 S6477, May 10, 1971.
10. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39
Cornell L. Q. 195, 202 (1954).

See also Rogers, The Case For

Wire Tapping, 63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).
11. The government argues there were 1562 bombing
incidents in the United states from January 1, 1970 to July 1,
1971, most of which involved government relatedi: facilities.
Respondents dispute these statustics as incorporating many
frivolous incidents as well as bombings against non-governmental
facilities.

The precise level of this activity, however, does not

affect the disposition of this case. Gov't • Brief, p. 18; Resp.
Brief, p. 26-29; Gov't Reply Brief, p. 13.
12.

Professor Alan Westin has authored an important

book on the likely course of future conflict between the value of

vi.
privacy and the 'XNIDizx "new technology" of law enforcement.
Much of the book details new techniques of physical and electronic
surveillance and such possible threats to personal privacy as
psychological and personality testing and electronic information
storage and retrieval.
13. Though the number of warrantless 'national security'
telephone surveillances operated by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has decreased in the past ten years: 1960 - 78;
1965 - 44; 1970 - 36; the average surveillance involves interception
of numerous different conversations. In non-national security
wiretaps, for which figures are available, the average intercept
in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations, of which 295
or 45 percent were incriminating.

Gov't. Brief, p. 27; Cong.

Rec. Vol. 117, 86477, May 10, 1971. It is important to point
out, however, that the numbers of warrantless surveillances
mentioned above reflect those in operation by the FBI at a

vii.

particular date, generally that of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's
testimony.

The total number of surveillances for the year is

naturally substantially larger than the number in use on a
particular day.

ACLU, Amici Brief, 11. 16-21; Gov't Reply Brief,

pp. 13-14.
14o J. Landynski,

~

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND

THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, 264-5 (1966).
14-1/2.

Martin Luther King for instance, had been under

government surveillance, apparently to determine the extent of
Communist influence on him.

Navasky, KENNEDY JUSTICE,

135-55 (1971); ACLU, Amici Brief, pp. 14-15.
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No. 701-53 U.S. v. U.S. DISTRICT COURT
The issue before us is an important one for the people
of our country and their national government. It involves the

delicate question of the President's power, acting through the
Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal
Resolving
security matters without prior judicial approval :lllwc::tliw:ig this
question requires sensitivity both to the government's righ to
p~otect

itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's

right to be secure in his :pxa. privacy against unreasoo.able
government intrusion.
This ease arises from a criminal proceeding in the
United states District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, in which the United states charged three defendants
with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of
18 U.S. C.

It§

371. One of the defendants,

~

"Pun" Plamondon,

was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the
Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Rider A, p. 5 (footnotes) 70-153
April 29, 1972

8. Section 2511(3) refers to "the constitutional power of
the President" in two types at. situations: (i) where necessary to
protect against attack, other hostile acts or intelligence activities
of a "forei@ power"; or (11) where necessary to protect against
the overthrow of the government or other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the government. Although both
of the spetified situations are sometimes referred to as "natbanal
security" threats, the term national security is used ooly in the
first sentence of

§

2511(3) with respect to the activities of foreign

powers. This case involves only the second sentence of

§

2 511( 3),

with the threat aa emanating .. according to the Attorney General's
affidavit - from "domestic organizations". Although we attempt no
precise dtfinition, we use the term "domestic organization" in this
opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or
informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United states
and which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its
agents or agencies. No doubt there are cases where it will be

iJ 5A2.
difficult to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful
activities directed against the government of the United states where
there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups
or organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But
this is not such a case.

footnotes) 70-153 4/29/72

This distinction is specifically drawn by the standards
z3aat relating to Electronic Surveillance of the American Bar

Association's Project on Criminal Justice, approved by the
Association's House of Delegates in February 1971. Section
3. 1 of the standards approve the use, without prior judicial
authorization, of electronic surveillance to protect against
hostile acts or intelligence activities of a foreign power. Section
3. 2 of the Standards approves the admissibility in evidence of
communications so overheard or recorded where this action was
reasonable. In these respects, the standards are in accord with
the first and third sentences of

§

2511{3). The commentary

accompanying the standards indicates that the American Bar
Association Committee considered and rejected a proposal which
would have extended executive power, without a warrant procedure,
to domestic security situations. The commentary states:
"The standard (adopted) anchors the concept of
national security to the relation between this
country and foreign nations. . • • The Committee

I

;I
l

I

1

I
I

I

I

/

11A 2

considered and :ujDda:k rejected language which
would have recogniz.ed a comparable residuary
power in the President not subject to prior
judicial review to deal with purely domestic
subervise groups. This is not, of course, to say
that there may not be domestic threats to the
national security. It is to say, however, that there
is a valid distinction in how each ought t:dx to be
treated insofar as these techniques are concerned.
Limitations which are proper when the internal
affairs of the nation are solely involved become
artificial when international rallities are considered."
Ane rtcan Bar Association Standards relating to
Eleetroo.ic Surveillance, Feb. 19'71, pp. 120, 121;
!!!_also additional commentary, p. 11.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the
Court.
The issue before us 1s an important one for the
people of our country and their national Government.
It involves the delicate question of the President's power,
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without
prior judicial approval. Resolving this question requires
sensitivity both to the Government's right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to
the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy against
unreasonable Government intrusion.
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government property in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the
defendants, "Pun" Plamondon, was charged with the
dynamite bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic

••
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surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to
determine whether this information "tainted'' the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the
Government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attomey General, acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in w·hich Plamondon had participated. The
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government." ' The affidavit, together with
the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit
for in camera inspection by the District Court.
The Attorney Grncr: d '~ afficlaYit read~ as follows:
".JoHN N. MrTCHEU, bring duly ~worn depo~es and s:1~·s:
"1. I am the Attornp~· Geneml of the United States.
"2. Thi,; affidrtYit is submitted in connection with the Governmrnt.'s oppo,;ition to the disclo~me to the defrndant Pl:nnondon of
information ronrrrning the o1·erhearing of his convrrsations which
occurrrd during thr couroe of e]rctronic sun·eillancrs which the
GoYernment rontrnd~ wrn• lrga I.
"3. The defendant Plnmondon has participatrd in cotwersntions
which were oYrrhrarcl h)· Gon•rnment ngents who werr monitoring
wirrt:tps which " ·ere bring employed to gather intrlligenee information deemed necr,~:H~· to protect the nation from nttempts of
domrstic organizations to nt tnck nne! ~ubYert the existing strurture
of the Gowrnmcnt. The rrcords of the Depnrtment of Justice
rrflcct the installation of theo:e wiret:1p~ hnd bern rxpressly appro,·rcl by the Altornc~· Geneml.
"·t Submitted with this afficlaYit is a scnled exhibit containing
the records of the intercepted cotwcrsn tion~, a desrript ion of the
prem~es that were the subjrcts of the sun·eillnnces , nne! copies of
the memoranda reflecting the Attorney Genet-.~!'~ expre~~ nppro1·al
of thr in~tallation of the sun·eillnncrs.
"5. I rerlif~· that il would prejudirr the nation:d intrrest to·
cli~clm•e the partieubr facts concerning these sun·cillancr.-; other tkm
to the court in camem. According]~·, the scaled exhibit referred
to here.in i8 being submi1trd ~olci)· for thr court'~ in came1'a inspcc1
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and
the sealed exhibit, the Government asserted that the
surveillances \\'ere la \\'ful, though concl ucted \\'ithout
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the
President's po\\'er (exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the national security. The District
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment, and ordered the Govemment to make full
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations.
- F.Supp.-.
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a \\'rit of mandamus
to set af'icle the District Court order, ,,·hich " ·as stayed
pending final disposition of the case. After concluding that it had jurisdiction/ that court held that the
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court
had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiorari.
I

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act. 18 U. S. C. ~§ 2510- 2520, authorizes the
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully sprcified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance
tion nnd a copy of the sPalrd exhibit iH not brin!!: furni~lwcl to the
clrfrndant s . I would rrqur>:t thr comt, at the conclusion of its
hraring on thi~ mattrr , to pbre thr "rnlrd rxhibit in a ~ralrcl envelope
and rrturn it to the Dep:utmrnt of .Tu>: tice whrre it will be rrtn.in ed
under ·r:ll ~o that it ma~ · br submiltrd to an~· apprllatr court that
m:ty r cYirw this matter."
2
.TnriHclirtion \Yn ~ ch:11lenged beforr the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the District Court's order \\'f\S interlocutory and not
appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On this i~" ur . the court held
that it. did ha,·e jmi ~ diction, relying upon the All Writs St:ttute,
28 LT. S. C. § 1651 , and cnsr~ ritrcl in it s opinion, 444 F. 2d, at 65.5G56. No altac·k is mad!' in this Court as to the nppropriatcnrss of
the writ of mand:1mus proeeclurr.

'

.
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is subject to prior court orcler. 3 Section 2518 sets forth
the detailed and particularized application necessary to
obtain such an order as \Yell as carefully circumscribed
conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective
control of crime \Yhile protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression. Much of Title III was
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. U11ited
Slates, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C.
~ 2511 (3):
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat.
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of
a foreign povYer, to obtain foreign inte1ligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful
means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral com3

18 U. S. C. § 2518 (7) dors provide an exrrpt ion for certain
emergency situations but, even herr, application for a court order
must be made within 48 hours after the interception begins.

'

.
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munication intercepted by authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing po\vers
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that
power." (Emphasis wpplied.)
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that
"in excepting national security surveillances from the
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the
President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28.
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance
of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as
that involved in this case.
We think the language of § 2511 ( 3), as well as the
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. The relevant language is that:
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... "
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this,
as the section refers-among other things-to protection "against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned,
the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose.
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left

70-15:3-0PI~IOi\"
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presidential powers where it found them. This view
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Section 2;)11 (1) broadly prohibits the use of electronic
surveillance "except as otherwise specifically provided
in this chapter." Subsection 2 thereof contains four
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions,
the statutory language is as follows:
"It shall not be unlawful . . . to intercept" the
particular type of communication described.'
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions set
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than statiug
that \varrantless presidential uses of electronic surveillance "shall not be unla"·ful" and thus employing the
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power
of the President."
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney
General to make application to a federal judge ''"hen
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses.
These offenses are described with meticulous care and
specificity.
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection ( 1)
thereof requires application to a judge of competent
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval. and states
in detail the information required in such application.,
4
These exceptions rrlatr to rrrtain :-~ctiYities of communication
rommon carriers and the Federal Communirntions Commi~~ion, and
to specified situations where n p~n·t~· to the communication has
consented to the interception.
" 18 U.S. C. §2518, subsection (1) reads as follows :
"§ 2ii18. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the
inlerrrption of a wire or ornl communication shall be made in writ-

'

.
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary clements of probable cause which the judge must find before issuing
an order authorizing an interception. Subsection ( 4)
set forth the required contents of "UCh an order.
Subsection (5) sets strict time limits on an order. Proing upon o:1th or affirmntion to a judgr of comprtrnt jurisdiction
n nd ~hnll Rt a to Ow npplira nt's nut hority to mnkr such npplication.
Enrh npplirlat ion shall inrlude t hr following information:
"(::t) thr identity of the im·r~ ti ,ga tJ,·r or h\\' rnforrrmrnt officer
making lhr :1ppli('at ion, and thr officer nulhorizing thr application;
"( h) a. fuLl :mel rompletr slntrmrnt of thr fnrtH nnd rirrum~t::~nccs
relied upon b~· tlw npplirant, to jw,tif~· hi,.; hrlid that an ordrr
should hr i~~twd. including (i) drtnils n ~ to thr p:ntirular offrnsr
that. hrt' bern, iH bring. or iH about to br rommittrd, (ii) a partirulnr drHr ription of the natmr :1nd !oration of thr farilitirs from
which or thr pbrr whrrr thr communication i ~ to be intrrceptrd ,
(iii) a pnrliculnr drs('ription of thr t~·pr of communications sought
to hr intrrrf'ptrd . (iv) the idrnlit~· of thr prr~on, if known , rommilling the offrn~c nnd who~r rommunicntions nrr to hr intrrrrptrrl ;
"(e) n full nne! romplrtr statrm rnt n.~ to whrthcr or not othrr
im·r~ tignti,·r prorrrlmrs haH lwrn tried and failed or wh~· thr~·
rr:1son.nbl~· npprnr to be unlik e !~ · to ,.;ucrrrd if tried or to be t oo
dang;f'rous;
"(d ) a Ht.'l.trmrnl of the pr riod of timr for whirh the intrrception
iH required to be m:1intnincd. If the nature of thr im·rstigation iR
~ u r h that thr au!horizntion for intrrcrption ~ hould not nutom.1ticall~·
tcrminnl<· whrn the dr~cribrd t~· pr of rommunication hn s brrn first
obtninrd, a pnrtirulnr description of fact s rstablishing probablr rau~e
to bclir\·e that ndditional communications of thr ~amr t~ · p e will
occur thrrrn ftrr ;
" (P) a full and complete stntrmrnt of the fact s concerning; :dl
pre\· iou~ np plicat ions known to t hr incliYiclu:ll nuthorizing nne! making the application, madf' to any judge for nuthorir.:tlion to intercPpt ,
or for approYal of interception~ of, wire or oral communications
im·oh·ing a n~· of thr ~amc prrsonH, fncilitirs or placrs speeifird in
the application. and the nrtion tnkcn by thr judg;r on cnch such
:1p plication ; and
"(f) where the applicntion i~ for the extension of an order, a
statrmcnt setting forth thr rr:.:ult s thuH far obtainc•d from the interception. or u rraso nahlr explanation of thr failure to obtain such
result s."

'
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vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest." In such a situation, emergency
surveillance may be conducted ''if an application for
an order approving the interception is made ... within
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed
to be a violation of the Act.
In view of these and other carefully interrelated provisions delineating permissible interceptions of particular criminal acitvity upon carefully specified conditions,
it "·ould have been incongruous for Congress to have
legislated with respect to the important and complex
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that
Congress only in tended to make clear that the Act
simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances. 6
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate
floor:
"Mr. Holland . . . . The section [2511 (3)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively give any po,ver. . . . We are not affirmatively
0 The final sentPnce of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an
interception "by authority of the PresidPnt in the exprcise of the
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillancopursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is
admissible.
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conferring any power upon the President. \Ve are
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such
power as the President has under the Constitution. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing.
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement.
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it understood that we are not trying to take anything
away from him.
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct.
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention
here to expand by this language a constitutional
power. Clearly we could not do so.
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we
could not do so.
"Mr. Hart . . . . However, we are agreed that
this language should not be regarded as intending
to grant any authority, including authority to put a
bug on, that the President does not have now.
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our exchange makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 (3)
even attempts to define the limits of the President's national security power under present law,
which I have always found extremely vague. . . .
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President
has such a power, then its exercise is in no iway
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7
7 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968.
Senator
McClellan wns the spon~or of the bill. The above exchange constitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on the
Senate or Hou~e floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of
the Pre~ident-whatever it may bc--"is not to be deemed disturbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2cl Se~s., 94 (1968). See
also The "N ation[tl Security Wiretap": Prc~idential Prerogative or
Judicial Reoponsibility where the nulhor concludes that in§ 2511 (3)
"Congress took whnl amounted to a position of neutral noninter-

'
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of congressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates that nothing in ~ 2511 ( 3) was intended to
expand or to contract or to define whatever presidential
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the national security. If we could accept the Govemment's
characterization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally prescribed exception to the general requirement of a warrant, it would be necessary to consider the question of
whether the surveillance in this rase came 'vithin the
exception. But viewing § 2511 (3) as a congressional
disclaimer and expression of neutrality, we hold that
the statute is not the measure of the executive authority
asserted in this case. Rather, we must look to the constitutional powers of the Presiclen t.
II
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited nature of the question before the Court. This case
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic stuTeillance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Xor
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national security interest. Katz Y. United
States, 389 U. S. 347 (Hl67); Berger V. New rork, 388
U. S. 41 (1967). Further, the instant case requires
no judgment on the scope of the President's smveillance
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or ·without this country. The Attorney General's
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances m"re
"deemed necessary to protect the na.tion from attempts
of domestic orgrmizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of Government" (emphasis supplied).
ferenre on the qu<'stion of lhe cons1 it ul ionalily of \ntrrantlr8~ n:1lional
security wiretaps authorized h.v the Pre~idcnt." 45 S. Cal. L. Rev.
(1972).
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There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign power. 8
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23:
"Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national
security .... "
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and seizure in question, and the 'vay
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971).
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President
of the United States has the fundamental duty, under
Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitutionrrl power of the
President" in two types of siturrtions : (i) whrre nrcrssnry to protrct ngainst attrrck. other hostilr acts or intrlligrnce nctiYities of a
"foreign power"; or (ii) wherr nr<·es8nry to protect ngninst th<>
oYerthrow of thr GoYernmcnt or othrr elear nnd prr.;;cnt danger
to the structure or rxistrnre of thr GoYernmrnt. Although both
of the specified situation~ are sometimrs rrfrrrrd to as "nn.tional
A<:>curity" threats. thr trrm "nationnl security" iR used on]~· in thf'
first sentrnre of § 2511 (3) with respect to the activities of forrign
powers. This case im·olws only the srcond scntrncc of § 2511 (3),
with the thrrat. em:mnting-arcording to the Attorney General's
affidaYit-from "domrstic organizn t ions." Although we attempt no
prcri~c definition, we usc the term "domr,;;tir organization" in this
opinion to mrnn a group or orllanizntion (whrthcr formally or informrrlly constituted) composrd of citizens of the United States and
which has no signifiennt connection with a foreign power, its agrnts
or ngrnries . No doubt thrre arr crt~rs whrrc it will be difficult
to distinguiHh between "domrstic" and "forei!ln" unlawful actiYities
dirertrd agninst the Gon:~rnmrnt of the United Statrs where then~
is collabomtion in Yarying drgrers between domr~lic groups or
orgnnizations and agents or agrnries of foreign powers. But this
is not such a case.
8
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Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve. protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Govemment against those '"ho would subvert or overthrow
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this
duty, the President-through the Attorney Generalmay find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those
'"ho contemplate unlawful acts against the Government.
Enactment of Title III reflects congressional recognition of the importance of such surveillance in combatting various types of crime; 9 and its use in internal
security cases has been sanctioned more or less continuously by various Presidents and Attorneys General
since July 1946. 10 Herbert Brownell, Attorney General
"Frank S. Hog:m, District Attorney for N' ew York County for
OYer 25 years, dr:;cribed telephonic interception, punmant to court
order, as "the single mo~t Yaluable "·eaJ)On in law enforrrmrnt's fight
against organized crimr." Cong. Roc. Vol. 117, S G47G,l\Iay 10, 1971.
The "Crime" Commi~sion appointrd by Presidont John on noted
that "the great majority of law enforcement officiab belie\·e that the
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently
on the higher echelonH of organizrd crime will not be obtained without the aid of electronic surYeillance techniquos. They maintain
these techniques arr indi~prn~able to develop adpqunte strategic
intelligence concerning organizrd crime, to set up SJ)ecific ingostigations, to develop witne~ses, to corroborate their testimony, and to
i"erve as substitutrs for them-each a necessary step in the evidencegathering process in organized crime investigations nnd prosecutions."
Report by the Pre~ident's Commission on Law Enforcement nnd
Administration of Ju ticP, The Challenge of Crime in a Frre Society,
p. 201 (1967).
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President
Truman of the necessity of u:;ing wiretaps "in cnsrs Yitally affectingthe domestic security." In May 1940 Presidont RooseYclt had authorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters
"involving the clefon~c of the nation," but it is questionable whether
this language wa~ meant to apply to solely domestic subyersion.
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under dif-
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under President Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic
surveillance both in internal and international security
matters on the grounds that those acting against the
Government
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue.
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received from
many sources and many nests. The participants
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic positions in government and
industry throughout the country." 11
Though the Government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage
against the Government exist in sufficen t number to
justify investigative powers with respect to them. 1 ~ The
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the necessary dependency of conspirators upon the telephone make electronic
surveillance an essential investigatory instrument m
ferent administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the·
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance
has been used both ap;ainst organized crime and in domestic security
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Govt. Brief, PI). 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. VoL
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971.
11
Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). See abo Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).
1
~ The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing incidents in the United States from January 1, 1971 , to July 1, 1971,
most of which invoh·ed Go\'Crnment related facilities. Rc.<pondents
dispute these stat icitics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as
well as bombings against nongovernmental facilities. The precise
le\'cl of this arti1·ity, however, is not rele1·anL to the dispo~ition of
this case. GoYt. Brief, p. 18; Resp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govl. Reply
Brief, p. 13.
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certain circumstances. The marked acceleration in technological developments and sophistication in their use
have resulted in nev,· techniques for the planning.
commission and concealment of criminal activities. It
would be irrational and contrary to the public interest
for Government to deny to itself the employment of
those very techniques which arc employed against the
Government and its law abiding citi?:ons.
It is \\·ell to remember that "the most basic function
of any government is to provide for the security of
the individual and of his property." Miranda Y. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 53!) (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And
unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve tho security of its people. society
itself could become so cl isordered that all rights and
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569,
574 (1940):
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution. imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself
·would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."
But a recognition of these elementary truths docs not
make the employment by Government of electronic
surveillance a welcome development-even when employed with restraint and under judicial supervision.
There is. understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude
upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citi7.ens. 13 We
1
~ Professor Alnn 'V0stin hn.~ [1\lthorrd an importnnt book on the
likrly rour.•e of fnturr conflict betwrrn the Ya lue of priYar~· and the
"new trrhnolo!!:~' " of l:1\\" cnforcrment. ::\[uch of the book detail:;
teehniqucs of physicnl :md rlrdronic smTrillance and such possible
ihrrat~ to personnl priYac~' as psyeholop;ic::il and prr~on:ility te:;ting
and electronic information stornp;r nnd retrieval. Not all of tho
contemporary thrrats to priyac·~· rmanatc directly from the pressures
of crime control. A. Westin, Pri\·acy and Freedom (196i).

70-15:3-0PI~ION

UKITED STATES

1'.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15

look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.
Though physical entry of the home is the chief eYil
against which the " ·ording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed, its broader spirit no"· shields private speech
from unreasonable smvcillancc. Katz v. United States,
supra; Berger v. 1\"ew York, supra; Silverman v. United
Slates, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Kalz
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements \vithout any technical trespass under ... local property law.' "
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unc;;:uspectecl governmental
incursions into conversational privacy "·hich electronic
surveillance entails 11 necessitate the application of
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
Xational security cases. moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle
for freedom of speech and press in England \vas bound
up with the issue of the scope of the search and ~eizure
power." Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government-however benevolent and benign its motiYes-to view with suspicion those who most fervently
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections beH Though the total numbrr of intcrcrpts authorizrd by state
nne! frdrral .iudgr~ pur~unnt to Tit. III of the HHl~ Omnibus Crimr
Control :mel Safe St rcctH Act \\":IS 59i in l9i0, cnch ~uiTcillance may
inYolve intcrcrpt ion of hundrrds of diffrrrnt con\"C'r~n tion~. The
a.verage intercept in 19i0 im·oh-cd 44 people :wd 655 conversationH ,
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rcc. Yol. 117,
S 6477, Ma.y 10, 1971.

70-153-0PINION
16

UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

come the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those "suspected of unorthodoxy in
matters of political belief and conscience." lr. The danger
to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect "domestic security." Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse
in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate
on § 2511 (3):
"As I read it-and this is my fear- we are saying that the President, on his motion, could declarename your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists
to be a clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government." lfl
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to
our free society.
III
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Govern1
" J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A
Study in Constitn t ional Interprrtation, 264-265 ( 1966) .
JG Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14750, May 23, 1968.
The subsequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3)
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential
power eased the Senator's mi sgiving~.
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ment to safeguard domestic security requires the use of
electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be
better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion
and overthrow directed against it.
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition or
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950). 17 This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead
language. Rather it has been
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result in scores and
scores of cases in the courts all over this country.
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed''
against the claims of police efficiency. It is. or should
be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly overThi.> view has not been accepted. In Chime/ v. California, 395U. S. 752 (1969) , the Court considered the Government's contention
that the search be judged on a general "rea sonableness" standard
without reference to the '"arrant rlause. The Court concluded that
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of rrrtain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considrration~ rrlrYant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under
such an unconfined analy~is, Fourth Amcndmrnt J1rotcction in this
area would nppro:-tch the C\·aporalion point." Chime/, supra, at
764-765.
17

'

.
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zealous executive officers' who are a part of any
system oflaw enforcement.'' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 4tll.
See also United States v. Rabhwuritz, 339 U. S. 57. 68
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., disl"cnting); Davis v. United
Slates, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
OYer t"·o centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit,"
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the
information ought to be left to the discretion of the
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should
give certain directions to the officer." Leach v. Three
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765).
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence
of m·ongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a man's private premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz v. United States, supra,
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause"
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not
proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillaJJces may
be conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute. Katz v. United States, supra, at 359-360
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(Dot-GLAS, J., concurring). But those charged with this
investigative and prosccutorial duty should not be the
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewecl
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech. 18
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a
reasonable one "·hich readily would have gained prior
judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent "·ith that encl." Katz, supra,
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a
prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a
separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of Government. John
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the
Judicial Function in Balance. 49 A. B. A. J. 943-044
(1963). The judicial check upon executive discretion
is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by "extremely
limited" post-surveillance judicial review. 1 n Indeed,
18 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United Stale:; Constitution, 79-105 (1937).
10 The GoYernment :1 rgnes that dome;; tic security wiretaps should
be upheld by eolll'b in post :;:mnillnnce n·,·iew "nnlf'~" il nppear~
that the Attorney General'H dctPrmination that the proposed surveillance relates to a national security matter i~ arbitrary and capricious, i. e., thnt it constitutes n dear abuse of the broad discretion
that the Attorney General hns lo obtain all information that will be
helpful to the Pre~idcnt in protecting the Gon•rnmrnt. .. .'' agnin~t
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22.
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post-surveillance review ''"ould never reach the surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions. Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time
tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.
B eck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964).
It is true that there have been some exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Chirnel v. Califomia, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Terry Y. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those exceptions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz,
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs
of la"· enforcement officers to protect their own wellbeing and preserve evidence from destruction. Even
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v.
Ohio , supra., at 20; Chimel Y. California, supra, at 762.
The Government argues that the special circumstances
applicable to domestic security surveillances nece~sitate
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. We are told
further that these surveillances are directed primarily
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It
is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to traditional warrant requirements \Yhich ''"ere
established to govern investigation of criminal activity,
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp.
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Heply Brief, pp. 2-3.
The Government further insists that courts "as a
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor
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the techniques necessary to determine whether there
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security." These security
]Woblems, the Government contends, involve "a large
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4.
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requirement, the Government believes that disclosure to
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion o£ the
information involved in domestic security surveillances
"v,·ould create serious potential dangers to the national
security and to the lives of informants and agents ....
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering; requmng prior judicial authorization would
create a greater 'danger of leaks ... , because in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25.
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemption from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf
of the President and the national security in its domestic
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time
when civil disorders arc more prevalent than in the less
turbulent periods of our history. There is, no doubt,
pragmatic force to the Government's position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards.
The circumstances described do not justify complete
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances arc
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness

..
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of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad
and continuing nature of intelligence gatheri11g, and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. \Ve recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant
procedure.
\Ve cannot accept the Government's argument that
intema1 security matters are too subtle and complex
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal 'vith the
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason
to believe that federal j uclges will be insensitive to or
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance invoh·es dift'crent considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significa.nce to a court,
one may question whether there is probable came for
sun·e.illa.nce.
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The investigation of criminal activity has long
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial officers '\'ho have respected the confidentialities involved.
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious
of security requirements in national security cases. Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage
and treason, ~ 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may invol\·e domestic as well as foreign security threats. Moreover, a. warrant application involves no public or
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a

i(l-15a-OPI~IO~

UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 23

magistrate or judge. \Vhatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the
necessary clerical assistancr.
Thus, we conclude that the Go,·ernment's concerns
do not justify departure in this case from the customary
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although
some added burden \\'ill be imposed upon the Attorney
General. this inconvenience is justified in a frer society
to protect constitutional values. Nor do we think the
Government's domestic surveillance powers \Vill be impaired to any significa.nt degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance
judicial review. By no means of least importuner, will
be the reassura.nce of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of la\v-abicling citizens
cannot occur.

IV
We emphasize before concluding this opnuon, the
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this
case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. \Ve have not addressed, and express no opinion
with respect to, the issues which may be involved with
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agrn ts. "0
~ 0 See n. R, sup.1·a. At lenst one fedrrfll judge hfls ~ugge~ted that
"it might ver~· wrll be that warrantle~~ Rurwillrmcc . . . , while
unronst itutiorwl in thr domr~t ir ~it u:d ion, would br ron::-;1 it ut ion a I
in the area of forrign affairs. This posRihlr diRtinction is largrly
dur to thr Prr>:idr11t '8 long-rerog:nizcd. inhrrrnt power with rri'JWct
to forrign rcla1 ion~." Ull'ilrd Slates v. Smith, F. Supp. (19il). This diRtinrtion is spcrifi<"all~· drawn hy the Standards relating to Electronir Sun·rillanrc of the Amrriran Bflr AsRociation's
Project on Criminal Justice, approved by the Association's House of
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K ot· do we hold that the standards and procedures of
Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. We
recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations
from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance
operations against many types of crime specified in
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity
Delegates in February 1971. Section 3.1 of the Stnndarcb approves
the u~e, without prior juclirinl nuthorization, of electronir surveilbnre to protert ngainst hostile arts or intelligence ncti,·ities of a
foreign power. Section 3.2 of the Stnndards approws the admisRibility in evidence of communications so overhenrd or recorded
where this artion was rmRonable. The commentnry arrompanying
the Standards indicates that the American Bar Association Committee considered and rejrcted a proposal which would have extended
executive power, "·ithout a warrant procedure. to domestir security
:;ituntions. The rommentnry l"tatcs:
"The standard (adopted) anrhors the concept of national security
to the relation between this rountr~· nnd foreign nation~. . . . The
Committee considered and rejected language which would have
recognized a comparable re~iduary power in tho President not subject to prior judicial review to deal with purely domestir subversive
groups. This is not, of rour:;c, to say that there may not be
donwstio threats to tho nationnl security. It is to i"ay, however,
that there is a valid distinction in how each ought to be treated
insofar as these techniques arc concerned. Limitations which are
proper when the internal affnirs of the nation are solely involved
become artifirial whrn international realities are considered."
Amrricnn Bar As~ociation Standards Relating to Elect ronir Sur\'eillance, Feb. 1971, pp. 120, 121; sec also nclditional commentary, p. 11..
The Court of Appeals for tho Fifth Circuit also rerently held a
warrant would not be reqnirccl for SliiYrillaJICe invoh·ing foreign intelligence operations, United States Y. Clay, 430 F. 2d 165 (1970),
certiorari granted and ronr:;rcl on another issue.
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or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than
that directed against more conventional types of crime.
Given these potential distinctions between Title III
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic
security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant
application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights
deserving protection. As the Court said in Canwra v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967):
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable
cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant for that inspection- the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of law enforcement."
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that
the application and affidavit showing probable cause
need not be as particularized as in cases of specified
crimes; that the request for prior court authorization
could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a
specially designated court (e. g., the District Court or
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); and that
the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict
as those in § 2518.
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The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for "domestic security" warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal
surveillances ,..,.hich now constitute Title III. We do
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in
this case and that such approval may be made in accm·dance with such reasonable standards as the Congress
may prescribe.

v
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial approval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 168 (1969), is controlling and
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own impermissibly intercepted conversations. As stated in
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the
materials which they may be entitled to inspect.'' 394
U.S. 185.~
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
1

Affirmed.

21 ''re think it unnecessary at this time and on the facts of this
case to consider the arguments advanced by the Government for a
re-examination of the bai"is and scope of the Court's decision in
Alderman.

May

3, 1972

PERSONAL

Re: No. 70-153 u.S. v. U.S. District Court
Dear Chief:
Here is my draft opinion in the domestic security wiretap
ease. I could not conclude, after further eoosideration, that this
ease is controlled by Title UL
Nor do I believe that it would be in the public interest - in
the long run -if Title m were deemed eootrolling. Under that view,
this particUlar ease would still be affirmed - as the Attorney
General !.s affidavit did not bring the ease within the language of
§ 2511(3).
But let us assume that the next ease which reaches the Court
involves an affidavit....whieh does track the exact language of the seeood
sentence of § 2511(3). We could not then avoid the constitutional
issue, which woold include net ooly (i) the Fourth Amendment question
but llso ( ii) a question as to impermissible vagueness and overbreadth.
For the same reasons that caused the ABA Committee to draw a
distinction between domestic security surveillance and foreign power
surveillance, I think it inevitable that we woold hold § 2511(3)
unconstitutional.
Even if we have a choice now (which I really do not see),
there are some ecnsiderations in favor of resolving the issue.
Concern around the country as to warrantless surveillance is
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genuine. There is uncertainty among the lower court, and in government itself as to the applicable constitutional standards. Moreover,
an opinion along the lines I have drafted may prompt the Congress to
address this issue at this session of Congress in a constructive way.
I am sure that all of these thoughts have occurred to you.
Of course, if Byron is correct that the statute does control, the

policy coosiderations I have mentioned are irrelevant. I have been
unable to c oovinee myself, however, that Byron's view can be
supported.
One final comment: We did not discuss the government's
request with respect to Alderman in the Conference. If and wlten we
reconsider Alderman, I may well vote to overrule it for the reasons
stated in the dissenting opinicn. Certainly, I would limit its scope.
I have discussed this with Byron and I do not think he is ready for
a reccnsideration. Accordingly, I concluded that it was best under
the narrow facts in this ease to follow Alderman but - by the last
footnote - indicate that the story may not be finally written.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

I

I

j;lt}tutttt a;(l"U:ft of t~t ~ttittb j;tntts

Jlas!p:ttgtcn 2~, ~.Qt.
"'-.,;

CHAMBER S O F

.JUSTI C E WILLIAM 0 . D O U G LA S

May fourth
1972

Dear Lewis:
I

a.m happy to join your fine

opinion in No. 70-153 - United States v .
U. S. District Court .
I may possibly file a. separate

opinion, not in derogation of what you
have written , but in further support of
it .

Mr . Justice Powell
CC :

The Conference

~u.p-renu

<!Jourt of tqt ~nittb ~bt,tts
'Jifasfrittgton. ~. <!J. 21lgtJ!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

May 4, 1972

Dear Lewis:
Re: No. 70-153 - U. S. v. U. S. D. C.
As you know, Bill Brennan is considerably disturbed
by footnote 20 in your opinion.
You state in the text: "We have not addressed, and
express no opinion with respect to, the issues which may be
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents."
I thought as I read that that it was a very proper
reservation, and I still think it is.
Bill Brennan apparently thinks that footnote 20
squints toward a position that is in support of the American
Bar position.
It is a question which, as you know, is highly
controversial, and Bill Brennan and I expressed our views on it
in the Katz case.
The Court has never spoken on it, and this certainly
is not the time to do so.
But I was hoping that you could find some way to satisfy
Bill Brennan so as to bring him into the opinion.
It would be fine
if this could be wholly unanimous.

Mr. Justice Powell

j)u.vumt <qourl cf f4t JtniU~ j)taftil
'Jlllru;frin:gfcn. ~. <q. 2.0gtJ.1~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 4, 1972

70-153, U. S. v. U. S. District Court
Dear Lewis,
I think you have done a fine job in this case, and
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

P. S. - I have one minor suggestion -- that something along
the fall owing l ines be added after the word "exception"
in the 11th l ine on page 10: ", and, if so, whether
the statutory exception was itself constitutionally valid."

i'ttprtmt Q}tturl cf t4t 'J!lttitt~ .it:\tftg

'IJagJringhm.lfl. <!}.

2!lp'!!~

CHAMBERS OF

May 4, 1972

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 70-153- U. s. v.U. s. District Court,
Eastern District of Michigan

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,~::

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Conference

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, UI

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: May 13, 1972

No. 70-153 Wiretapping Case
Over the weekend, I reviewed the second draft of our opinion
with the following result:
1. I have added a rld.dr A on page 1. This is designed primarily

to meet the suggestion that the present draft does not show with
sufficient clarity the long standing nature of the problem, and the fact
that no one - Presidents or otherwise - has known the ground rules.
This rider will require a renumbering of some footnotes. Rather

'.

than renumber all of them, I suggest that present footnote No. 3 can
be eliminated entirely, as we later refer to § 2518(7). If you agree,

we -could drop footnote 3 and simply renumber present notes 1 and 2.
2. As I reread our draft, it occurs to me that we may have
emphasized the necessity for prior "judicial" authorization in a way
that might circumscribe future decisions as to who may constitute

..

'

a "neutral and detllched magistrate" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. I have in mind, for example, our Tampa, Florida case
in which we must write an opinion, where the question is whether a
deputy clerk may be regarded as a "neutral and detached magistrate".

.
)

3.
Mr. Justicd Marshall argues that the Fourth Amendment requires
a "judicial officer". But prevailing view o6the Court is that only a
neutral and detached magistrate is necessary, who need not be a licensed
lawyer or judge. He must, however, meet the basic specifications of
being neutral and disinterested, which means he must be separate and
apart from the prosecutorial arm of government.
My suggestion is that you add a footnote at some appropriate
point (possibly p. 19) which indicates that we use the word judicial
to connote a neutral and detached magistrate. In Title

m the Congress

specifically required that a judge perform this function. In other
circumstances, this Court has not held that only a judge can meet the
standards of detachment and disinterest which are required.
3.

Please note the other quite minor changes which I have

suggested. In general, I found very little I wished to change, as I
think the opinion is sound and well written.
4. As soon as we have agreed on these changes, let's print

a third draft. I will then try to clear it with the Justices concerned
L. F. P., Jr.

.iu:p-rtutt <!feud cf tqt ~tb .itatts

Jfttsftinghm. ~. Of.

2!lp'l-~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE W M. ,J BRENNAN . ,JR .

May 18, 1972

RE: No. 70-153 - United States v. United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, etc.
Dear Lewis:
The changes you have made meet completely my concerns.
I very much appreciate your bearing with meo
I therefore make bold to offer one more suggestion. This
concerns the last full paragraph on page 13 through the quote from
Chief Justice Hughes in Cox v. New Hampshire. Am I correct in
believing that those paragraphs are a summary of the Government•s
justification for the asserted authority? If I am, could something
like the additions I've noted in the margins at pages 13 and 14 be
mocle to make that clear? My recollection is that Ramsey Clark's
attitude was in part explained by his disagreement with these propositions and I make the suggestions to avoid any misunderstanding
that the Court is resolving the controversy.

s;;re
Mr. Justice Powell

,j~tmt

Qfourl at tJrt ~ttittb .i9tattg

Jfns!p:ttgtcn, ~.

<!f.

2ll.;i~.;l

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 19, 1972

RE: Noo 70-153 - United States v. U.S.
District Court of the Eastern District
of Michigan, etc.
Dear Lewis:
Thank you very much for your consideration of my suggestions in the above.
Your proposed accommodation is entirely
satisfactory.
Thank you again for bearing with me.

Mr. Justice Powell

May 19, 1972

Re: 70-153 U.s. v. U.S. District Court

Dear BUl:

Thank you for yours of May 18. I am glad that my changes
met your cmcerns.
I also appreciate your editing suggestims oo pp. 13 and 14.
The two sentences you mentioo in the paragraph beginning in the
middle of p. 13 were based primarily upoo studies which I commenced
as a member of the President's Crime Commissim and the Task
Foree thereof which coosidered organized crime problems and
whether legalized wiretapping was necessary. In the course of that
study I reviewed the testimooy of former Attomeys General going
back to Robert Jacksoo and extending through Robert Kennedy, all
of whom agreed essentJally that coo.trolled surveUlance is in the
public interest.
You are quite right in saying that Ramsey CJark disagrees,
and be so stated to the Crime Commission. I believe, however, that
the annual reports to the Congress as to the effectiveness of wiretapping under Title m (you are familiar with some of it in New Jersey)
demmstrate its utility.
However, I have made a couple of changes in these sentences
which make them re1at1vely neutral I believe that even Ramsey
would agree that electronic surveillance is "effective" in many
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situations. He questions whether its effectiveness is worth the
financial cost and the incrimental intrusion upon privacy. The last
sentence in the paragraph leaves us all perfectly free because of
my having added the word "lawful". I hope these changes are
satisfactory.
With my thanks.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: May 2, 1972

No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. District Court
Here is a revised Part V of our opinion, dealing with the difficult
and delicate Alderman issue.
The last sentence in my draft is an important one, as it is
intended to leave open the issues raised by the government's arguments
in all cases other than those that come within the narrow factual
context of this ease.
In addition to situations where foreign powers or their agents
may be involved, there may well be a case arising under Title

m

where it would be appropriate to coosider more carefully the government's arguments. As the facts in our case do not present a situation
controlled by Title

m,

we deed not consider, for example, whether

Alderman is based on constitutional grounds or is an exercise of the
Supreme Court's authority with respect to practice in the federal
sys.tem.
In short, I have triedd to leave all of these questions open.
If tou think I have been successful, it is unnecessary to add footnote

Z'5 which you have drafted.
L.F.P., Jr.

~.

I,

,.

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m
No. 70-153
United States, Petitioner,

v.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
United States District Court
of Appeals for the Sixth
for the Eastern District
Circuit.
of Michigan, Southern
Division, et al.
rMay -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the
Court.
The issue before us is an important one for the
people of our country and their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President's power,
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without
prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more
than one-quarter of a century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees/ without guidance from the
Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This
case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity
both to the Government's right to protect itself from
unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's
right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable
Government intrusion.
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government property in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the
1

See n. 10, infra.
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defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency
in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic
surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to
determine whether this information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the
Government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had participated. The
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government." ~ The affidavit, together with
the logs of the surveillance. were filed in a sealed exhibit
for in camem inspection by the District Court.
The Attorney General's affidnYit reads as follows:
"JoHN N. MITCHELL being duly sworn drposes and says:
"1. I am the Attornry General of the United States.
"2. This affidavit is submitted in connection with the Government's oppo~ition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of
information concerning the owrhearing of his conYersations which
occurred during the course of electronic sun·eillances which the·
Government contrmb were legal.
"3. The defendant Plamondon has participated in conversntions
which were oYcrheard by Government agents who were monitoring·
wiretaps whirh were being rmployed to gather intelligence information deemed nece~sary to 11rotect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structureof the Government. The records of the Department of Justice·
reflect the installation of these wiretap:> had been expressly approved by the Attorney General.
"4. Submitted with this affidrwit is a sealed exhibit containing
the records of the intercepted conversations, a description of the
premises that were the subjects of the surveillances, and copies of
2
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and
the sealed exhibit, the Government asserted that the
surveillances were lawful, though conducted without
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the
President's pO\ver (exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the national security. The District
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment, and ordered the Government to make full
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations.
-F.Supp.-.
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus
to set aside the District Court order, which was stayed
pending final disposition of the case. After concluding that it had jurisdiction." that court held that the
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court
had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiora.ri.
the memoranda reflcrting the Attorney General's express approval
of the installation of the suryeillanccs.
"5. I rerlify that it would prejudire the national interest to
di~rlose the partirular facts concerning the.se surveillances other than
to the court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit referred
to herein is being submittrd solely for the court's in camera inspection and a cop~r of thr Healed exhibit i~ not being furnished to the
defendants. I would request the court, at the conrlusion of its
hearing on this matter, to place the scaled exhibit in a sraled envelope
and return it to the Departmrnt of JuRtice where it will be retained
under seal so that it ma,y be submitted to any appellate court that
may review this matter."
3
Jurisdiction was rhallenged beforr the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the Di~trirt Court's order was interlocutory and not
appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On thi;; iHsue, the Court correctly held that it did ha\·e juri~diction, relying upon the All Writs
Statute, 28 U.S. C.§ Hi51, and rases cited in its opinion, 444 F. 2d,
at 655-656. No attack was made in this Court as to the appropriateness of the writ of mandamus proredure.

\
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I

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes the
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully specified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance
is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth
the detailed and particularized application necessary to
obtain such an order as ·well as carefully circumscribed
conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective
control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression. Much of Title III was.
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967) , and Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2511 (3):
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat.
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
.deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful
means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
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ernment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that
power." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that
"in excepting national security surveillances from the
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the
President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28 ..
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance
of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as
that involved in this case.
We think the language of § 2511 (3), as well as the
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. The relevant language is that:
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... "
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this,
as the section refers-among other things-to protec-tion "against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned,
the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the·
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose.
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left
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presidential powers where it found them. This view
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Section 2511 (1) broadly prohibits the use of electronic
surveillance "except as otherwise specifically provided
in this chapter." Subsection (2) thereof contains four
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions,
the statutory language is as follows:
"lt shall not be unlawful . . . to intercept" the
particular type of communication clescribed. 4
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions set
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating
that "·arrantless presidential uses of electronic surveillance "shall not bC' unlawful" and thus employing the
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power
of the President."
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney
General to make application to a federal judge when
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses.
These offenses are described with meticulous care and
specificity.
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection (1)
thereof requires application to a judge of competent
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval, and states
in detail the information required in such application."'
These exception~ relatr to rrrtain activitirs of communication
common c:uriers and the Frdrral Communirntions Commi~sion, and
to sperified situations where a pnrty to the rommuniration has
ronsrnted to the interception.
5
18 U. S. C. § 2518. subsection (1) rrnds as folJows:
"§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wirr or ora.] rommunirations
"(1) Each appliration for an order authorizing or appro\'ing the
interc·eption of a wire or oral communiration shall be made in writ4

70-153-0PINION
UNITED STAT:&S v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7

Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary elements of probable cause which the judge must find before issuing
an order authorizing an interception. Subsection ( 4)
sets forth the required contents of such an order.
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Proing upon oath or affirmntion to a jud~r of competent jurisdiction
and shall state thr applirant's authority to make such application.
Each appliclation shall include the following information:
"(a) the identit~· of the im·e~tigahve or Jaw enforcement officer
making the appliration, nnd the officer authorizing thr application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the faets and circumstanees
relied upon by the applirant, to juRtify his belief that an order
should be i~sued, including (i) details as to the particular offense
that has been, is brin~. or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and !oration of the facilities from
which or the place where the rommunicntion is to be intercepted,
(iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought
to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offen r nnd whose communication~ .ue to be intercepted;
"(c) n full and complete stntement as to whether or not other
invcstigativr procedures ha\·c been tried and fniled or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
"(d) a statement of thr period of time for which tho interception
is required to be maintained. If the nature of the inYCstigation is
such that the authorization for interception ~hould not automntically
terminate when the described type of communication has been first
obtained, a particulnr description of facts establishing probable cause
to bclie\·c that additional eommunications of the Ramc type will
occur theren ftcr;
"(c) a full and complete stntement of the faets concerning aU
previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the applicai ion, made to any judge for authorization to intercept,
or for approYal of interceptions of, wire or oral communications
involving any of thr same persons, facilities or places specified in
the application, and the action takrn by the judge on each such
application; and
"(f) where the npplication iH for tho extension of an order, a
statement ·ctting forth the results thus fnr obtained from the interception, or a rensonablc explanation of the failure to obtain such
results."
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vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest." In such a situation, emergency
surveillance may be conducted ''if an application for
an order approving the interception is made ... within
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed
to be a violation of the Act.
In view of these and other interrelated provisions
delineating permissible interceptions of particular criminal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it
would have been incongruous for Congre~s to have
legislated with respect to the important and complex
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care
Congress exerci~ed in drafting other sections of the
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that
Congress only intended to make clear that the Act
simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances. a
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate
floor:
"Mr. Holland . . . . The section [2511 (3)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively give any power. . . . We are not affirmatively
Tho final sentence of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an
interception "by authority of the President in the exercise of tho
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillancepursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is
admissible.
6
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conferring any power upon the President. We are·
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such
power as the President has under the Constitution. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing ..
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement.
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it understood that we are not trying to take anything·
away from him.
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct.
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention
here to expand by this language a constitutional
power. Clearly we could not do so.
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we
could not do so.
"Mr. Hart. . . . However, we are agreed that
this language should not be regarded as intending
to grant any authority, including authority to put a
bug on, that the President does not have now.
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our exchange makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 ( 3)
even attempts to define the limits of the President's national security power under present law,
which I have always found extremely vague. . . .
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President
has such a power, then its exercise is in no 'way
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7
7 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968.
Senator
McClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The above exchange constitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on the
Senate or House floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of
the President-whatever it may be--"is not to be deemed disturbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2cl Sess., 94 (1968). See
also The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or
Judicial Responsibility where the author concludes that in § 2511 (3)
"Congress took what amounted to a position of neutral noninter-
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of congressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates that nothing in § 2511 (3) was intended to
expand or to contract or to .define whatever presidential
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the national security. If we could accept the Government's
characterization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally prescribed exception to the general requirement of a warrant, it would be necessary to consider the question of
whether the surveillance in this case came within the
exception and , if so, whether the statutory exception was
itself constitutionally valid. But viewing § 2511 (3) as
a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality,
we hold that the statute is not the measure of the executive authority asserted in this case. Rather, we must
look to the constitutional powers of the President.
II
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited nature of the question before the Court. This case
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nor
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national security interest. Katz v. Un'i ted
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388.
U. S. 41 ( 1967). Further, the instant case requires
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country. The Attorney General's
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were
"deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts
ference on the qucf'tion of the constitutionality of warrantless national
security wiretaps authorized by the President." 45 S. Cal. L. R ev .

-

(1972).
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of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of Government" (emphasis supplied).
There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign pow~r.s
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23:
"Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national
security .... "
The determina.tion of this question requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and seizure in question, and the way
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971).
Section 2511 (3) refers to "the conRtitutionnl power of the
in two t~·pcs of situntiom;: (i) wh!:'re necrssnry to protect against attark, other hostile acts or intelligence ncti\"ities of a
"foreign power"; or (ii) where neceRl'ary to protect against the
overthrow of the Government or other clear and preRent danger
to the structure or existence of the Government. Although both
of the specified situation.- are sometimes refrrred to us "national
security" threats, the term "nationnl srC'urity" is used only in the
first sentence of § 2511 (3) with rc.<;pect to the n,rtivitics of foreign
powers. This rase involves only the second Rrntcnce of § 2511 (3),
with the threat emanating-nccording to the Attorney General's
affidavit-from "dome<>tic orgnnizations." Although we attempt no
precise definition, we use the term "domestic organization" in this
opinion to mean a group or organization (whrther formally or informally constituted) compo~ed of citizens of the United States and
which hns no signific:mt connection with a forrign power, its agents
or agencies. No doubt then' arc casrs wherr it will be difficult
to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities
directed again;;t the GoYernment of the United State.:; where there
is collaboration m Yar~·ing drgrers between domestic groups or
organizations and agrnts or agPncics of foreign power". But this·
is not such a case.
8

Prc.~ident"
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We begin the inquiry by noting that the President
of the United States has the fundamental duty, underArt. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this
duty, the President-through the Attorney Generalmay find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those
who plot unlawful acts against the Government. 0 The
use of such surveillance in internal security cases has
been sanctioned more or less continuously by various
Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.10
u Enactmrnt of Titlr III rdlrct~ congrr~~imtnl l'P<'ognition of thl"
importamr of ~uch ~nrvcillaucc' in combatting vnriom; tnw~ of crime.
Fmnk S. Hogan, Di~trict Attomey for I\r\\' York County for
over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant to court
order, as "the single most valuable weapon in law cnforcrment's fight
against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, S 6476, May 10, 1971.
Tho "Crime" Commission appointed by President Johnson noted
that "the great majority of law enforcement officials believe that the
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently
on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained without the aid of electronic ~urveillancc techniques. They maintain
thrse techniques arc indispensable to develop adequate strategic
intrlligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific ingestigations, to develop witnessrs, to corroborate thrir testimony, and to
serve as substitutes for them-each a necessary step in the evidencegathering process in organized crime investigations and prosecutions."
Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
p. 201 (1967).
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President
Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases \'itally affecting
the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had authorized Attorney General Jack~on to utilize wiretapping in matters
"involving the defense of the nation," but it is questionable whether
this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion.

'

.
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Harbert Brownell, Attorney General under President
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both
in internal and international security matters on the
grounds that those acting against the Government
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue.
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received from
many sources and many nests. The participants
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic positions in government and
industry throughout the country." 11
Though the Government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage
against the Government exist in sufficent number to
justify investigative powers with respect to them. 1 ~ [The
covertness and complexity of potential unlawfuf' conduct against the Government and the necessary dependency of many conspirators u on the tele hone make electronic surveillance an essentia mvest1gatory ms rument
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the·
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance
has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rcc. Vol.
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971.
11 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). Sec also Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,.
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).
12 The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing incidents in the United States from January 1, 1971, to July 1, 1971,
most of which involved Government related facilities. Respondents
dispute these stati~tics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as
well as bombings again~t nongovernmental facilities. The precise
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of
this case. Govt. Brief, p. 18; Rcsp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govt. Reply
Brief, p. 13.
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in certain circumstances. The marked a celeration in
technological developments and sophisticat· n in their use
t !..4_ f
have resulted in new techniques for he planning,_
commission and concealment of crimin activities.~ 1 • 1.1
. ..L
wou d be · · ·
contrary to t
public interest I ~~ u.r·· . A.
for Government to deny to itself th
wful employment
A--U~ u. A:z-)b. ttY
of those very techniques which are employed against the
·
Government and its law abiding citizens.
1a
1e mos as1c function
I
(
·
of any government is to provide for the security of
Jf .J...,..~ b ,......_,
the individual and of his property." Miranda Y. Arizona.,
...~...,_
384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And
unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society
itself could become so disordered that all rights and
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569,
574 (1940):
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."

[../..J.u,

'

cJ/ )

~

~

~

I
IUA 4AJ.O I(..

'

4. !Ud

But a recognition of these elementary truths does not
make the employment by Government of electronic
SUI'Yeillance a welcome development-even when employed with restraint and under judicial supervision.
There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and
apprehension that this capability wi1l be used to intrude
upon cherished privacy of la,Y-abiding citizens. 1 ~ We
1
~ Professor Alan 'Westin has written on the likrly rourse of
future ronf!irt brtween thr v::llue of prin1r~· and the "nrw terhnology" of law rnforcrmrnt. l\1urh of the book details techniques
of physical and electronir sun·cill:mce nnd such possible threats
to personal privacy as p~yrhologirnl nnd pcr:;onality trsting and
electronic information storngc nnd retrieval. Not all of the contemporary thrrat ~ to privacy emanate directly from the pressures
of crime control. A. We:;tin, Privacy n.nd Freedom (19G7).

70-153-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.
Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech
from unreasonable surveillance. Katz v. United Stales,
•
supra; Berger v. New York, supra; Silvennan Y. United
Slates, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 'without any technical trespass under ... local property law.' "
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental
incursiolls into conversational privacy which electronic
surveillance entails 1 '' necessitate the application of
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
National security cases. moreover. often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be .s tronger in
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure
power," Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government-however brnevolent and benign its motives--to view with suspicion those who most fervently
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be14

Though the total number of intt?rrepts authorized by state
and federal judges J1Ur~uant to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Stret?t~ Art wa~ 597 in 1970, each surveillance may
involve interception of hundrrd~ of different eonverHations. The
average intercept in 1970 i.Jn·oh·rd 44 people and 655 conversations,
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117,
S 6.477, May 10, 1971.
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come the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute
where the Government attempts to act under so vague
a concept as the power to protect "domestic security."
Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security
interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that
interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this
dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511 (3):
"As I read it-and this is my fear-we are saying that the President, on his motion, could declare-name your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists
to be a clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government." 1 5
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to
our free society.
III
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use of
Cong. R ec. Vol. 114, pt . 11, p. 14750, May 23, 196R The subsequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3)
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential
power eased the Senator's misgivings.
15
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electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be
better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion
and overthrow directed against it.
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition of
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950). 16 This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead
language. Rather it has been
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result in scores and
scores of cases in the courts all over this country_
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed'
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should
be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to•
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over10 This view has not been accep1ed.
In Chime/ v. California, 395
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court considered the Government's contention·
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard
without reference to the warrant clause. The Court concluded that
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under ·
such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this
area would approach the evapomtion point." Chimel, supm, at
764-765.
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zealous executive officers' who arc a part of any
system of law enforcement." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 491.
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 57, 68
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. U11ited
Sta.tes, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit,"
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the
information ought to be left to the discretion of the
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should
give certain directions to the officer." Leach Y. Three
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765).
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence
of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz v. United States, supra,
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause"
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not
proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may
be conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose-
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cute. Katz Y. United States, supra, at 359-360
(DouGLAS. J., concurring). But those charged with this
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech."
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a
reasonable one which readily would have gained prior
judicial approval But this Court "has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that encl." Katz, supra,
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a
prior judicial juclgment,' 8 not the risk that executive dis~
cretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a
separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of Government. John
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the
Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943-944
( 1963). The independent check upon executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by
"extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial review. 1
l}

La~~on, The Hi~tor~· a11d Developnwnt of tlw Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 79-105 (1937).
IR We u"e the \\'ord "judicial" to counote the traditionnl Fourth
Amendment requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate.
10 The Government argues that domestic security wiretaps should
he upheld by comts in post surwillanr(' revirw "unlei<i< it appe~tr~
that the Attorney General's determination that the proposed sur17
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Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the
surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions.
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the
time tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment
rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964).
It is true that there have been some exceptions t(}
the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDon-ald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those exceptions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz,
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs
of law enforcement officers to protect their own wellbeing and preserve evidence from destruction. Even
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v. California, supra, at 762.
The Government argues that the special circumstances
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. We are told
further that these surveillances are directed primarily
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It
is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to traditional warrant requirements which were
veilla.nce relates to a national security matter is arbitrary and capricious, i. e., that it constitutes a clear abuse of the broad discretion
that the Attorney General has to obtain all information that will be
helpful to the President in protecting the Government . .. " against
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22 .
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established to govern investigation of criminal activity,
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp.
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3.
The Government further insists that courts "as a.
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor
the techniques necessary to determine whether there
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security." These security
problems, the Government contends, involve "a large
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4.
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requirement, the Government believes that disclosure to
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the
information involved in domestic security surveillances
"would create serious potential dangers to the national
security and to the lives of informants and agents ... _
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering; requmng prior judicial authorization would
create a greater 'danger of leaks . . . , because in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."'
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25.
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemption from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf
of the President and the national security in its domestic·
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time
of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this
country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent
periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic
force to the Government's position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards.
The circumstances described do not justify complete.

'

.
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exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness
of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner·
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant
procedure.
We cannot accept the Government's argument that
internal security matters are too subtle and complex
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason
to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court,
one may question whether there is probable cause for
surveillance.
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The investigation of criminal activity has long
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial of-.
ficers who have respected the confidentialities involved.
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious
of security requirements in national security cases. Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
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already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage
and treason. § 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may involve domestic as well as foreign security threats. Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a
magistrate or judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the
necessary clerical assistance.
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns
do not justify departure in this case from the customary
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although
some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society
to protect constitutional values. Nor do '"e think the
Government's domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any significant degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive va.lidity of the surveillance and will
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance
judicial review. By no means of least importance will
be the reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens
cannot occur.

IV
We emphasize. before concluding this opinion, the
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this
case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion
as to, the issues which may be involved with respect
to activities of foreign powers or their agents. 20 Nor
~ Sec n. 8, supra. For the virw that warrantlr~s surveillance,
though impermissible in domestir security cases, rna~· be eon:::titntioual where foreign powers arc involved, sec United States v. Smith,
0

I
l
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does our decision rest on the language of § 2511 (3}
or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus Crime·
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does
not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the·
President to meet domestic threats to the national
security.
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily
applicable to this case. We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime."
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range
and involves the interrelation of various sources and types
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance
operations against many types of crime specified in
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli- ·
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity
or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than
that directed against more conventional types of crime.
Given these potential distinctions between Title III
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic
security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant
application may vary according to the governmental inF. Supp. (1971); and American Bar A~::;ociatiou Criminal
Justice Project, Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance, Feb.
1971, pp. 11, 120, 121. See also United States v. Clay, 430 F. 2cl
165 (1970).

)
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terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights.
deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967):
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires.
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probablecause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining·
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and
thus in determining whether there is probable causeto issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of thesereasonable goals of law enforcement."
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that
the application and affidavit showing probable causeneed not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but
should allege other circumstances more appropriate todomestic security cases; that the request for prior court
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any
member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia);
and that the time and reporting requirements need not
be so strict as those in § 2518.
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineatethe present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal
surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in
this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress
may prescribe.

'

.
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v
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial approval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 168 (1969), is controlling and
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own impermissibly intercepted conversations. As stated· in
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the
materials which they may be entitled to inspect." 394
U.S. 185. 21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
Affirmed.

We think it unnecessary at this time and on the facts of this
case to coMider the arguments advanced by the Government for a
re-examiMtion of the basis and scope of the Court's decision in
Aldemw.n.
21
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES'
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United States, Petitioner,

v.
United States District Court
for the Eastern District
of Michigan, Southern
Division, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.

[May -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the·
Court.
The issue before us is an important one for the ·
people of our country and their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President's power,
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without
prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more.
than one-quarter of a century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees/ without guidance from the .
Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This
case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity
both to the Government's right to protect itself from
unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's
right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable
Government intrusion.
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government property in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the
1

See n. 10, infra.
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defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency
in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic
surveillance information and to conduct a. hearing to
determine whether this information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the
Government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had participated. The
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government." ~ The affidavit, together with
the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit
for in cam..em inspection by the District Court.
~The Attornr~· Grnrr:1l's a.!Tid:l\"it rracls :1s follows:
".JoHN N. MITCJIEJ.T. bring duly sworn clrposrs and says:
"1. I am the Attornry Genrral of the United States.
"2. This affidaYit i~ submittrcl in connection with the Govcrnment.'s opposition to thr cliselosure to the clrfrndant Pbmondon of
information concerning the O\'rrhenring of his rmwersations which
occurred during 1he <'our~r of electronic sun·rillnnres which the
Govcrnmrnt conlPncl~ were lrg:d.
"3. The defendant Pl:lmonc!on has participated in conversations
which were ovcrhcnrd by Go,·prnment ngrnt~ who were monitoring
wiretaps which werr being employed to gat h!'r intelligence information deemed nerr~:-<ary to protect til<' n:1tion from :1ttrmpts of
domestic organizations to att:wk and subvert the existing structure
of the Government. The record~ of the Department of .Justice
reflect the installation of these wiretaps had been expressly approved by the Attorney General.
"4. Submitted with this aflidnYit is a scaled exhibit containing
the records of the intercepted rom·er.•mtion~, a description of the
premises that were the subjects of the smTrillnnccs, and copies of

'
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and
the scaled exhibit, the Government asserted that the
surveillances were lawful, though conducted without
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the
President's power (exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the national security. The District
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment, and ordered the Government to make full
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations.
-F.Supp.-.
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus
to set aside the District Court order, which was stayed
pending final disposition of the case. After concluding that it had jurisdiction.~ that court held that the
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court
had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiorari.
the memoranda rdleding the Attorney Oenernl's express approval
of the installation of the sur\'Cillances.
"5. I certify that it would prejudire the national interest to
disclose the particular fncts concerning these surveillances other than
to the court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit referred
to herein is being snbmittrd solrly for the court's in camera inspection and a ropy of the sralcd exhibit is not being furnished to the
defendants. I would requr~t the court, at the conclusion of its
hearing on this matter, to place the sen led exhibit in a scaled envelope
and return it to the Department of Justice where it will be retained
under seal so that it may be submitted to an~' nppellate court that
may review this matter."
3
Jurisdiction was rhnlkngrd beforr the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the District, Court's order was interlocutory and not
appealable undrr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On this issue, the Court correctly held that it did ha,·e jurisdiction, relying upon the All Writs
Statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1G51, nncl rases cited in its opinion, 444 F. 2d,
nt 655-656. No attack was mnde in this Court a. · to the appropriatene.ss of the writ of mandamus procedure.
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I

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes the
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully specified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance
is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth
the detailed and particularized application necessary to
obtain such an order as well as carefully circumscribed
conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective
control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression. Much of Title III was
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements.
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2511 (3):
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat.
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
.deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or othe1· unlawful
means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
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ernment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that
power." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that
"in excepting national security surveillances from the
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the
President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28 ..
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance
of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as
that involved in this case.
We think the language of § 2511 (3), as well as the
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. The relevant language is that:
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit
the con stitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... "
against th e dangers specified. At most, this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this,
as the section refers- among other things-to protection "against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the·
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned,
the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the·
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose ..
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left
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presidential powers where it found them. This view
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Section 2511 ( 1) broadly prohibits the usc of electronic
surveillance "except as otherwise :specifically provided
in this chapter." Subsection (2) thereof contains four
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions,
the statutory language is as follows:
"It shall not be unlawful . . . to intercept" the
particular type of communication described.•
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions :set
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating
that warrantless presidential uses of electronic surveillance "shall not be unlawful" and thus employing the
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power
of the President."
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attomey
General to make application to a federal judge when
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses.
These offenses are described with meticulous care and
specificity.
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection (1)
thereof requires application to a judge of competent
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval, and states
in detail the information required in such application."
These exceptions relate to certain activities of communication
common carriers and the Frdrml Communications Commission, and
to specified situations where a party to the communirntion has
consented to the interception.
5
18 U.S. C. §2518, subsection (1) reads as follows:
"§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the·
interception of a wire or oral cornrnnnic:1tion shall be made in writ4
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary clements of probable cause which the judge must find before issuing
an order authorizing an .interception. Subsection ( 4)
sets forth the required contents of such an order.
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Proing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction
and shall state thr applicant's authority to make such application.
Each applichtion shall includr the following information:
"(a) the idrntit~· of the im·e~tig:ati\'e or law enforcement officer
makinl!: the application, and thr officer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statrmrnt of the facts and circumstances
rdied upon by the applirant, to ju~t ify his belief that an order
should be is~ued, including (i) details ns to the particular offense
that has been. is being, or is about to be commitlrd, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from
which or the place where the communiration is to be intercepted,
(iii) a particular description of the t~·pr of communications sought
to be interccptrd, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense :md whose communications nrc to be intercepted;
"(c) a full and complrle stntrment as to whether or not other
investigntivr prorrdnres have hren tried and failed or why they
rrnsonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) a stntement of the 11eriod of time for which tho interception
is required to be maintained. If the nnture of the investigation is
such that the author.ization for intercrption should not automatically
terminate when the drscribcd type of communication has been first
obtained, a particular description of fads establishin~ probable cause
to belie\·e that 11dditional communications of the same type will
occur thereafter;
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all
previous applications known to the individual nuthorizing and making the application. made to any judge for authorization to intercept,
or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications
involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in
the application, a.nd the aetion taken by the judge on each such
application; and
"(f) where the application is for thr extension of an order, a
statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from tho interception, or a reasonable expl:mation of the failure to obtain such
results."

'

.

70-153-0PINION
8 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest." In such a situation, emergency
surveillance may be conducted "if an application for
an order approving the interception is made ... within
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed
to be a violation of the Act.
In view of these and other interrelated provisions
delineating permissible interceptions of particular criminal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it
would have been incongruous for Congress to have
legislated with respect to the important and complex
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that
Congress only intended to make clear that the Act
simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances. c
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate
floor:
"Mr. Holland . . . . The section [2511(3)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively give any power. . . . We are not affirmatively
6 The final sentence of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an
interception "by authority of the President in the exercise of the
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillance-pursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is
admissible.
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conferring any power upon the President. We are
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such
power as the President has under the Constitution. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing.
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement.
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it understood that we are not trying to take anythingaway from him.
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct.
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention
here to expand by this language a constitutional
power. Clearly we could not do so.
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we
could not do so.
"Mr. Hart. . . . However, we are agreed that
this language should not be regarded as intending
to grant any authority, including authority to put a
bug on, that the President does not have now.
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our exchange makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 (3)
even attempts to define the limits of the President's national security power under present law,
which I have always found extremely vague. . ..
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President
has such a power, then its exercise is in no May
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7
7
Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968. SenatorMcClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The above exchange constitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on theSenate or House floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of
the President-whatever it may bo-"is not to be deemed disturbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Scss., 94 (1968). See
also The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or
Judicial Responsibility where the author concludes that in § 2511 (3)
"Congress took what amounted to a position of neutral noninter-

..
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of congressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates that nothing in § 2511 (3) was intended to
expa·n d or to contract or to define whatever presidential
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the national security. If we could accept the Government's
charac~rization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally prescribed exception to the general requirement of a warrant, it would be necessary to consider the question of
whether the surveillance in this case came within the
exception and, if so, whether the statutory exception was
itself constitutionally valid. But viewing § 2511 (3) as
a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality,
we hold that the statute is not the measure of the executive authority asserted in this case. Rather, we must
look to the constitutional powers of the President.
II
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited nature of the question before the Court. This case
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nor
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national Sf'curity interest. Katz v. Un·i ted
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); B erger v. New York, 388
U. S. 41 ( 1967) . Further, the instant case requires
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country. The Attorney General's
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were
"deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts
ference on the question of the ron Rtitutionnlity of warrantless nntionai
security wiretaps authorized by the Pre~ idenl." 45 S. Cnl. L. R ev.

-

(1972).
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of domest1'c organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of Government" (emphasis supplied).
There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign power. 8
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23:
"Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national
security .... "
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and seizure in question , and the way
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v.
N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971).
Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitution:1l power of the
President" in two types of situations: (i) where nece>:sary to protect against attark, other hostile arts or intelligencr :1ctivities of a
" foreign power": or (ii) where necessa ry to protcrt against the
overthrow of the Government or othrr clear nnd present danger
to the stmcturc or existrncc of the Govrrnmrnt. Although both
of the specified situations arc somctimrs rcfrrred to ns "national
security" threats, the term "national srrurity" is used only in the
first sentence of § 2511 (~) with respect to thr activities of foreign
powers. This rnsc involves only the second srntrncc of§ 2511 (3),
with the threat emana1ing-:wrording to the Attorney General's
affidavit-from "domest ie organizntions." Although we attempt no
precise definition , we usc the term "domestic organizfltion" in this
opinion to mean a group or organizntion (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of thr United States and
which has no significnnt connection with a foreign power, its agents
or agencies. No doubt there arc rases where it will be difficult
1o didtinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities
directed against the Government of the United States where there
is collaboration in \'::trying drgrees between domestic groups or
organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this·
is not such a case.
8

'
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We begin the inquiry by noting that the President
of the United States has the fundamental duty, under
Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve, protect~
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Govern-·
ment against those who would subvert or overthrow
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this
duty, the President-through the Attorney Generalmay find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those
who plot unlawful acts against the Government.~ The
use of such surveillance in internal security cases has
been sanctioned more or less continuously by various
Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.10
9 Enactment of Title III reflects congressional recognition of the (
importance of such SUITeillnncr in combatting vnrious types of erime.
Frank S. Hogan, Distriet Attorney for New York County for
over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant to court
order, as "the sin11:le most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight
against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, S 6476, May 10, 1971.
The "Crime" Commission appointed by President Johnson noted
that "the gre..'lt majority of law enforcement officials believe that the
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently
on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained without the aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain
these techniques arc indispen~able to develop adequate strategic
intelligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific ingestigations, to develop witne ·ses, to corroborate their testimony, and to
serve as substitutes for them-each a necessary step in the evidencegathering process in organized crime investigations and prosecutions."
Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
p.201 (1967).
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President
Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases vitally affecting
the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had authorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters
"involving the defense of the nation," but it is questionable whether
this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion.
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Harbert Brownell, Attorney General under President
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both
in internal and international security matters on the
grounds that those acting against the Government
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue ..
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received from
many sources and many nests. The participants
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic positions in government and
industry throughout the country." 11
Though the Government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage·
against the Government exist in sufficent number to
justify investigative powers with respect to them. 12 The
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone make elec- {
tronic surveillance an effective investigatory instrument
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the·
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance
has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. VoL
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971.
11 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). See also Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,.
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).
12 The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing incidents in the United States from January 1, 1971 , to July 1, 1971,
most of which im·olvcd Government related facilities. Respondents
dispute these statistics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as
well as bombings against nongovernmental facilities. The precise
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of
this case. Govt. Brief, p. 18; Rcsp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govt. ReplyBrief, p. 13.
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in certain circumstances. The marked acceleration in
technological developments and sophistication in their use
have resulted in new techniques for the planning,
commission and concealment of criminal activities. It
would be contrary to the public interest for Government
to deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment
of those very techniques which are employed against the
Government and its law abiding citizens.
It has been said that "the most basic function of /
any government is to provide for the security of the
individual and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And
unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society
itself could become so disordered that all rights and
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569,
574 (1940):
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organi11ed society
maintaining public order ·without which liberty itself
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."

I

But a recognition of these elementary truths does not
make the employment by Government of electronic
surveillance a welcome development-even when employed with restraint and under judicial supervision.
There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude
upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. 13 We
1 3 Professor Ahn West in ha s written on i he likely rourse of
future conflict between the ntluc of privnr~· nnd the "nrw technology" of law enforcement. Much of the book details techniques
of physical and electronic sun·eillanre and such possible threats
to personal privacy as ps ~·c hologiral and per~onality testing and
electronic information storage and rctrim·al. Not all of the contemporary threats to pri,•ary eman:1te directly from the pressures
of crime control. A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967).

r
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look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.
Though physical entry of the hon1e is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech
from unreasonable surveillance. Katz v. United States,
supra; Berger v. New York, supra; Silverman v. United
States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 'without any technical trespass under ... local property law.' "
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic
surveillance entails 14 necessitate the application of
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. "Historica1ly the struggle
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure
power," Marcus v. Search JVarrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government-however benevolent and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections beThough the total number of intercepts authorized by state
and federal judgeR pursuant to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act was 597 in 1970, each surveillance may
involve interception of hundreds of different conversations. The
:werage intercept in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations,
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117,
S 6477, May 10, 1971.
14
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come the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute
where the Government attempts to act under so vague
a concept as the power to protect "domestic security."
Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security
interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that
interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this
dilemma in the floor debate on ~ 2511 (3):
"As I read it-and this is my fear-we are saying that the President, on his motion, could declarename your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists
to be a clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government." J r>
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to
our free society.

III
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use of
1
~ Cong. Rrc . Vol. 114, pt . 11, p. 14750, l\fa~· 2:3, 196S. ThC> ~ uh
sequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3)
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential
power cased the Senator's misgivings.

0
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electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be·
better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion
and overthrow directed against it.
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition of
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950). 1 G This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead
language. Rather it has been
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result in scores and
scores of cases in the courts all over this country.
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed,.
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should
be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to·
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly overw Tbi~ YiC\1' has not been accepted . In Chimel v. California, 395
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court considered the Government's contention·
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard
without reference to the warrant clause. The Court concluded that
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under
such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this
area would approach the evaporation point." Chirnel, supra, at
764-765.
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zealous executive officers' who are a part of any
system of law enforcement." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 491.
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 57, 68
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United
States, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit,"
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the
information ought to be left to the discretion of the
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should
give certain directions to the officer." Leach v. Three
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765).
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence
of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private prcmi~Ses or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge Y. New
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz Y. United States, supra,
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause''
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not
proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may
be conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the la,vs, to investigate and to prose-
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cute. Katz v. United States, supra, at 359-360
(DouGLAS, J., concurring). But those charged with this
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech."
It may ·well be that, in the instant case, the Government's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a
reasonable one which readily would have gained prior
judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particula.r crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end." Katz, supra,
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a
prior .i udicial j udgment, 18 not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a
separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of Government. John
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the
Judicial Function in Balance, 40 A. B. A. J. 943-944
(1963). The independent check upon executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by
"extremely limited" post-surveillance .i udicial review. JnLasson, Thr Hi~tor.'· and Dcvrlopmrnt of thr Fomth Amrndment to the United States Constitution, 79-105 (1937).
1s We use th<' word "judicial" to ronnot-<' tlw traditional Fomth
Amendment rrquirrmrnt of a nrntral and dctarh<'Cl magi~trate.
19 The Government nr~~:ues that domestic security wiretaps should
be upheld b~r courts in post surn~illaner re,·icw "un]p;;:s it appear"
that the Attorney General's determination that the proposed sur17
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Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the
surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions.
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the
time tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment
rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 ( 1964).
It is true that there have been some exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Chimel v. CalijoTnia, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); CarToll v.
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those exceptions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz,
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs
of law enforcement officers to protect their own wellbeing and preserve evidence from destruction. Even
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v. California, supra, at 762.
The Government argues that the special circumstances
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. We are told
further that these surveillances are directed primarily
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It
is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to traditional warrant requirements which were
vcillance relates to a national security matter is arbitrary and capricious, i. e., that it constitutes a clear abuse of the broad discretion
that the Attorney General has to obtain all information that will be
hPlpful to the President in protcctiug thP GovcrmnPnt ... " aga in~t
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22.
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established to govern investigation of criminal activity,
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp.
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3.
The Government further insists that courts "as a
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor
the techniques necessary to determine whether there
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security." These security
problems, the Government contends, involve "a large
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4.
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requirement, the Government believes that disclosure to
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the
information involved in domestic security surveillances·
"would create serious potential dangers to the national
security and to the lives of informants and agents ...•
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathermg; requiring prior judicial authorization would
create a greater 'danger of leaks ... , because in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."·
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25.
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemption from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf
of the President and the national security in its domestic
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time
of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this
country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent
periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic·
force to the Government's position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards.
The circumstances described do not justify complete"
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exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness
of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. \Ve recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant
procedure.
We cannot accept the Government's argument that
internal security matters are too subtle and complex
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason
to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court,
one may question whether there is probable cause for
surveillance.
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval ·will fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The investigation of criminal activity has long
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial officers who have respected the confidentialities involved.
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious
of security requirements in national security cases. Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
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already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage
and treason, § 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may involve domestic as well as foreign security threats. Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a
magistrate or judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the
necessary clerical assistance.
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns
do not justify departure in this case from the customary
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although
some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society
to protect constitutional values. Nor do v.·e think the
Govemment's domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any significant degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance
judicial review. By no means of least importance will
be the reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens
cannot occur.

IV
We emphasi?:e, before concluding this opinion. the
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this
case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion
as to. the issues which may be involved with respect
to activities of foreign powers or their agents.~ Nor
0

~ 0 Sec n. R, supra. For thr Yirw thnt warran1lr~~ survrillnnrr,
1hough impermissible in domr~tic security rn~cs. ma~' be ronstit u-

tioual whcro foreign powrr:; are involved, sec United States v. Smith,

I
I
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does our decision rest on the language of § 2511 (3)
or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does
not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the
President to meet domestic threats to the national
security.
Moreover, ;ve do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily
applicable to this case. Yre recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime."
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range
and involves the interrelation of various sources and types
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance
operations against many types of crime specified in
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity
or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than
that directed against more conventional types of crime.
Given these potential distinctions between Title III
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic
security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant.
application may vary according to the governmental in-

F. Supp. (1971) ; and American Bar Association Criminal {
Justice Proj ect, Standard::; R elating to Electronic Surn~ illancr , Frb.
1971, pp. 11, 120, 121. See also United States v. Clay, 430 F . 2d
1G5 (1970) .
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terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights.
deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967):
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable
cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining·
whether a particular inspection is reasonable--and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of law enforcement."

It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that
the application and affidavit showing probable cause·
need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to
domestic security cases; that the request for prior court
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any
member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia);
and that the time and reporting requirements need not
be so strict as those in § 2518.
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate·
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal
surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required forthe type of domestic security surveillance involved in
this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress.
may prescribe.

'

.
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v
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial approval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman
v. United States, 394 U. S. 168 (1969), is controlling and
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own impermissibly intercepted conversations. As stated in
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the
materials which they may be entitled to inspect." 394
U.S. 185. 21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
Affirmed.

MR.

took no part in the considera-/
tion or decision of this case.
JusTICE REHNQUIST

21 We think it uunercssary al this time and on the facts of this
rase to consider the arguments advanrcd by the GoYernment for a
re-examination of the basis and srope of the Court's decision in
Alderman.
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May 25, 1972

Dear Mr. Justice Powell:
Re: No. 70-153, United States v. U. S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al.
Attached is a draft syllabus for your opinion in the above
case which I shall appreciate your returning to me ~ together
with any suggestions that you care to make , If the line- up
of the Court is available, please send it to me; otherwise,
please send the line-up to the Print Shop when it becomes
available, and send me a copy.
This draft of the syllabu~ is based on the opinion draft
number given in the upper right-hand corner , Please send
me two copies of any subsequent draft of ·your opinion neces sitating changes in the syllabus so that app.ropriate revisions
can be made and resubmitted to you before the syllabus and
, opinion are issued,
When I receive the syllabus back from you, I shall have
t he Print Shop set it in type and shall then send you a proof, copy,

~lly~-~
Henry Putzel, jr ,
Reporter of Decisions
Attachment
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
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May 26, 1972

Re: No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.s. District Court

Dear Mr. Putzel:
I retum herewith your draft syllabus in the above case.

I have suggested a few changes in subparagraphs 2(b) and

2(c).
You have a most remarkable capacity to summarize a decision
accurately and briefly. I admire greatly the way you perform your
duties.
Sincerely,

Mr. Henry Putzel, jr.
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No. 70-153 -- United States v. United States
District Court, E. D. Michigan

Dear Lewis:
I have reviewed the May 22 draft in the
above and for my part I still find too much of
the language I cannot join.
Will you therefore show me as joining
only in the result.

Mr. Justice Powell

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE:

May 31, 1972

Wiretap Cases
In view of the Chief's note of May 26, saying he would join

"only in the result", perhaps we should circulate another draft adding
that at end as the only change. I believe that is the practice here.
still no word from Mr. Justice Blaekmun.
L. F. P., Jr.
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June 12, 1972

Re:

No. 70-153-

U.S. v. U.S. DistrictCourtfor
the Eastern District of Michigan

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

j(l. tJ.
Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference
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v. District Court, etc.

case?
W. 0. D.

Mr. Justice Powell
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U. S. v. U. S. District Court
This case involves the President's power, acting

~hrough

the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance · a
domestic security cas(without prior judicial approval.
Successive Presidents /tor more than a quarter of a century
have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees/- without
guidance from the Congress/or a definitive decision of this Court.
The issue is here for the first time. a:R:ii is iW!'8J!Ii81Rt "8eth

conspiracy to destroy by bombing /a CIA offic~ in Michigan.
government,
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operation, overheard conversations in which one of the defendants
participated.

The purpose of the tap was to obtain iMellisonce

~-i attempts of~~omestic

informationyw
L ith respect to,.

organization~/to attack and subvert the
The case does

government.

~t involve j and we did not consider,) the

authority of the government in national security casefhere
foreign powers/ or their agents are concerned.
We concludef, first that Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Act of 196;/does ~t apply to this type of surveillance.
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Executive Department.
The government clearly has a duty/to safeguard domestic
I

securityf/ Witd7he Fourth Amendmeny equally

-

clearl~protects

citizens against unreasonable electronic surveillance. In balancing

-

-

these basic values, ~e conclude that prior judicial approval is
.
'
I
necessar~ before employment of electronic surveillanc/:eliin
domestic security cases.
We think this can be accomplished
safeguards

der appropriate

hich will enable the government to discharge its

important dutf and at the same time protect the Fourth Amend-
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ment rights of our citizens. /" C. _.. __ : , ~
~ ~
The Chief Justice concurs in the result. Mr. Justice
Douglas has filed a separate concurring opinion.
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White, in a separate opinion, concurs in the judgment. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist did not participate ~ ~~
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UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

PoWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DouGLAS,
BRENNAN, MARsHALL, STEWART, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
DouGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BuRGER, C. J., concurred
in the result. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.

and is not a grant of authority to conduct warrantless national
security surveillances. Pp. 4-10.
2. The Fourth Amendment (which shields private speech from
unreasonable surveillance) requires prior judicial approval for the
type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case. Pp.
16-23,25.
(a) The Government's duty to safeguard domestic security
must be weighed against the potential danger that unreasonable
surveillances pose to individual privacy and free expression. Pp.
16-17.
(b) The freedoms of the Fourth Amendment cannot properly
be guaranteed if dome10tic security surveillances are conducted
solely within the discretion of the executive branch without the
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate. Pp. 18-20.
(c) Resort to appropriate warrant procedure would not
frustrate the legitimate purposes of domestic security searches.
Pp. 20-23.
444 F. 2d 651, affirmed.

u

2 The Attorney General's affidavit reads as follows:
"JoHN N. MITCHELL being duly sworn deposes and says:
"1. I am the Attorney General of the United States.
"2. This affidavit is submitted in connection with the Government's opposition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of
information concerning the overhearing of his conversations which
occurred during the course of electronic surveillances which the
Government contends were legal.
"3. The defendant Plamondon has participated in conversations
which were overheard by Government agents who were monitoring
wiretaps which were being employed to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure
of the Government. The records of the Department of Justice
reflect the installation of these wiretaps had been expressly approved by the Attorney General.
"4. Submitted with this affidavit is a sealed exhibit containing
the records of the intercepted conversations, a description of the
premises that were the subjects of the surveillances, and copies of

defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency
in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic
surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to
determine whether this information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the
Government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had participated. The
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government." 2 The affidavit, together with
the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit
for in camera inspection by the District Court.
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ernment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that
power." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Government relies on § 2511 (3) . It argues that
"in excepting national security surveillances from the
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the
President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28.
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance
of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as
that involved in this case.
We think the language of § 2511 (3) , as well as the
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. The relevant language is that:
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... "
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this,
as the section refers-among other things-to protection "against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned,
the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose.
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary elements of probable cause which the judge must find before issuing
an order authorizing an interception. Subsection ( 4)
sets forth the required contents of such an order.
Subsection (5)" sets strict time limits on an order. Proing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction
and shall state the applicant's authority to make such application.
Each appliclation shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer
making the application, and the officer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order
should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense
that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from
which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted,
(iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought
to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception
is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is
such that the authorization for interception should not automatically
terminate when the described type of communication has been first
obtained, a particular doocription of facts establishing probable cause
to believe that additional communications of the same type will
occur thereafter;
" (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all
previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept,
or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications
involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in
the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such
application; and
"(f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a
statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such
results."

6 The final sentence of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an
interception "by authority of the President in the exercise of the
foregoing powers may be received in evidence . .. only where such
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillance-pursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is
admissible.

vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest." In such a situation, emergency
surveillance may be conducted "if an application for
an order approving the interception is made ... within
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed
to be a violation of the Act.
In view of these and other interrelated provisions
delineating permissible interceptions of particular criminal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it
would have been incongruous for Congress to have
legislated with respect to the important and complex
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that
Congress only intended to make clear that the Act
simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances. 6
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate
floor:
"Mr. Holland .. .. The section [2511 (3)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively give any power. . . . We are not affirmatively
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of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of Government" (emphasis supplied).
There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign power. 8
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23:
"Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national
security .... "
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and seizure in question, and the way
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971).
8
Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitutional power of the
President" in two types of situations: (i) where necessary to protect against attack, other hostile acts or intelligence activities of a
"foreign power"; or (ii) where necessary to protect against the
overthrow of the Government or other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government. Although both
of the specified situations are sometimes referred to as "national
security" threats, the term "national security" is used only in the
first sentence of § 2511 (3) with respect to the activities of foreign
powers. This case involves only the second sentence of § 2511 (3),
with the threat emanating-according to the Attorney General's
affidavit-from "domestic organizations." Although we attempt no
precise definition, we use the term "domestic organization" in this
opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and
which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents
or agencies. No doubt there are cases where it will be difficult
to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities
directed against the Government of the United States where there
is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups or
organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this
is not such a case.
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Herbert Brownell, Attorney General under President
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both
in internal and international security matters on the
grounds that those acting against the Government
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue.
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received from
many sources and many nests. The participants
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic positions in government and
industry throughout the country." 11
Though the Government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage
against the Government exist in sufficent number to
justify investigative powers with respect to them. 1 2 The
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone make electronic surveillance an effective investigatory instrument
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administ rations and Attorneys General, but except for the
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance
has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18 ; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. Vol.
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971.
11
Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell
L. Q. 195, 202 (1954) . See also Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,
63 Yale L. J . 792 (1954) .
12
The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing incidents in the United States from January 1, 1971 , to July 1, 1971 ,
most of which involved Government related facilities. Respondents
dispute these statistics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as
well as bombings against nongovernmental facilities. The precise
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of
this case. Govt. Brief, p. 18 ; Resp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govt. Reply
Brief, p. 13.
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look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.
Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech
from unreasonable surveillance. Katz v. United States,
supra; Berger v. New York, supra; Silverman v. United
States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 'without any technical trespass under ... local property law.' "
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic
surveillance entails 14 necessitate the application of
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure
power," Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government--however benevolent and benign its motives--to view with suspicion those who most fervently
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be14 Though the total number of intercepts authorized by state
and federal judges pursuant to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act was 597 in 1970, each surveillance may
involve interception of hundreds of different conversations. The
average intercept in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations,
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117,
S 6477, May 10, 1971.
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electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be
better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion
and overthrow directed against it.
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition of
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950) .16 This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead
language. Rather it has been
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result in scores and
scores of cases in the courts all over this country.
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed'
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should
be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over16 This view has not been accepted.
In Chimel v. California, 395
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court considered the Government's contention
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard
without reference to the warrant clause. The Court concluded that
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under
such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this
area would approach the evaporation point." Chimel, supra, at
764-765.
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cute. Katz v. United States, supra, at 359-360
(DouGLAS, J., concurring). But those charged with this
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech. 17
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a
reasonable one which readily would have gained prior
judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end." Katz, supra,
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a
prior judicial judgment,'8 not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a
separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of Government. John
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the
Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943-944
(1963). The independent check upon executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by
"extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial review. 19
17 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 79-105 (1937).
18 We use the word "judicial" to connote the traditional Fourth
Amendment requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate.
19 The Government argues that domestic security wiretaps should
be upheld by courts in post surveillance review "unless it appear3
that the Attorney General's determination that the proposed sur-
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established to govern investigation of criminal activity,
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp.
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3.
The Government further insists that courts "as a
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor
the techniques necessary to determine whether there
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security." These security
problems, the Government contends, involve "a large
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4.
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requirement, the Government believes that disclosure to
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the
information involved in domestic security surveillances
"would create serious potential dangers to the national
security and to the lives of informants and agents ....
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering; requiring prior judicial authorization would
create a greater 'danger of leaks ... , because in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25.
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemption from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf
of the President and the national security in its domestic
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time
of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this
country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent
periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic
force to the Government's position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards.
The circumstances described do not justify complete
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IV

already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage
and treason, § 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may involve domestic as well as foreign security threats. Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a
magistrate or judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the
necessary clerical assistance.
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns
do not justify departure in this case from the customary
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although
some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society
to protect constitutional values. Nor do we think the
Government's domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any significant degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance
judicial review. By no means of least importance will
be the reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens
cannot occur.
We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this
case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion
as to, the issues which may be involved with respect
to activities of foreign powers or their agents. 20 Nor
20
See n. 8, supra. For the view that warrantless surveillance,
though impermissible in domestic security cases, may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved, see United States v. Smith,

't
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terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights
deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v.
11funicipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534--535 (1967):
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable
cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable--and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of law enforcement."
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that
the application and affidavit showing probable cause
need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to
domestic security cases; that the request for prior court
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any
member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia);
and that the time and reporting requirements need not
be so strict as those in § 2518.
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal
surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in
this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress
may prescribe.
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the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, concurring.
While I join in the opinion of the Court, I add these
words in support of it.
This is an important phase in the campaign of the
police and intelligence agencies to obtain exemptions
from the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
For, due to the clandestine nature of electronic eavesdropping, the need is acute for placing on the Government the heavy burden to show that "exigencies of the
situation [make its] course imperative." 1 Other abuses
such as the search incident to arrest, have been partly
deterred by the threat of damage actions against offending officers/ the risk of adverse publicity, or the
possibility of reform through the political process.
These latter safeguards, however, are ineffective against
lawless wiretapping and "bugging" of which their victims
are totally unaware. Moreover, even the risk of exclusion of tainted evidence would here appear to be
1 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 455; McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456; Chimel v. California, 395 U. S.
756; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51.
2 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U. S. 388.
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the most innocent and random caller who uses or
telephones into a tapped line can become a flagged
number in the Government's data bank. See Laird v.
Tatum, 1971 Term, No. 71-288.
Such gross invasions of privacy epitomize the very
evil to which the Warrant Clause was directed. This
Court has been the unfortunate witness of the hazards
of police intrusions which did not receive prior sanction by independent magistrates. For example, in Weeks
v. United States, supra; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643;
and Chimel v. California, supra, entire homes were ransacked pursuant to warrantless searches. Indeed, in
Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346, the entire contents of a cabin, totalling more than 800 items (such as
"1 Dish Rag") 5 were seized incident to an arrest of
its occupant and were taken to San Francisco for study
by FBI agents. In a similar case, Von Cleef v. New
Jersey, 395 U. S. 814, police, without a warrant, searched
an arrestee's house for three hours, eventually seizing
"several thousand articles, including books, magazines,
catalogues, mailing lists, private correspondence (both
open and unopened), photographs, drawings, and film."
/d., 815. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U. S. 385, federal agents "without a shadow of authority" raided the offices of one of the petitioners (the
proprietors of which had earlier been jailed) and "made
a clean sweep of all the books, papers, and documents
found there." Justice Holmes, for the Court, termed
this tactic an "outrage." I d., 385, 390, 391. In Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, state police seized more
than 2,000 items of literature, including the writings of
Mr. Justice Black, pursuant to a general search warrant
issued to inspect an alleged subversive's home.
Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and
Order," 67 Mich. L. Rev. 455 (1969).
5
For a complete itemization of the objects seized, see the Appendix
to Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346, 349.
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practices which also were endured by the colonists, 6 have
been recognized as the primary abuses which ensured the
Warrant Clause a prominent place in our Bill of Rights.
See J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court 28-48 (1966). N. Lasson, The History And Development Of The Fourth Amendment To The United
States Constitution 43-78 (1937); Note, Warrantless
Searches In Light of Chimel: A Return To The Original
Understanding, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 455, 460-476 (1969).
As illustrated by a flood of cases before us thi~ Term,
e. g., Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288; Gelbard v. United
States, No. 71-110; United States v. Egan, No. 71-263;
United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57; United States v.
Gravel, No. 71-1026; Kleindienst v. Mandel, No. 71-16;
6
"On this side of the Atlantic, the validity of general search warrants centered around the writs of assistance which were used by
customs officers for the detection of smuggled goods." N. Lasson, The
History And Development Of The Fourth Amendment To The
United States Constitution 51 (1937) . In February 1761, all writs
expired six months after the death of George II and Boston merchants petitioned the Superior Court in opposition to the granting
of any new writs. The merchants were represented by James Otis,
Jr., who later became a leader in the movement for independence.
"Otis completely electrified the large audience in the court room
with his denunciation of England's whole policy toward the Colonies
and with his argument against general warrants. John Adams, then
a young man less than twenty-six years of age and not yet admitted to the bar, was a spectator, and many years later described the
scene in these oftquoted words: 'I do -say in the most solemn manner,
that Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed into
this nation the breath of life.' He 'was a flame of fire! Every man
of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready
to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the
first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years,
namely in 1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself free.'"
N. Lasson, supra, 58-59.
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triotism and loyalty are questioned. 11 Senator Sam Ervin,
who has chaired hearings on military surveillance of civilian dissidents, warns that "it is not an exaggeration to talk
early 1920's. When fears began to focus on Communism, groups
thought to have some connection with the Communist Party were
heavily infiltrated. Infiltration of the Party itself was so intense
t.hat one former FBI agent estimated a ratio of one informant for
every 5.7 members in 1962. 1fore recently, attention has shifted
to militant antiwar and civil rigl:rts groups. In part because of
support for such groups among university students throughout the
country, informers seem to have become ubiquitous on campus.
Some insight into the scope of the current use of informers was
provided by the Media Papers, FBI documents stolen in early
1971 from a Bureau office in Media, Pennsylvania. The papers disclose FBI attempts to infiltrate a conference of war resisters at
Haverford College in August 1969, and a convention of the National
Association of Black Students in June 1970. They also reveal FBI
endeavors 'to recruit informers, ranging from bill collectors to apartment janitors, in an effort to develop constant surveillance in black
communities and New Left organizations' [N. Y. Times, April 8,
1971, at 22, col. 1]. In Philadelphia's black community, for instance, a whole range of buildings 'including offices of the Congress
of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
la nd] the Black Coalition' [ibid .] was singled out for surveillance
by building employees and other similar informers working for the
FBI." Kote, Developments In The Law-The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1272-1273
( 1972). For accounts of the impersonation of journalists by police,
FBI agents and soldiers in order to gain the confidences of dissidents,
see Press Freedoms Under Pressure, Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Government and the Press 29-34,
86-97 (1972). For the revelation of Army infiltration of political
organizations and spying on Senators, Governors and Congressmen,
see Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Subcom. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong,, 1st Sess. (1971) (discussed in
my dissent from the denial of certiorari in Williamson v. United
States, 405 U. S. - ) . Among the Media Papers was the suggestion
by the F. B. I. that investigation of dissidents be stepped up in
order to "enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and [to]
further serve to get the point across that there is an FBI agent
behind every mailbox." N. Y. Times, March 25, 1971 , at 33, col. 1.
n E. g., N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 8 (Senate peace
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liberties . . . which make the defense of the Nation
worth while."
The Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into the privacies of life. But
if that barrier were lowered now to permit suspected subversives' most intimate conversations to be pillaged then
why could not their abodes or mail be secretly searched
by the same authority? To defeat so terrifying a claim
of inherent power we need only stand by the enduring
values served by the Fourth Amendment: As we stated
last Term in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
455: "In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or
racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic
law and values that it represents may appear unrealistic
or 'extravagant' to some. But the values were those of
the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.
In times not altogether unlike our own they won ... a
right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions . . . . If times have changed, reducing every man's
scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial
world, the changes have made the values served by the
Fourth Amendment more, not less, important." We
have as much or more to fear from the erosion of our
sense of privacy and independence by the omnipresent
electronic ear of the Government as we do from the
likelihood that fomenters of domestic upheaval will
modify our form of governing. 14
14
I continue in my belief that it would be extremely difficult
to write a search warrant specifically naming the particular conversations to be seized and therefore any such attempt would
amount to a general warrant, the very abuse condemned by the
Fourth Amendment. As I said in Osborn v. United States, 385
U. S. 323, 353: "Such devices lay down a dragnet which indiscriminately sweeps in all conversations within its scope, without regard
to the nature of the conversations, or the participants. A warrant
authorizing such devices is no different from the general warrants
the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit."

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

V.

United States, Petitioner,
United States District Court
for the Eastern District
of Michigan, Southern
Division, et al.
[June 19, 1972]
MR. JuSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
This case arises out of a two-count indictment charging
conspiracy to injure and injury to Government property.
Count I charged Robert Plamondon and two codefendants with conspiring with a fourth person to injure
Government property with dynamite. Count II charged
Plamondon alone with dynamiting and injuring Government property in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The defendants
moved to compel the United States to disclose, among
other things, any logs and records of electronic surveillance directed at them, at unindicted coconspirators, or
at any premises of the defendants or coconspirators.
They also moved for a hearing to determine whether any
electronic surveillance disclosed had tainted the evidence
on which the grand jury indictment was based and which
the Government intended to use at trial. They asked
for dismissal of the indictment if such taint were determined to exist. Opposing the motion, the United
States submitted an affidavit of the Attorney General
of the United States disclosing that " [ t] he defendant Plamondon had participated in conversations which were
overheard by Government agents who were monitoring
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Court of Appeals. 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). That court
held that the Fourth Amendment barred warrantless
electronic surveillance of domestic organizations even ii
at the direction of the President. It agreed with the District Court that because the wiretaps involved were
therefore constitutionally infirm, the United States must
turn over to defendants the records of overheard conversations for the purpose of determining whether the
Government's evidence was tainted.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals but on the statutory ground urged by respondent Keith (Brief, p. 115)
without reaching or intimating any views with respect
to the constitutional issue decided by both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 212, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520,
forbids under pain of criminal penalties and civil actions
for damages any wiretapping or eavesdropping not undertaken in accordance with specified procedures for obtaining judicial warrants authorizing the surveillance. Section 2511 ( 1) establishes a general prohibition against
electronic eavesdropping "except as otherwise specifically
provided" in the statute. Later sections provide detailed
procedures for judicial authorization of official interceptions of oral comunications; when these procedures are
followed the interception is not subject to the prohibitions of§ 2511 (1). Section 2511 (2), however, specifies
other situations in which the general prohibitions of
§ 2511 (1) do not apply. In addition, § 2511 (3) provides that
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat.
1103; 47 U.S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual
or potentional attack or other hostile acts of a for-
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The defendants in the District Court moved for the
production of the logs of any electronic surveillance to
which they might have been subjected. The Government responded that conversations of Plamondon had
been intercepted but took the position that turnover of
surveillance records was not necessary because the interception complied with the law. Clearly, for the Government to prevail it was necessary to demonstrate first that
the interception involved was not subject to the statutory
requirement of judicial approval for wiretapping because
the surveillance was within the scope of § 2511 (3); and,
secondly, if the Act did not forbid the warrantless wiretap, that the surveillance was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
"The United States has made no claim in this case that
the statute may not constitutionally be applied to the
surveillance at issue here. 3 Nor has it denied that to
lance authorized by the President to uncover private or official
graft forbidden by federal statute, the interception would be illegal
under § 2511 (1) because it is not the type of presidential action
saved by the Act by the provision of § 2511 (3). As stated in the
text and footnote 3, the United States does not claim that Congress
is powerless to require warrants for surveillances which the President
otherwise would not be barred by the Fourth Amendment from
undertaking without a warrant.
3 See the Transcript of Oral Argument in this Court, pp. 13-14:
"Q. . . . I take it from your answer that Congress could forbid
the President from doing what you suggest he has the power to do
in this case?
"Mr. Mardian [Assistant Attorney General]: That issue is not
before this Court-"Q. Well, I would-my next question will suggest that it is.
Would you say, though, that Congress could forbid the President?
"Mr. Mardian: I think under the rule announced by this court
in Colony Catering that within certain limits the Congress could
severely restrict the power of the President in this area.
"Q. Well, let's assume Congress says, then, that the Attorney
General, or the President may authorize the Attorney General in
specific situations to carry out electronic surveillance if the Attorney
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ment in this case a measure deemed necessary by the
President to implement either the first or second branch
of the exception carved out by § 2511 (3) to the general
requirement of a warrant?
The answer, it seems to me, must turn on the affidavit
of the Attorney General offered by the United States in
opposition to defendants' motion to disclose surveillance
records. It is apparent that there is nothing whatsoever
in this affidavit suggesting that the surveillance was
undertaken within the first branch of the § 2511 (3)
exception, that is, to protect against foreign attack, to
gather foreign intelligence or to protect national security
information. The sole assertion was that the monitoring
at issue was employed to gather intelligence information
"deemed necessary to protect the Nation from attempts
of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government." App. 20.
Neither can I conclude from this characterization that
the wiretap employed here fell within the exception recognized by the second sentence of § 2511 (3); for it utterly
fails to assume responsibility for the judgment that Congress demanded: that the surveillance was necessary to
prevent overthrow by force or other unlawful means or
that there was any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government. The affidavit
speaks only of attempts to attack or subvert; it makes
no reference to force or unlawfulness; it articulates no
conclusion that the attempts involved any clear and
present danger to the existence or structure of the
Government.
The shortcomings of the affidavit when measured
against § 2511 (3) are patent. Indeed, the United States
in oral argument conceded no less. The specific inquiry
put to Government counsel was: "[D]o you think the
affidavit, standing alone, satisfies the Safe Streets Act?"

UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9

vinced the mere endorsement of the Attorney General
on the request for approval submitted to him must be
taken as the Attorney General's own opinion that the
wiretap was necessary to avert a clear and present
danger to the existence or structure of the Government
when in an affidavit later filed in court and specifically
characterizing the purposes of the interception and at
least impliedly the grounds for his prior approval, the
Attorney General said only that the tap was undertaken
to secure intelligence thought necessary to protect
against attempts to attack and subvert the structure of
Government. If the Attorney General's approval of
the interception is to be given a judicially cognizable
meaning different from the meaning he seems to have
ascribed to it in his affidavit filed in court, there obviously must be further proceedings in the District Court.
Moreover, I am reluctant myself to proceed in the
first instance to examine the in camera material and
either sustain or reject the surveillance as a necessary
measure to avert the dangers referred to in § 2511 (3).
What Congress excepted from the warrant requirement
was a surveillance which the President would a.ssume
responsibility for deeming an essential measure to protect against clear and present danger. No judge can
satisfy this congressional requirement.
Without the necessary threshold determination, the
interception is, in my opinion, contrary to the terms of
the statute and subject therefore to the prohibition contained in § 2515 against the use of the fruits of the
a request which asserted a need for a wiretap. We are told that
under present procedures the Attorney General makes an express
written finding of clear and present danger to the structure and existence of the Government before he authorizes a tap. Tr. of Oral
Arg., pp. 17-18.
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been no determination by the District Court that it
would be reasonable to use the fruits of the wiretap
against Plamondon or that it would be necessary to do
so to implement the purposes for which the tap was
authorized.
My own conclusion, again, is that as long as nonconstitutional, statutory grounds for excluding the evidence or its fruits have not been disposed of it is
improvident to reach the constitutional issue.
I would thus affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals unless the Court is prepared to reconsider the
necessity for an adversary, rather than an in camera,
hearing with respect to taint. If in camera proceedings
are sufficient and no taint is discerned by the judge,
this case is over, whatever the legality of the tap.

Would you draft a very brief letter to counsel along the
following lines:
~·

In light of the holding of the Court in No. 70-153, that the

electronic surveillance was impermissible, the motion for review
of the intercepted conversations is now moot.

June 20, 1972
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 71-239

F~rguson

v. United states

This case involves the same issues as those in United States
v. United States District Court, No. 70-153 and has been held pending
disposition in that case. Judge Ferguson has noted that the case
involved "a wholly domestic situation. " The CA 9 had vacated submission of the case pending decision in United States v. United states
District Court. Accordingly, I recommend that we remand the case
to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision
in No. 70-153.
l. F. P., Jr •

..

~.-.

,.

August 9, 1972

No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. Dist.Court
Dear Mr. Putze 1:
Thank you for your suggestions in U.S. v. U.S.
District Court. The only ones on which I wish to comment
are as follows:
On page 8, you are correct in stating that no
affidavit was filed as a sealed exhibit. The sentence should
therefore read "The logs of the surveillance were filed. . • "
I think it would be best to use the singular form
of surveillance throughout the opinion. This will necessitate
changes only on page 3. We will, of course, want to change
the verb form from "were" to "was" in the appropriate piac:ances.
On page 6, I wish to leave the indented portion in
its present form for purposes of emphasis. I recognize that
quotes of less than three lines are often "run in" but I do
not think it appropriate here .
• '"":J

·>

between •

On page 8, please leave the expression "colloquy
II

On pgge 18, I wish the sentence to remain "whom
the officer might conclude .
"
Thanks again.
Sincerely,

Putzel, jr.
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4.
Until 1967, the law with respect to electronic surveillance was
chaotic. In Olmstead v. United states, 277 u.s. 438 (1928), the Court
held, where the interception of a telephone line was accomplished without entry upon the premises, that it was not proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. Apparently in response to this ruling, the Congress enacted
§

605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. * Section 605,

covering both interstate and intrastate telephone calls applied to
private persons as well as federal and state law enforcement officers. **
But in view of the ambiguous wording of the statute, it was construed
by the Department of Justice as allowing interception so long as no
disclosure was made outside of the Department of the fruits of the
interception. Federal officers therefore felt free, both under the statute
and Olmstead, to engage in wiretapping although the results could not
be used in the federal courts.***

-

47 u.s. c. §605, 11 (1958), prohibiting the
interception and public divulgence of the coo.tents of any wire communication or its interception and use for personal benefit.

-:r*4'"8r-st~at~""'".-=1r'21"11rox-3"'J"'l(1..-,c9:"&'3"7\4),

**See Nardone v. -U.s., 302 u.s. 379 (1937); Benati v. United states,
355 u.s. 96 (1957):-***See Nardone v. u.S., 302 u.s. 379 (1937); Nardone v. u.s., 308
u.s. 338 (1938). See, !: I· , testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Committee on
the Judiciary, U.s. Senate, 89th Cong. 2d session 34 (1966).

5.
The confusion at the federal level was compounded by that
among the states. Most of them made no effort to regulate •
surveillance of any kind; others had a variety of statutes of dubvious
meaning and merit.*

In addition to the lack of harmony among

state laws, and between the federal statute and such state laws as
did exist, there was doubt as to the degree .._ of supremacy of
§

605, as to who had standing to complain, and- for a time -as

to whether the 1B fruits of an interception must be suppressed in
state as well as federal courts.
Not untU 1942 did a ''bugging" case reach the Court. In
Goldman v. United states, 316 u.s. 129, it was held that a

an office involved no physical trespass and therefore did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. **
**Bee also Oii Lee v. United states, 343 U.S. 747 ~ (1953).

*The most notable exception to the inadequacy of state law was New
York, where a court order system had been employed with notable
success for many years. "Wiretapping was the mainstay of the
New York attack against organized crime until federal court decisions
intervened." The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 201
(1967). The New York iDda statute was held invalid as being overly
broa.d,x and violative of 4th Amendment BNybta rights in Burger v.
New York, 388 U.s. 41 (1967).

6.
In Silverman v. United states, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) the Court

found a Fourth Amendment violation wle re "the eavesdropping was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises occupied by petitioners. And in Wong Sun v. United
states, 371

u.s. 471 (1963), the Court for the first time specifically

held that the Fourth Amendment protects "against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure
of papers and effects". •
It was this state of the law, both statutory and that derived

from the cases, that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration found to be "intolerable":
"It serves the interest XIS aik neither of privacy
nor of law enforcement. One way or the other, the
present cmtroversy with respect to electronic
surveillance must be resolved. "

*Wong Sun v. United states, 371 u.S. at 485. The exclusionary
rUle was applied where the evidence was obtained through "an
unlawful invasion" of a private area, as contrasted with the absence
of physical invasion in Goldman. Cf. Lopes v. United states, 373
u.s. 427 (1963)
**The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra, 203.

7.
A long step toward clarification was taken a few months later
in Katz v. United States, 389

u.s.

347 (1967). * Although foreshadowed

by the decision in Burger, the Court expressly held in Katz that "the
underpinning of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the DD: trespass doctrine there enunciated
can no lcnger be regarded as controlling." 389

u.s.

at 353. The

interception in question has been accomplished in a public telephone
booth in an interstate gambling:x:t}O&a4 IM•c investigation.

Kif.?

*Prior to
the Court in Bur&fr v. New Yor\ supra, had held
that the New ork :ifx statute vio ed the Fourth mendment.

8.

standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely disclaims
any intention to "limit the constitutional power of the President."
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances
is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney General to make

application to a federal judge when surveillance may provide
evidence of certain offenses. These offenses are described with
meticulous care and specificity.
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure to
be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection (1) thereof

requires application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for a
prior order of approval, and states in detail the information
5

required in such application.

Subsecution (3) prescribes

the necessary elements of probable cause which the judge must
find before issuing an order authorizing an interception.
Subsection (4) sets forth the required contents of such aa order.
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Provision is made
in Subsection (7) for "an emergency situation" found to exist by the

11.
One could hardly expect a clearer expression of congressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates
that ncthing in

§

2511(3) was intended to e?CJ?!nd or to contract or

to define whatever prestdenttal surveillance powers existed in
matters affecting the national security. It we could accept the
Government's characterization oA § 2511(3) as a congressionally
prescribed exception to the general requirement of a warrant,
it would be necessary to consider the question of whether the

surveillance in this ease came within the exception. But
viewing

§

2511(3) as a eoogressiooal disclaimer and e:xpresstoo

·.
of neutrality, we hold that the statute is not the measure of
the executive authority asserted in this ease. Rather, we must
look to the constitutional powers of the President.

22.

United states, npra, at 356. The further requirement of
"probable cause" instructs the magistrate that baseless searches
shall not proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security survetll_ances may be conducted
solely within the dlseretton of the

executt~ branch.

The Fourth

Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of
government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their

*

duty and respmstbtlity is to enforce the laws, to investigate and
to prosecute. Katz v. United states, supra, at 359-60 {Douglas, J.,
c mcurrlng). But those charged with this investigative and
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
cmstltuttonally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The
historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts,
is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook p<tential
18

invasions of privacy and protected speech.

28.

ccmstitutional basis of the President's domestic security role,
but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with
the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold that this requires
an appropriate prior warrant procedure.
We cannot accept the government's argument that internal
security matters are too subtle and complex for juc:Hcial evaluation.
Courts regularly deal with the moiBt complex issues of our society.
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in
domestic security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that
domestic security surveillance involves different considerations
from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the threat ts too
subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to
convey its significance to a court, one may question whether
there is probable cause d1x for surveillance.
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture
the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The

4.
6. The final sentence of

§

2511{3) states that the cootents

of an interception "by authority of the President in the exercise
of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence • • • only

where such interception was reasonable. • • " This sentence seems
intended to assure that when the President conducts lawful
surveillance - pursuant to whatever power he may possess .. the
evidence is admissible. It would be nonsensical to suggest that
the President has power to gather intelligence information and
then to deny its use in court.
7. Cong. Rec. Vol. 114

pt,

11, p. 14751, May 23,

1968. Senator McClellan was the sponsor of the bUl. The
above exchange constitutes the ooly time that S 2511(3) was
expressly debated on the Senate or House floor. The Report of
the Senate Judiciary Committee is not so explicit as the exchange
on the floor, but it nonetheless recognizes that under

§

2511(3)

the national security power of the President - whatever it may be "is not to be deemed disturbed."
2d Sess. 94 (1968).

s.

Rept. No. 1097, 90th Coog.,

5.
8. We construe a domestic orga.ni21.tlon to mean an
organization composed of citizens or residents of the United
States without significant cCIUlection or collaboration with a
foreign power or its agencies. No doubt there are cases where
there is collaboration between domestic groups and agencies
of foreign powers where the listinction between "domestic" and

"foreign" unlawful activities directed against the government
wUl be difficult to draw. But this is not such a case.
9. Franks. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County
for over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant
to court-order, as ''the single most valuable weapon in law
enforcement's fight against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol.
11'7, 864'76, May 10, 1971. The "Crime" Commission appointed

by President Johnsoo noted that "the great majority of law
enforcement officials believe that the evidence necessary to
bring ctiminal sanctions to bear consistently on the higher
echelons of organized crime wUl not be obtained without the

I
I

I

I

6.

aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain these
techniques are indispensable to develop adequate strategic
intelligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific
investigations, to develop witnesses, to corroborate their
testimony, and to serve as substitutes for them -each a necessary
step in the evidence -gathering process in organized crime investtgattons and prosecutions. Report by the President's Commiss1Cil
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society, p. 201 (1967).
10. In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised

.
President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in eases
vitally affecting the dometltic security. " President Roosevelt had
1n May 1940

authorized Attomey General Jackson to utilize

wiretapping 1n matters "involving the defense of the nation, " but
it is questionable whether this language was meant to apply to

solely domestic subversion. The nature and extent of wiretapping
apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys

7.
General, but except for the sharp curtailment under Attorney
General Ramsey Clark in the latter years of the Johnson
administration, electronic surveillance has been used both a gatnst
organized crime and in domestic security cases at least since the
1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18;

Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. Vol. 117,

s. 6476-7,

May 10, 1971.

11. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39

Cornell L. Q. 195, 202 (1954). See also Rogers, The Case For
Wire TapPing, 63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).
12. The government asserts that there were 1562 bombing

incidents in the United states from January 1, 1970 to July 1, \
'·

1971, most of which involved government related facilities.

\

\

Respondents dispute these statistics as incorporating many
frivilous incidents as well as bombings against non-governmental
facilities. The precise level of this activity, however, is not
relevant to the disposition of this case. Gov't. Brief, p. 18;
Resp. Brief, p. 26-29; Gov't Reply Brief, p. 13.

8.

13. Professor Alan Westin has authored an important
book on the likely course of future conflict between the value of
privacy and the "new technology" of law enforcement. Much
of the book details techniques of physical and electronic

surveillance and such possible threats to perscmal privacy as \
\

•\

1

psychological and perscmaltty testing and electronic information ,, \
\
storage and retrieval. Many of the contemporary threats to

\

privacy do not, of course, emanate directly from the pressures
of crime controL

(196'1).
14. Though the number of warrantless 'national security'
telephone surveillances operated by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has decreased over the past ten years, :tUI:di;
1960 - '18; 1965 - 44; 1970 - 36; the average surveillance involves
interception of hundreds of different conversations. In non-national
security wiretaps, for which figures are available, the average
I

I

Intercept in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 cmversations, of \

\
,I

I
I

I

.I

l

\

~

9.
which 295 or 45 percent were incriminating. Gov't. Brief, p. 27;
Cong. Rec. VoL 117, S6477, May 10, 1971. It is important to
point out, however, that the numbers of warrantless surveillances
mentioned above reflect those in operation by the FBI at a particular
date, generally that of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's testimony.
The total number of telephone surveillances for the year is
substantially larger than the number in use on a particular day.
ACLU, Amici Brief, 16-21; Gov't. Reply Brief, pp. 13-14.
15. J. Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, 264-5 (1966).
16. Cong. Rec. VoL 114, pt, 11, p. 14750, May 23,
1968. The subsequent assurances, quoted in section 1 of the
opinion, that

§

2511(3) implied no statutory grant, contraction,

or definition of presidential power eased the Senator's misgivings.
17. This view has largely been overruled. In Jlh.ii&a
Chimel v. California, 395 U.s. 752, (1969), the Court considered

10.

the government's contention that the search be judged on a general
"reasonableness" standard without reference to the warrant clause.
The Court concluded that argument was "founded on Uttle more
than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts
of pollee conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth
\
\

Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analys,ts, Fou~
Amendment protection ta this area would approach the

-.

,, ,

.......

.

'

evaporation point." Chimel, supra, at 764-5.
18. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
79-105 (1937).
19. The government aregues that domestic security wiretaps

should be upheld by courts in post-surveillance review "unless it
\ \

appears that the Attorney General's determinatloo that the

' 1\

I

\

l

'\
\
I'
I \

proposed surveillance relates to a national security matter is

'

1\

arbitrary and capricious, 1. e., that it constitutes a clear abus1e

I

\

of the broad discretion that the Attorney General has to obtain '

\

\

\

\\

\

11.

all Information that will be helpful to the President in protecting
the government . • • • " against the various unlawful acts in
§

2511(3).

Gov't. Brief, p. 22. This standard. however, would

reduce the judicial role commanded by the Fourth Amendment
to be a virtual nullity.
20. See n. 8 supra.

At least one federal judge has

suggested that "it might very well be that warrantless surveillance
.•• , while uncmstituttonalin the domestic situation, would be
be constitutional in the area o1 foreign affairs.

This possible

distinction is largely due to the President's long-recognized,
inherent power with respect to foreign relations. " United states
v. Smith, _ _ F. Supp.

- - ( 1971 ).

Commentaries to

standards for electronic surveillance which were eventually
adopted by the House of Delegates o1 the American Bar Association
noted that "limitations which are proper when the internal affairs
of the nation are solely involved become arttftctal when international

realities are cmsidered." American Bar Association Project

12.
on Minimum standards of Criminal Justice, standards Relating
to Electronic Surveillance, Tentative Draft, p. 121 (1968). We,
:dD of course, intimate no views whatsoever on this matter in

the instant case.
21. This inquiry as to relevance is required by Wong Sun v.

-

\

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963): " ••• the more Ill& a~,
question . . • is 'whether, granting the establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint. '" See also Nardone v. United states, 308 U. s.
338, 341 {1939).

22. The Court in Alderman limited disclosure to the
\

transcripts of a defendant's own conversation and of those whi~\h
I

\

took place em his premises. Alderman at 184. The latter typ~3

1

of conversation is not involved In this case. See also the

limitations on disclosure rights In Tagliaretti v. United States,
394 U.S. 316 (1969) which we affirm.

I

'\
I

\
I

13.
23. Alderman at 181. The government does, of course,
have the option to dismiss some prosecutions "in deference to
national security or third party interests. But this is a choice
the Government concededly faces with respect to material which
tt has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge

would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against
the defendant. " Id. at 184.

6.

The Government relies on

§

2511(3). It argues that "in

excepting national security surveillances from the Act's warrant
requirement Congress recognized the President's authority to
cooduct such survelllances without prior judicial approval"
( Govt. brief p. 7, 28 ). The section thus is viewed as a 'Zec:lr.lyc

"recognition" or affirmance of the constitutional authority of the
President to conduct such warrantless surveillances.
We think the language of

§

2511(3), as well as the

legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation.
The relevant language 1s that:
''Nothing contained in this chapter ••• shall limit
the coostltutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect"
against the dangers specified. At most, this 1s an implicit
recognition that the President does have certain powers in the
areas specified. Few would doubt this, as the Section refers among other things - to protection "against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power. " But so far as

7.
the use of the President's electroolc surveillance power is coocerned, the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511{3) certainly confers no power, as the language
is wholly inappropriate for such purpose. It merely provides that
the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such power as
the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress
simply left presidential powers where it found them. This view is
reinforeed by the general coo.text of Title

m.

Section 2511{1)

broadly prohibits the use of electronic surveillance "except as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter. " Subsectioo 2
thereof contains four specific exceptions. In each of the specified
exceptions, the statutory language is as follows:
"It has not been unlawful . • • to iuDat intercept"
the communication.
Subsection {3), here involved, 1s to be contrasted with
the exceptions set forth in the preceding subsection. Rather
than stating that warrantless presidential uses of electronic
surveillance "shall not be unlawful" and thus employing the

8.

standard language of exception, subsection (S) merely disclaims
any intention to "limit the constitutional power of the President."
The express grant of authority to intercept 1s found 1n
§

2516, which authorizes the Attorney General to make application

to a federal judge when sureeillance may provide evidence of certain
offenses. These offenses are described with meticulous care and
specificity.
Where the Act authorizes electronic surveillance, the
procedure to be followed is specified in

§

2518. Section t 2518(1)

requires application to a judge of competent jurisdictiDn for an
order approving the surveillance, and specifies in detaU the
information required in such application. Section 2518 (S)
prescribes the necessary elements of probable cause which the
judge must find before issuing an order authorizing an interception.
Section 2518 (4) sets forth the required cmtents of such an order.
Section 2518( 5) sets strict time limits. Provision is made in
§

2518( 7) for "an emergency situation" found to exist by a the

9.
Attorney General (or by the principal prosecuting attorney of
a state) ''With respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the
national security interest. " In such a situation, emergency
surveillance may be conducted "if an application for an order
approving the interception is made • • • within 48 hours. " If
such an order is not obtained, or the application therefor is
denied, the interception is deemed to be a violation of the Act.
In view of these and other comprehensive and carefully

interrelated provisions delineating permissible interceptions
of particular criminal activity upon meticulously specified

conditions, it would have been incongruous for Congress to have
legislated with respect to the important and complex area of
national security in a single brief and nebulous Jii*'I*P paragraph.
This would not comport with the sensitivity of the problem
involved or with the

.. <fl

4• : ~ t II

t

1•

• . .. f t • .

extraordinary care Congress

exercised in drafting other sections of the Act. We therefore think
the coo.clusion inescapable that there was no congressional

10.

intention to do more than make it clear that the Act simply did
not relate to national security surveillances. The legislative
history of

§

2511(3) supports this interpretation. Most relevant

in this regard is the colloquy between Senators Hart, Holland
and McClellan on the Senate floor:
"Mr. Holland •.• The section [2511(c)] from
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively
give any power•••• We are nd:affimatively
conferring any&ower u\iioo. the President. We are
simply saylrig at noth g hereii shallltmit such
power as the President has under the Constitution.
. • • We certainly do not grant him a thing.
There is nothing affirmative in this statement.
Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it
understood that we are not trying to take anything
away from him.
Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct.
Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention
here to expand by this language a constitutional power.
Clearly we could not do so.
Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we
could not do so.
Mr. Hart •••• However, we are agreed that
this language should not be regarded as intending
to grant any authority, including authority to put a
bug on, that the President does not have now.
In addition, Mr. President, as I think our exchantfi makes clear, nothing in Section 2511(3)
even aempts to define the limits Of the President's
aational security power under present law, which
I have ..always found extremely vague•••• Section
2511(3) merely says that if the President has such
a power'5 then its exercise is in no way affected by
title m
(emplla.sis supplied)

11.
One could hardly expect a clearer expression of congressional
neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates that nothing in
§

2511(3) attempts to e~d or to contract or to define whatever

presidential surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the
national security. The reasons for this restraint are understandable.
Quite apart from the intrinsic difficulty of legislation in this area
there were strongly held divergent views with respect to the
6

surveillance of domestic organizations, and Congress may have
been reluctant to address an area so fraught with political emotion.
WJomx Were we to accept the Government's and my brother

White's characterization of

§

2511(3) as a congressionally

recognized exception to the general requirement of a warrant,
it might be necessary to consider the question of whether the

surveillance in this case fitted within it. But viewing

§

2511(3)

as a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality we
cannot utilize it as a ground for decision. We do not lightly brush
aside the wise admonition that courts should avoid constitutional

12.
determinations except where necessary to decide the case before
them. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 279 U. S. 288,
346-7 (1936) (concurring opinion). But we cannot accept a
statutory ground of decision where Congress intended no statutory
instruction. Clearly Ashwander does not teach the avoidance
of constitutional issues which squarely front this Court.

Section

2511( 3) says only that nothing in the Act shall ''be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President" in the surveUlance
of foreign and domestic attack and subversion.

Given a proper

controversy before us, the scope of that constitutional power is
for this Court to determine.

11.

u.
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited
nature of the question before the Court. This ease raises no
constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as specifically
authorized by Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Aet of 1968. Nor is there any question or doutt as to
the necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes
unrelated to the national security interest, Katz v. United states,
389

u.S.

347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388

U.s.

41 (1967).

Further, the instant ease requires no judgment on the scope of
the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities
of foreign powers, within or without this country. The Attorney
General's affidavit in this ease ·s tates that the surveillances
were "deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing .
- i
structure of government" (emphasis supplied). There is no

evidence of any involvement, directly or indirectly, of a
7

foreign power.

12.

Our present inquiry, though important, ls therefore a
narrow one. It addresses a question left open by Katz, suprp.,
p. 358, n. 23:

Whether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving
the national security •..
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth
Amendment inquiry into the "reasmableness" of the search and
seizure in question, and the way in which that "reasonableness"
derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant
clause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-484
\

(1971).

We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the
United States has the fundamental duty, under our Constitution,
Art.

n Section 1,

''to preserve, protect, and defend the

Constitution of the United states." Implicit in that duty is the
power to protect our government against those who would subvert
or ll1ibEamd: overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge

13.

of this duty, the President -through the Attorney General -may
find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain
intelligence information on the plans of those who contemplate
unlawful acts against the government. Enactment of Title

m

reflects Congressional recognition of the importance of such
8

surveillance in combatting various types of crime; and its
use in internal security cases has been more or less continuously
sanctioned by' various Presidents and Attorneys General since
.

9

July 1946.

Herbert Brownell, Attorney General under President

Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both in
\

\

internal and international security matters oo the grounds that
those acting against the government
turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue.
The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information reqeived
from many sources and many nests. The participants
in the c oospiracy are often dispersed and stationed
in various strategic positions in ftfvernment and
industry throughout the country.
Though the government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage against

14.
11
the government exist in sufficient number to justify
investigative powers with respect to them. The covertness
and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the government and the necessary dependency of conspirators upon the
telephone make electronic surveillance an essential investigatory
instrument in certain circumstances. The marked acceleratiop.
in technological developments and sophistication in their use
have resulted in new techniques for the planning, commission
and concealment of criminal activities. It would be irrational
and contrary to the public interest for government to deny to
itself the employment of those very techniques which are
employed against the government and its law ltbiding citizens.
It is well to remember that "the most basic function of
any government is to provide for the security of the individual
and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 839
White J., dissenting (1966). And unless government safeguards

15.
its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its
people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights
and liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1940):
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the :£\»wf•MxtM
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses.
But a recognition d: of these elementary truths does not
make the employment by gOvernment of electronic surveillance
a welc orne development - even when employed with restraint
and under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a
deep ... seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability
will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law abiding
12
citizens.

We look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this

privacy. Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,
its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable
surveillance. Katz v. United States, supra; Berger v. New Yo!:!g

16.
!u2ra; Silverman v. United States, 365 u.S. 505 (1961). Our
decision in Katz refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into
instances of actull physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as
well to the recording of oral statements 'without any technical
trespass under . . . local property law.'" Katz, supra, at 353.
That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which
13
electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a
convergence of First and Fourth ft.mendment values not present
in cases of "ordinary'crime.

Though the investigative duty

of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.
"Historically, the struggle for freedom of speech and press in
England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search

17.
and seizure power," Marcus v. Search Warrant 2 367 U.S. 717,
History abundantly documents the tendency of government ...
however benevolent and benign its motives - to view with suspicion
those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment
protections become the more necessary when the targets of
official surveillance may be those "suspected of unorthodoxy

14
in matters of political belief and conscience."
to political dissent is acute

whe~e

The danger

the government attempts

to act mder so vague a concept as the power to protect
"domestic

BIDIJDC:

security· " Given the difficulty of defining the

domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to

14-1/2
protect that interest becomes apparent.
addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on

Senator hart
§

2511(3):

As I read it ... and this is my fear - we are
saying that the President, on his motion, could
declare -name your favorite poison -draft
dodgers, Black Muslims, tjle Ku Klux Klan, or
civil rights activists to 'bEV'Clear and present
danger' to thf structure or existence of the
Government. 5

18.

The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of
unauthorized official eavesdropping chill vigorous citizen dissent
and discussion of government action in private conversation. For
private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential
to our free society.

m.
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms,
our task is to examine and balance the basic values at stake in
this case: the duty of government to protect the domestic
security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable
surveillancd to individual privacy and free expression. If the
legitimate need of government to safeguard domestic security
requires the use of electronic suneillance, the question is
whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression
may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant

19.
requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of government to
protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it.
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of "unreasonable
searches and seizures," the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at
least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant clause.
Some have argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search
was reasonable, " United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66
(1950). This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the
Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is
not dead language. Rather it has been
a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result In scores and scores
of cases in the courts aDD. over this country. It is not
an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against
the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be,
an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to
check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any
system of law enforcement. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supSa, at 491. See also UnitedStates
v. Rabinowitz,- 39 U. S. 57, 68 (1950)( Frankfurter
J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U. S.
582, 604 (Frankfurter J. , dissenting).

20.
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that common
law principles prohibited warrants that ordered the arrest otx.E
unnamed individuals whom the officer might conclude were guilty
of seditious libel. "It is not fit, " said Mansfield, "that the
receiving or judging of the information ought to be left to the
discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and
..

should give certain directions to the officer. " Leach v. Three

'

of the King's Messengers, How. st. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765).
Lord Mansfield's im: formulation touches the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where practical, a
governmental search and seizure should represent both the
efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and
the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is
sufficient to justify invasion of a man's private premises or
conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its
issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate"

~

CoolidS'! v. New Hampshire, supra, at 453; llfa:tdx Katz v.

\

21.

United

~ates,

supra, at 356. The further requirement of

"probable cause" instructs the magistrate that baseless searches
shall not proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed for domestic security surveillances within the sole
discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does
not contemplate the President and AttornJy General as neutral
and disinterested magistrates in this instance. Their proper
mission is to uncover threats to the domestic security. Katz
v. United States 2 supra, at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Those charged with investigation and possible prosecution should
not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means to pursue their tasks. The historical judgment, which
the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive
discretion may yield too readily to the pressures for incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
16
speech.

29.
It may well be that, in the instant case, the government's

surveillance of Plamondon!B conversations was a reasonable one
which would have readily gained prior judicial approval. But
this Court ''has never sustained a search upon the sole ground
that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least
intrusive means consistent with that end." Katz, supra, at
356-7. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior mjudicial
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably
exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through
a separation of powers and division of functions among the
different branches and levels of government. John M. Harlan,
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance,
49 A. B. A. J. 943-44 (1963). The judicial check upon executive
discretion is not satisfied, as the government argues, by
17
"extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial review.

Indeed,

23.
post-surveillance review would never reach the surveillances
18
which failed to result in prosecutions.

Prior z:Jravreview by

a neutral and detached magistrate is necessary to effectuate
Fifth Amendment rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
It is true that there have been some exceptions to the

warrant requirement. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); MaDonald v. United
states, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Carroll v. United states, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). But those exceptions are few in number and carefully
delineated, Katz, supra, at 357; in general they serve the
legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to protect their
own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the
principle that the "pollee must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v.
California:, supra, at 762.

24.

The government agrues that the special circumstances
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate a
further exception to the warrant requirement. It is urged that
the requirement of prior judicial review would obstruct the
President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect
domestic security. We are told further that these surveillances
are directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of
intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and are not an
attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions.
It is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to
trtlditional warrant requirements which were established to
govern investigation of criminal activity, not on-going intelligence

19
gathering.
The government further insists that courts "as a practical
matter would have neither the knowledge nor the techniques
necessary to determine whether there was probable cause to
believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national

25.

security. " These

BD

security problems, the government points

out, involve "a large number of complex and subtle factors"
20

beyond the competence of courts to evaluate.
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant

requiremen~

the government believes that disclosure to a magistrate of all or
/en a significant portion of the Information involved in domestic

j security surveillances "would create serious potential dangers
I

to the national security and to the lieves of informants and agents
. . . Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering;
requiring prior judicial authorization would create a greater danger
of leaks • . . , because in addition to the judge, you have the

clerk, the stenographer and some other official like a law assistant

21
or bailiff who may be apprised of the nature of the surveillance. "
These cmtentions in behalf of a complete exemption from
'

~1; warrant requirement,
i

/

/+d the national security in its domestic implications, merit

:1

I

I

I

I

I

I

(

'

I

I

/

when urged on behalf of the President

'
I

I

I
I

;'

,1

.I
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the most careful consideration. We certainly do not reject them
lightly, especially at a time when civil disorders are more
pxnaiaat prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our

history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic force to the government's
position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards.
The circumstances described do not justify

complete~plax

exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial
scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal
investigation or on-going intelligence gathering, risks infringe ..
ment of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security
surveillances are especially BIIJlJdd!v sensitive because of the
inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering,
and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee
political dissent. We recognize as we have before, the

27.

cOnstitutional nature of the President's comestic security role,
but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with
the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold that this requires
an appropriate prior warrant procedure.
We cannot accept the government's view that internal
security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation.
Courts regularly deal with the most complex issues of our society.
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in
domestic security cases. Certainly, courts can recognize that
domestic security surveillance involves different considerations
from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the threat is too
subtle or complex for our ablest law enforcement officers to
convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there
is probable cause for surveillance.
Nor, do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture
the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The

28.

investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting
liJIR1dllx

senstivie information to judicial dficers who have

respected the confidentialities involved. Judges may be counted

.. ·,

upon to be especially conscious of security requirements in
national security cases. Title

m of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act already has imposed this responsibility
on the judiciary in connection with such crimes as espionage,
sabotage and treason,

~

§

2516(1)(a)(c), each of

which may involve domestic as well as foreign security threats.
Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or adversary
proceedings: it is

an~

parte request before a magistrate or

judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial
personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative
measures, possible to the point of allowing the government itself
to provide the necessary clerical assistance.
Thus, we conclude that the government's concerns do
not justify departure in this case from the Fourth Amendment

··-

29.
m: commandment of judicial approval prior to initiation of a

search or surveillance. Although some added burden will be
imposed upon the Attorney General, this type of burden is
justified in a free society to protect constitutional values. Nor
do we think the government's domestic surveillance powers will
be

impaired to any significant degree. A o prior warrant

establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance
judicial review. By no means of least importance, will be the
reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping cannot occur.
IV.

We emphasize before concluding this opinion, the scope
of this decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves mly
the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed
the more difficult issues which may be involved with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents. Nor do we hold

I

I

1

I'

I
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that the standards and procedures of Title

m are necessarily

applicable. We recognize that domestic security surveillance
from the surveillance
may involve different policy and practical consideration/of
"ordinary crime. " The gathering of security intelligence is
often long range and involves the interrelation of va~us sources
and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance
against many types of crime specified in Title

m.

o~ rations

Often, too,

the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention
of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the

government!~:!

preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus,
the xxx focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than
that directed against more conventional types of crime.
Given these potential distinctions between routine criminal
surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress
may wish to consider somewhat different protective standards for
the latter than those already prescribed for specified crimes

31.

in Title III. Different standards may still be compatible with
the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation
to the legitimate need of government for intelligence information
and the prctected rights of our citizens. For the warrant
application may vary according to the governmental interest
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.
As we said in Camara:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant to search be obtained, "probable
Baase cause" is the standard by which a particular
decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable - and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant for that inspection -the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of law enforcement. Camara, supra,
at 534-5.
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the
application and affidavit showing probable cause need not be as
particularized as in cases of specified crimes; that the request
for prior court authorization could, in:as.ecwctbck sensitive cases,
be made to any member of a specially designated court

<!· !·

the District Court ot Court of Appeals for the District of

32.

Columbia); and that the time or reporting requirements need not
be so strict as those in § 2518.

The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to guide
the congressional judgment but rather to delineate the present
to
scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt Ia detail the precise

\

standards for "domestic security" warrants any more than our
decision in Katz sought to set the refined requirements for the
specified criminal surveillances which now constitute Title

m.

We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required
for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this
case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such
reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe.

34.

v.

was unlawful, because coo.ducted without prior judicial approval,
the final question pertains to the procedures the District Court
must follow in determining the relevance of the impermissible

21
interception to the Government's case.

In Alderman v. United
I>

states, 314 U.S. 165 (1969), this Court held that once a
surveillance had been found to be unlawful, disclosure to an
accused of his monitored c oo.versations was required to safeguard
his opportunity for effective assertion of Fourth Amendment
rights. The purpose of this disclosure was to insure the
scrutiny of the impermissibility intercepted coo.versat ions
"which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands. "
Alderman, suprp., at 184. Scrutiny by the accused himself,
not solely by the trial judge, was held necessary to detect what
the Government may have utilized in buildings its case:

- 35.

An apparently innocent phrase a chance remark,
a reference to what appears to be a neutral person
or revent, the identity of a caller or the individual
on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner
of speaking or using words may have special
significance to one who lmows the more intimate
facts of an accused's life. And yet that information
may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to
one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances.
Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in
our view the task is too complex, and the margin for
error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera
judgment of the trial court to identify those records
which might have contributed to the Governmenf;fs
case. Alderman at 182.
We have evaluated, as did the Court in Alderman, those
considerations of security and confidentiality which underlie
the government's request to have the relevance of :laiJpet:xicJa&
impermissibly overheard conversations first reviewed in camera
by the trial judge. We recognize the importance of portecting
sensitive national security information, ever after prosectuion
has commenced.

The disclosure to a defendant must be limited
22

to the transcript of his own wrongly intercepted conversations.
The availability of a strict protective order under Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 16(e) and the trial judge's discretion to limit
the number of persons to whom the transcript is exposed should

36.

further reduce the security risks involved. But the legitimate
need for confidentiality of national security information must
still accommodate itself to neighboring constitutional principles.
The dictates of a fair trial have often required a state to divulge
information which might otherwise remain undisclosed. In
Alderman, the government itself acknowledged that relevant
surveillance records must be disclosed to a defendant "even
though attended by potential danger to the xep•ll reputation of

23
third parties or to the national security."
Alderman's ctllcat disclosure requirements can henceforth
be avoided by ••II••..., undertaking surveillances with proper

prior judicial approval. In the instant case, however, Alderman's
ace ommodatton of the security interests of government and the
opportunity for effective exercise of Fourth Amendmetlt rights
must control.

We therefore affirm the lower courts' orders

for disclosure to defendant Plamondon of tbc his monitored
c ooversations.
Mfirmed.

